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More women entering politics has led to questions regarding so-called ‘women’s issues’ 
and whether female representatives make a difference in reference to these issues. This 
thesis moves beyond the question of whether women represent women and instead, focuses 
on the representation process as a whole. This approach widens the scope beyond seeing 
women as a homogenous group, with uniform interests and unvarying political 
motivations. To do so, this thesis evaluates the substantive representation of women in 
England and Wales. Specifically, this thesis assesses four pieces of domestic violence 
legislation: The Crime and Security Act 2010, the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, the 
Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, and the Serious Crime Act 2015. This thesis 
employs a critical path framework and uses this framework to research the impact of 
substantive representation regarding this specific category of legislation. In addition to 
utilizing this framework, the main aims of this thesis include: drawing conclusions on 
substantive representation and expanding present knowledge regarding both the political 
representation of women and domestic violence legislation in England and Wales. In order 
to accomplish these aims, this thesis considers the following research question: what does 
the substantive representation of women mean in England and Wales, regarding domestic 
violence legislation? The case study is driven by a substantive political problem, domestic 
violence, and uses longstanding conceptual ideas, such as political representation, in order 
to ask new questions. This thesis further adds to the conversation surrounding the 
substantive representation of women by creating a critical path, or logical pathway, used to 
evaluate what is ‘going on’ in regard to representation. This pathway aids in tracing 
occurrences across instances of time, legislation, sites, and actors. The pathway utilises 
many concepts within the field including critical junctures, critical acts, and critical actors, 
and assembles them in a logical way, by employing the framework of questions mentioned 
above. This thesis benefits from and demonstrates the changing nature of representation 
and how we as researchers evaluate and draw conclusions from it. Evaluating substantive 
representation is important because numbers do not equal an understanding of behaviour, 
and why representatives and legislators may attempt to represent one group of citizens 
rather than another.
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Introduction: Evaluating the Substantive Representation of Women in               





The main subject of inquiry for this thesis is the substantive representation of women 
(hereafter referred to as SRW) in terms of violence against women legislation. The project 
focuses on a single case study of England and Wales and the cases to be evaluated within 
the case study are pieces of key legislation passed by the national parliament. These cases 
are: The Crime and Security Act 2010, the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, the Criminal 
Justice and Courts Act 2015, and the Serious Crime Act 2015. The main aims of this thesis 
are to implement a formalised critical path framework surrounding SRW, employ this 
framework to research the impact of SRW on domestic violence legislation in England and 
Wales, draw conclusions regarding SRW, and expand future knowledge on the political 
representation of women, as well as its effects on domestic violence legislation. To 
accomplish these aims, this thesis considers the following research question: what does 
SRW mean in England and Wales, regarding violence against women? In order to answer 
the research question, this thesis assesses the following questions that have been 
synthesised from various authors. These questions comprise: 1) When does SRW occur; 2) 
why is SRW attempted; 3) who acts in SRW; 4) how is SRW manifested; 5) where does 
the substantive representation occur; 6) in relation to which women is substantive 
representation expressed; and 7) what policies are passed or debated. 
Substantive representation has been defined as ‘acting for’ the represented.1 In this case 
study, the ‘represented’ are women. Conventionally in England and Wales, research on the 
political representation of women has centred on asking whether women in politics make a 
difference in terms of positive policy changes to so-called ‘women’s issues’ such as 
childcare, equal pay and welfare. Specifically since the 1980s, when voluntary party 
                                                        
1 Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1967), 209. 
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gender quotas were enacted in the United Kingdom, much of the research focus has been 
on the impact of those quotas and whether women have made a difference in the political 
arena, in terms of acting for these issues.2 This type of research often carries the 
assumption that only women can represent women and increasingly, it is being 
acknowledged by scholars that this assumption does not necessarily present the whole 
picture regarding the political representation of women and can be quite limited. Because 
this type of examination is narrow, it is important to move outside this and to look beyond 
the simple question of whether having more women in formal political institutions will 
lead to better representation of ‘women’s issues.’  
In order to produce a less narrow and more inclusive understanding of SRW, this thesis 
will explore a current public policy issue, violence against women, specifically domestic 
violence, in order to analyse the political representation of women in England and Wales. 
While the topic of ‘women’s issues’ is a contested matter within the literature, violence 
against women is seen as an important gendered issue and life experience of women that 
needs representation.3 In the United Kingdom, from 1974 to 1994, only four national 
policy areas regarding violence against women, as conceptualised by S. Laurel Weldon, 
were addressed in the national legislature.4 However, at least 25 percent of women are 
targets of domestic violence in the United Kingdom over their lifetime, showing the need 
for this type of research in order to bring attention to the issue.5 Why do women continue 
to suffer from violence in such a universal capacity? Personally, throughout my academic 
career and studies, this has been a persistent question that has often driven my interest in 
the political aspect of this problem. While this thesis does not seek to answer the question 
regarding why women suffer from violence, it is a question that has helped motivate my 
interest in this research. 
Since 1994, many organisations and legislators have pushed for more and also improved 
policies regarding violence against women, however a significant gap remains in terms of 
government responsiveness to this issue.6 For example, violence against women as an issue 
                                                        
2 Mona Lena Krook and Judith Squires, “Gender Quotas in British Politics: Multiple Approaches and 
Methods in Feminist Research,” British Politics (2006): 48. 
3 Anne Phillips, The Politics of Presence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 
4 S. Laurel Weldon, Protest, Policy, and the Problem of Violence against Women: A Cross-National 
Comparison (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2002), 31. 
5 Rhys Andrews and Karen Johnston Miller, “Representative Bureaucracy, Gender, and Policing: The Case 
of Domestic Violence Arrests in England,” Public Administration (2013): 998. 
6 Weldon, Protest, Policy, and the Problem of Violence against Women. 
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was found to be of primary importance by all actors in the United Kingdom in a study 
focusing on representative claims, yet the Westminster government has most recently been 
criticised in a report by the United Nations (UN) for their inconsistent approach on 
combating violence against women.7 In the UN report, a spokesperson stated that 
“although the [United Kingdom] has made the issue a policy priority, the reality is that 
‘isolated pockets of good practice’ are compromised by the ‘lack of a consistent and 
coherent human-rights based approach in the government’s response to violence against 
women and girls.’”8 This shows that while the government has made the issue a policy 
priority, a gap remains between the priority and the approach to combat it. Violence 
against women further remains an important issue because few studies investigate the 
impact of political representation on violence against women legislation.9 
 
Contribution to Knowledge 
This case study is driven by fundamental political problems regarding political 
representation and seeks to use old conceptual ideas in order to ask new questions 
regarding the concept of SRW. This thesis will benefit from and demonstrate the changing 
nature of representation and how we as researchers evaluate and draw conclusions from it. 
This changing nature of representation is defined in detail in the literature review in 
Chapter 1. This thesis synthesises suggested questions from a number of different authors, 
including Karen Celis, Sarah Childs, Johanna Kantola, Mona Lena Krook, Joni 
Lovenduski, Marila Guadagnini, and Suzanne Dovi, as a way to create a critical path 
framework to look at the sequence of how things happen within the representation process. 
This critical path framework is applied to a detailed case study and England and Wales in 
hopes of trying to add to the conversation regarding substantive representation and 
introduce a way to interrogate legislation or any policy process. Additionally, this thesis 
presents the term ‘critical actions,’ or actions or steps taken by critical actors, initiated by a 
critical juncture, which lead to critical acts, into the conversation surrounding SRW and 
second, bring together the concepts of this representation in order to effectively evaluate 
                                                        
7 Karen Celis et al., “Constituting Women’s Interests through Representative Claims,” Politics and Gender 
(2014): 165. 
8 “UK under Fire Over ‘Incoherent’ Approach to Domestic Violence,” last modified June 14, 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/jun/14/uk-domestic-violence-un-report-yarls-wood.  
9 S. Laurel Weldon, “Beyond Bodies: Institutional Sources of Representation for Women in Democratic 
Policymaking,” The Journal of Politics (2002): 1163. 
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SRW. This will aid in providing a more consistent way to understand the representation 
process as a whole. This is important because it increases the researcher’s ability to trace 
various aspects of representation across several instances of substantive representation. For 
example, when considering one issue across various time periods, this critical path can 
become increasingly important because of the above stated ability to trace this issue, and 
also bring together a nuanced evaluation of this representation. 
Further, this changing nature of representation has allowed other ways for representation to 
be evaluated. For example, this thesis’ critical path framework is developed as a way to 
systematically look at the sequence of how things happen within the representation process 
and also identify the activities within the representation process that are critical to its 
success. Importantly, this framework does not assume who acts on women’s issues, or 
where SRW may occur. The framework confronts previous research and aids in examining 
several actors, sites, timing, actions, and motivations; not simply what women do, or do 
not do. The development of this framework contributes to the research and literature 
surrounding the political representation of women, as well as aiding in the transition from 
traditional questions to more inclusive questions regarding gender and representation. 
Furthermore, this framework aids in illuminating ‘gendered blind spots’ within the 
discipline by “expanding the range of comparison, as well as moving beyond exclusive 
attention to female legislative [behaviour], [and] presents an opportunity to explore how 
gendered identities and interests are articulated and advanced in politics.”10  
In addition to the above illumination, this critical path framework contributes to the 
methodological scholarship of SRW by enhancing our ability to do further research and 
expand the future study of representation. This framework increases the knowledge 
regarding SRW and allows a bigger picture of research to be presented. This is important 
because it allows the political and substantive representation of women to be explored 
from a distinctive angle. This thesis contributes to knowledge in the disciplinary and sub-
disciplinary areas of political representation theory and analysis, policy formation, and the 
expansion of knowledge on the United Kingdom, in terms of moving past gender quota 
studies or focusing explicitly on female legislators and their actions. Moreover, I will 
expand the process of how research is conducted in regard to the political representation of 
                                                        
10 Mona Lena Krook, “Women’s Representation in Parliament: A Qualitative Comparative Analysis,” 
Political Studies (2010): 235. 
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women and possibly change the way researchers and readers consider and deliberate the 
topic of women and politics. It is also my expectation that this framework can be expanded 
to other cases in the future in a comparative way, but also by either validating or 
contradicting the existing research. 
 
Chapter Outline 
The remainder of this thesis comprises of five chapters and a comprehensive conclusion. 
Chapter 1 situates the project within the wider scope of literature and brings attention to 
gaps which exist. Specifically, the literature review focuses on the various concepts of 
importance to this thesis including theories related to political representation: critical mass, 
critical acts, and critical actors. In addition to the section on political representation, the 
concept of network/grassroots feminism is presented. This literature review aids in ‘setting 
the scene’ for the thesis as a whole, by presenting the narrative that surrounds these 
concepts. Chapter 1 also presents the rationale for using domestic violence as a policy area 
to be evaluated and offers feminist theories on violence against women and how these 
experiences manifest itself in various settings. In addition to ‘setting the scene,’ the 
literature review serves as a theoretical background for the case study presented in Chapter 
3 and Chapter 4. 
Chapter 2 presents the case study method and what it means to conduct a case study in the 
social sciences. In addition, the chapter offers various concepts regarding feminist research 
and methodologies, and how to employ these concepts within the wider case study frame. 
Chapter 2 also offers a comprehensive definition of violence against women and the 
definition of domestic violence within the English and Welsh context. Further, the critical 
path framework that I have conceptualised has been presented in detail, following the 
questions which encompass the study of substantive representation. Similar to the way that 
the literature review in Chapter 1 aids in presenting the contextual background of what has 
been written on the topic, this chapter establishes the environment under which the case 
study takes place and is the pillar of this thesis’ methodological approach.  
Following the introduction of the literature review and the methodological approach, 
Chapter 3 introduces the first two cases of the case study. These cases are the Crime and 
Security Act 2010 and the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. The critical path framework 
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presented in Chapter 2 is employed in this chapter. For both cases, the legislation is 
introduced followed by an evaluation of the critical path framework, including assessment 
of the critical juncture, critical actions, and the critical act. Briefly, the Crime and Security 
Act 2010 introduced Domestic Violence Protection Notices and sought to close the gap 
that existed within the law regarding domestic violence in England and Wales. The 
Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 updated the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 to 
make stalking a specific criminal offence, also in attempts to close a gap within the law. 
The findings from these two cases will be presented in the chapter. 
Chapter 4 introduces the final two cases of this case study: The Criminal Justice and 
Courts Act 2015 and the Serious Crime Act 2015. As presented in Chapter 3, the critical 
path framework will be utilised in this chapter. These two cases include an evaluation of 
the critical juncture, critical actions, and the critical act. The Criminal Justice and Courts 
Act 2015 criminalised so-called revenge pornography and the Serious Crime Act 2015 
criminalised coercive and controlling behaviour in a domestic violence context. Both of 
these pieces of legislation sought to close gaps within the existing domestic violence 
legislation in England and Wales. The findings from these two cases will be presented in 
the chapter. 
Following the presentation and evaluation of the case study in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, 
Chapter 5 will assess the methods and the questions within the critical path framework, and 
address the contributions that this thesis has made to the field. Finally, the conclusion will 
summarise the thesis as a whole and what the findings from the case study mean for future 
research on the topic of substantive representation. 
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This chapter will present the relevant literature regarding the main subject of this thesis: 
SRW, as well as a brief review of feminist theories regarding the issue of violence against 
women as a way to show how this is an important and collective issue which remains a 
rhetorically central policy area in England and Wales and around the world more 
generally. By presenting the relevant literature regarding the political representation of 
women, this review and analysis will situate the theoretical framework for this project and 
express how it underpins my positioning on this topic. Presenting feminist theories on 
violence against women is important because it is through feminism, the women’s 
movement, and gender scholars that this issue has entered the general political discourse in 
the English and Welsh context. Furthermore, distinguishing feminist theories on violence 
against women from everyday views on violence against women can help to determine 
whether the representation that is attempted within the case study in Chapter 3 and Chapter 
4 is underpinned by feminist views on violence against women or more traditional 
everyday views, such as men protecting ‘vulnerable’ women against violence. 
The literature review is not intended to be an exhaustive account of the literature; rather, its 
purpose is to show the general context in which this thesis is situated. The literature review 
begins from the premise of political representation and transitions to a presentation of 
network feminism. The section on political representation specifically focuses on various 
theories adapted by gender scholars and applied to gender politics such as the theories of 
critical mass, critical acts, and critical actors. Following this literature review, the gaps 
within the literature are presented alongside a reiteration of this thesis’ contribution to 
knowledge regarding filling these identified gaps presented in the introduction. This 
chapter will present the literature surrounding the above concepts as a way to frame the 
theoretical underpinnings of this thesis. 
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Political Representation 
The issue of representation, specifically political representation, dates back centuries. 
However, political theorist Hanna Fenichel Pitkin is considered the starting point for 
modern-day discussions on political representation, especially by feminist and gender 
scholars. In 1967, Pitkin published The Concept of Representation where she posited four 
theories regarding political representation: 1) formalistic, 2) descriptive, 3) symbolic, and 
4) substantive.11 These four theories are important to understand in order to appreciate the 
path that the theory of political representation has taken over the past decades.  
Two representation views fall under the category of ‘formalistic’: authorization and 
accountability. They both share common characteristics such as the focus on authority, 
where “a representative is someone who has been authorized to act.”12 In this sense, the 
representative is highly favoured and “defines representing in terms of a transaction that 
takes place at the outset, before the actual representing begins. To the extent that he has 
been authorized, within the limits of his authority, anything that a man does is 
representing.”13 The formalistic views are shared by political theorists such as Max Weber, 
Eric Voegelin, and Joseph Tussman. For Pitkin however, the formalistic views do not 
present the entire picture of representation, and do not acknowledge ‘the activity of 
representing.’14 The formalistic category highlights political culture, and its links to 
political representation and representatives. Generally speaking, political culture can be 
described where “[e]very political system is embedded in a particular pattern of 
orientations to political actions.”15 As stated by Shirley Zimmerman, this political culture 
“refers to the values and attitudes that people hold toward government and toward each 
other.”16 The United Kingdom has been categorised as having a traditionalistic political 
culture where “a substantially hierarchical society [was] part of the natural order, 
authorizing those at the top of the social structure to take a special and dominant role in 
government.”17 This observation can be extended into a broader understanding of how 
today’s members of parliament (MPs) and peers, mostly men, take upon themselves the 
                                                        
11 Pitkin, The Concept of Representation.  
12 Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, 38. 
13 Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, 39. 
14 Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, 59. 
15 Gabriel Almond, “Comparative Political Systems,” The Journal of Politics (1955): 396. 
16 Shirley L. Zimmerman, “Political Culture: Definitions and Variations in the 50 States” in Family Policies 
and Family Well-Being: The Role of Political Culture, ed. Shirley Zimmerman (Thousand Oaks: SAGE 
Publications, Inc., 1992), 36. 
17 Zimmerman, “Political Culture: Definitions and Variations in the 50 States,” 36. 
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task of protecting ‘vulnerable’ women from violence. Lastly, “[g]ood government in this 
political culture involves the maintenance and encouragement of traditional patterns and, if 
necessary, their adjustment to changing conditions with the least possible upset.”18 This 
described ‘natural order’ and maintenance of ‘good government’ shows how society can 
view some as natural leaders and representatives, such as men. This lasting political culture 
is one reason why female representatives are necessary not only in bringing about various 
policy aims, but also a tool in which the state could help promote more women as 
representatives in order to change the traditionalistic political culture present within the 
United Kingdom.  
Political culture can correspond with the idea of a lasting ‘cultural memory.’ In the general 
sense, Kevin Laland and Luke Rendell explain: “Culture depends on the passing-on of 
learned knowledge between individuals, through teaching and copying.”19 This concept is 
important because it shows the ways in which ideas and memories are transmitted 
throughout time. These ideas, such as those detailed above in regard to men as the natural 
representatives within government, have been able to transmit through time and linger in 
the cultural memory of those in the United Kingdom. This is not to say that all individuals 
have learned these memories, however it is important to be aware of the lasting impacts of 
the past, especially in regard to gender relations. This learned knowledge is not necessarily 
intentional, but can be embedded in and reinforced through various social interactions. 
This is perhaps why it has taken so many decades for women to become formal political 
actors and representatives and also perhaps regarding discourses about domestic violence 
and violence against women more generally.  
While women were not able to stand as MPs until 1918, before suffrage was won, various 
reforms to local government allowed more women to enter the ranks, such as under the 
Municipal Corporations (Franchise) Act 1869, which allowed women to vote for municipal 
councils and stand as 15ouncillors, and the Education Act of 1870, which allowed women 
to stand to be members of school boards.20 For Krista Cowman, this reflects that 
“[w]omen’s place in national politics has been a recurrent theme in British history, both 
within Parliament and beyond it in the realm of print and debate, where opinion is formed. 
Discussions of women’s relationship to politics are as old as discussions of politics 
                                                        
18 Zimmerman, “Political Culture: Definitions and Variations in the 50 States,” 51. 
19 Kevin Neville Laland and Luke Edward Rendell, “Cultural Memory,” Current Biology (2013): R737. 
20 Krista Cowman, Women in British Politics, c. 1689-1979 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 51. 
 16 
itself.”21 This however, did not necessarily equal, substantive changes to the system. For 
example, “[w]ith the exception of queens, women never achieved equal access to the key 
sites of political power.”22 This is evidenced by the fact that in 1918, one woman, Countess 
Markievicz, was elected to parliament (out of 707 seats), but did not take her place, as she 
was a member of the Sinn Fein party.23 
After women won the right to vote and stand as MPs in the Westminster parliament, the 
major parties began to open up membership to women. Moreover, women were seen as 
important constituents to represent for the first time, as they now represented a large 
number of voters. As stated by Martin Pugh: 
By 1935, the [Conservative] party seemed to have settled on its approach to 
women; it was hardly necessary to refer to them specifically, provided that the cost 
of living, housing, pensions and education showed improvements. Conservatives 
showed themselves responsive, within certain well-defined limits, to what they 
perceived to be women’s interests.24 
Still, women were considered in terms of their status as mothers and wives, and less as 
autonomous beings. The Labour party also included similar stances, declaring the party the 
‘Women’s Party’ and focusing on domestic life as a major concern for women.25 As 
Pamela Graves details specifically about women in the Labour party: “When they argued 
for their reform programme, they used the language of class and directed their appeals and 
their criticism at hostile governments or greedy capitalists rather than at the men of their 
party. … The more integrated they became, the less visible they were.”26 As Joni 
Lovenduski states, “[t]he British political culture, entwined as it is with an unwritten 
constitution, encourages acceptance of a considerable degree of government secrecy, 
which compounds a tradition of covert rules of elite entry.”27 Not only is entry into the 
system complex, so too is the fight for change, especially in regard to women. The system 
itself reinforces this complexity. For example, “[t]here is no single document that sets out 
                                                        
21 Cowman, Women in British Politics, 2. 
22 Cowman, Women in British Politics, 29. 
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the operation of the system and the rights and duties of its citizens and leaders. In fact, it is 
uncodified; its provisions are written down but in a number of places, variously based on 
royal prerogative, statute, common law, conventions, and authoritative opinion.”28  
The differences between the theories emerge when Pitkin divides them by the distinction 
of ‘standing for’ representation and ‘acting for’ representation.29 For Pitkin, descriptive 
and symbolic representation are both ‘standing for’ while substantive representation is 
viewed as ‘acting for.’ The representative under the descriptive view, “does not act for 
others; he [or she] ‘stands for’ them, by virtue of a correspondence or connection between 
them, a resemblance or reflection…What seems important is less what the legislature does 
than how it is composed.”30 The symbolic view is similar in this sense, where it is about 
the presence of the representatives and less about what the representatives do.31 As Pitkin 
advances, “[a] symbol is considered to have a meaning beyond itself, not because of its 
actual resemblance to the referent, not because of any real connection, but just because it is 
so considered.”32 For example, the rise of Margaret Thatcher to the position of Prime 
Minister presented an interesting dichotomy in terms of women and politics. On one hand, 
this rise helped to show how far women had come, however on the other hand: 
Thatcher herself was a beneficiary of the gains and reforms achieved by earlier 
generations of women. She enjoyed the vote and access to higher education… Yet 
she steadfastly refused to acknowledge any debt or wider responsibility. … 
Women, in her view, should stop complaining and capitalise on the opportunities 
open to them already.33 
While it can be said with confidence that Thatcher was not a feminist, she could be 
considered a symbolic representation for many women and girls growing up in the era of 
‘Thatcherism.’ This symbolism helped to encourage the idea that women could ‘do’ 
politics and be considered powerful outside of motherhood and domesticity.34 Although 
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descriptive and symbolic representation expands the concept of representation beyond the 
formalistic views, none of the three views demonstrate acting for the represented, 
according to Pitkin.35 
The fourth and final theory of representation advanced by Pitkin is substantive 
representation where “representing here means acting in the interest of the represented, in a 
manner responsive to them.”36 Substantive representation draws on the connections 
between representatives and the represented, where this type of representation is about acts 
and acting for the represented, as opposed to intentions, or simply ‘standing for’ the 
represented.37 Some scholars such as Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer and William Mishler see 
Pitkin’s theories on representation as somewhat merged, rather than isolated where:  
Pitkin conceives of representation as a complex structure whose multiple 
dimensions are closely integrated. …the integrated model provides strong evidence, 
consistent with theory, that formal representative structures and processes exert 
powerful influences on the extent of women’s descriptive representation policy 
responsiveness (substantive), and symbolic representation.38  
Because descriptive representation does not focus on the outcomes of an institution, Pitkin 
identifies substantive representation as the ‘one true type’ of representation where “[t]he 
representatives must be responsive to the represented and not the other way around. …this 
implies that the wishes of the represented and the actions of the representative will 
converge.”39  
Never before had political representation been theorised and categorised in this way, and 
because of this, Pitkin’s work is considered to be most influential when writing on political 
representation today.40 In addition to naming and referencing Pitkin, a large number of 
scholars have adapted and interpreted her work in various ways, from examining 
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descriptive representation and case studies, to investigating symbolic representation. For 
example, Celis et al. state that “scholars ask whether an increase in the number of female 
representatives (women’s descriptive representation) results in an increase in attention to 
women’s policy concerns (women’s substantive representation).”41 Since Pitkin, these 
theories have been adapted by feminist theorists, and applied to gender politics. Feminist 
theorists typically agree with Pitkin’s issues with formalistic representation, but express 
criticism over her other three conceptions of representation.42 For example, speaking on 
descriptive representation, Childs states that “[c]omposition of political I matters…there is 
some kind of relationship between representatives’ behaviour and their gender.”43 On 
substantive representation, Childs states that “Pitkin’s definition is unable to evaluate the 
activity of representation as it occurs; it struggles to take account of gender—many 
feminists link women’s descriptive and substantive representation.”44 Because Pitkin’s 
four theories on representation do not include gender in the definitions or evaluations, 
feminist theorists have had to adjust Pitkin’s theories to incorporate gender into the 
conversation. Therefore, in terms of SRW, the literature has focused on three things: “the 
proportion of women elected, such as the achievement of a critical mass; individual factors 
that may affect the propensity of women to act for women, such as party membership and 
feminist attitudes; and institutional and contextual variables, such as party discipline, leftist 
parties in government, and civil society support.”45 The following sections will show how 
the literature on the political representation of women has progressed over time, to where 
the literature stands today on SRW. 
 
Critical Mass 
After the development of Pitkin’s four theories of representation, the theory of ‘critical 
mass’ and its connection to the political representation of women became prominent as a 
theory for how numeric representation could improve SRW within the field of gender 
politics.46 The theory of critical mass argues that as more women enter the political sphere, 
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more female-friendly policies will be passed and therefore these policies will be beneficial 
to all women.47 In the 1970s and 1980s, scholars such as Rosabeth Moss Kanter and Drude 
Dahlerup examined how women ‘act for’ other women in the corporate and political 
fields.48 However, there remains little consensus on what actually constitutes a critical 
mass. For example, Kanter created the skewed group and the tilted group, where the 
skewed group comprised a maximum of 15 percent (in this case, women, who were seen as 
tokens), and the tilted group constituted between 15 percent and 40 percent.49 On the other 
hand, Dahlerup conceptualised that 30 percent was the minimum for a critical mass, and is 
most often followed by scholars researching the effects of critical mass.50  
Following this research, scholars began to “draw on the concept to explain a range of 
different outcomes, most obviously instances where increased numbers of women result in 
greater attention to women’s issues, but also cases where increased numbers of women 
result in little or no change, on the grounds that women may not yet constitute a ‘critical 
mass’.”51 For example, Childs found that newly elected Labour women’s presence in the 
United Kingdom had a slightly positive effect on the political representation of women 
where “the findings support the contention that women representatives identify the 
articulation of women’s concerns as part of their representative function.”52 This result is 
not universal, however. In another article by Childs, many MPs were hesitant to state that 
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SRW was based on the presence of women politicians.53 As stated by Childs, “this 
suggests both that they accept that women have different experiences and that these will be 
included when women are present. At the same time, however, MPs and [p]eers appear 
reluctant to accept the assumption that women representatives act for women, even though 
their statements imply that women’s presence will make a difference.”54  
As the critical mass theory has become more prominent throughout the decades, one of the 
main problems that have emerged is the way that researchers have assumed that increasing 
the number of women legislators will automatically lead to more sex-based equality.55 An 
increasing amount of research concludes that there is no automatic link between the 
number of women in politics and the policy outcomes of a particular country.56 In addition, 
critical mass research tends to view women as a homogeneous group, where members of 
the group (women) agree on all issues, simply because they are women, and as Childs 
explains, critical mass, “assumes that the percentage of women in a particular political 
institution is the key to understanding women’s representatives’ behaviour and effects…it 
fails to consider why women might seek to act for women in the first place.”57 These 
findings have led to a new way to examine the political representation of women, or at the 
very least have altered the way in which critical mass is conceptualised, where “[t]here is a 
failure to adequately theorize the relationship between women’s descriptive and 
substantive representation; why should (on what basis will) women representatives act for 
women?”58 The problem with critical mass is not that more women should be 
representatives, as an equality issue; it is the slippery slope that could form if researchers 
assume that all women care about the same issues, and have the same opinions as all other 
women, and that the same is true of all men. 
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Critical Acts 
Following the rise of critical mass, scholars have shifted from simply researching the 
descriptive representation of women, and instead begun examining what became known as 
‘critical acts,’ because few legislatures met the threshold for critical mass.59 As the name 
implies, critical acts rely on the minority (in this case, women) to organise themselves 
together and form alliances to act on behalf of women in the group.60 In this sense, 
representation is about what is done rather than who does it.61 Critical acts have included 
gender quotas for women and new policies and legislation that have attempted to focus on 
women as a broad category.62 Specifically in the United Kingdom, positive action such as 
quotas has been seen as effective in increasing the political participation of women in 
parliament.63 As an examination of the political representation of women, the theory of 
critical acts has increasingly been combined with the theory of ‘critical actors,’ or those 
who perform critical acts.64 This thesis however, does not intend to dismiss and replace 
critical acts with those of critical actors. Instead, my research seeks to use both critical acts 
and critical actors as a way to provide a ‘thickened’ examination of SRW in England and 
Wales. How these critical acts will be determined and examined is presented within the 
methods section of Chapter 2. 
 
Critical Actors 
The concept of critical actors has become widely used in exploring women in politics. The 
concept of critical actors focuses on who rather than what—critical acts. Childs and Mona 
Lena Krook define critical actors as “legislators who initiate policy proposals on their own 
and/or embolden others to take steps to promote policies for women, regardless of the 
numbers of female representatives. Importantly, they do not need to be women: in some 
situations, men may play a crucial role in advancing women’s policy concerns.”65 In 
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contrast to critical mass, the critical actors approach focuses not on what women do, but 
what specific actors do, moving away from essentialist depictions of women in politics.66 
For example, Mateo Diaz found that “as more and more women enter parliament, more 
men start to take up issues formerly considered to be ‘women’s’, such as gender 
equality.”67 This is an important finding as it helps make the case for descriptive 
representation and equality, but also substantive representation where men can also 
represent women. To this, Mateo Diaz articulates:  
Different degrees of masculinity and femininity can be found in both men and 
women, which implies that male representatives could have more feminist values 
than their female counterparts. This is problematic when it comes to linking 
descriptive and substantive representation, in the sense that both women with 
feminist values and women without them will be categorised together, while men 
with feminist will be excluded.68 
Because of this problematic link detailed by Mateo Diaz, it is important that researchers 
expand their definition of critical actors and include men as potential actors, as has been 
articulated above. This link can also be extended to include differences between liberal and 
conservative women. For example, “conservative women have additionally to negotiate the 
conservatism (ideology and practices) that is specific to their parties, party systems, and 
wider political contexts.”69 This may be why we see actors from both sides of the aisle 
demonstrating action on the issue of violence against women, whether it be because 
legislators want to ‘protect’ women (a group they see as vulnerable), or because they view 
liberation from violence as a way to create more gender equality overall. This is expanded 
to differences between anti-feminist claims, feminist claims, and gendered claims: 
“[Gendered claims] might well be underpinned by a commitment to women’s traditional 
roles and experiences, not least as mothers, care givers, and victims of violence.”70 
Therefore, the issue of domestic violence within the context of this case study is interesting 
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because it may illuminate various reasons for why actors may claim to act on behalf of 
victim-survivors in this regard. Is it because of protection, liberation, or other reasons? 
Increasingly, research surrounding the political representation of women has focused on 
formal political institutions rather than the political process, which was popular in the 
1970s and 1980s.71 Because of this shift in research approaches, the theory of critical 
actors has become the model of choice in terms of exploring women and politics today. 
This new approach “should examine the extent to which, and the conditions under which, 
women’s policy agencies [WPAs] (operating within parliaments, governments and 
ministries), women’s movement actors, operating as part of civil society and as integrated 
parts of political parties, as well as representatives” function.72 As researchers however, we 
must be careful not to create a ‘pedestal effect’ when men are determined to be critical 
actors in some instances. This means there can be a “level of praise and escalating status 
men receive in feminist spaces that far outstrips what a man has actually accomplished or 
contributed.”73 While parliament is by no means a feminist space, this idea of the pedestal 
effect must be kept in perspective when evaluating critical actors. In the United Kingdom, 
critical actors could be assumed to be men, because women only comprise around 20 
percent of the parliament. While this is not to say that men cannot be critical actors, these 
ideas must be kept in view.  
One of the main issues in terms of gender and politics was, and continues to be, the 
relationship between who holds office and what types of policy outcomes are produced.74 
To sum up, Simon Tormey notes that “[s]ome people will speak and act on behalf of a 
group, political cause or identity and thus represent it; others will recognize themselves as 
being the object of this discourse and be represented by it. Some will hold power as 
representatives; other people will be represented.”75 
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Network Feminism 
While the above concepts surrounding political representation are more formal in nature, 
the concept of network feminism serves as a way to present a more informal, yet effective 
way of expressing a political agenda without necessarily being part of the traditional and 
formal policymaking process. Network feminism often encompasses small grassroots 
campaigns and local or national networks. The concept is often associated with the larger 
discussion of third wave feminism and how the third wave “has been closely associated 
with intersectionality, and inclusion of specific groups who had previously felt excluded 
from feminist activism.”76 In addition to better attention to intersectionality and inclusion, 
the third wave and network feminism have seen a shift towards a greater online activism, 
networking, and campaigning.77 Therefore, “[t]his shift… has significant implications for 
feminism, as many of those who were not able to attend rallies or meetings can now 
participate in the debate.”78 Issues which dominate today’s discourse of activism include 
women’s sexuality and violence against women. Because of the increased use of the 
internet, there is an observable overlap between third wave feminism and a new fourth 
wave of feminism.79 For example, Twitter, a popular social networking site, is often used 
to draw attention to various issues that otherwise would be overlooked, such as everyday 
violence against women. As stated by Ealasaid Munro, “[c]ontemporary feminism is 
characterised by its diversity of purpose, and amid the cacophony of voices it is easy to 
overlook one of the main constants within the movement as it currently stands—its 
reliance on the internet.”80 In addition to drawing attention to important issues, the internet 
has created a ‘call-out’ culture where it focuses on micropolitics and challenges sexism and 
misogyny.81 One aspect of network feminism that cannot be overlooked then, is the use of 
networks and online activism as a way for more women to become involved in political 
discourse because of the traditional and continued exclusion of women from formal 
policymaking processes.   
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One of the important concepts that network feminism has embraced is the notion of 
intersectionality and its impact upon how women ‘do’ feminism today. As stated by 
Brittney Cooper, “Intersectionality emerged in the late 1980s as an analytic frame capable 
of attending to the particular positionality of black women and other women of color both 
in civil rights law and within civil rights movements.”82 Coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw in 
the 1980s, “It is the most visible and enduring contribution that feminism, and in particular 
black feminism, has made to critical social theory in the last quarter century.”83 Because it 
is one of the most widely recognised contributions of black feminism, intersectionality has 
been adapted and utilised beyond civil rights law and the civil rights movement in the 
United States. It has become a major tool that is used to rethink current policy frameworks, 
including when discussing ‘women’s interests’ and acting on behalf of women.84 
At the heart of intersectionality is the idea of how “different axes of oppression intersect, 
producing complex and often contradictory results.”85 The concept of intersectionality has 
shown how gender as a standalone identifier of experience and identity is insufficient in 
understanding the ways in which women can be oppressed. As detailed by Munro, “[a]s a 
tactic, privilege-checking is about reminding someone that they cannot and should not 
speak for others.”86 While especially important, this privilege-checking does not always 
reflect reality. For example, this thesis examines SRW and the policymaking process 
surrounding domestic violence legislation in England and Wales. While women are 
overwhelmingly the victims of domestic violence, much of the formal discussion within 
parliament is typically left for men. This reflects both how women are underrepresented in 
formal discussions around issues central to them, but also how women continue to be 
spoken for and on behalf of. 
As stated by Alison Evans and Divya Nambiar, “[t]oday, the power behind these 
movements is even greater as globalisation and new communications technology have 
created new opportunities to raise awareness, create networks, generate debate and 
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mobilise people of all social groups against inequalities.”87 Network feminism is important 
for purposes of this thesis by introducing how it can serve as an informal, yet effective way 
of expressing political voices and change without being in a formal policymaking setting.  
 
Rationale: Violence against women legislation as an issue for evaluation 
Today, violence against women is seen as one of the most widely recognised problems 
plaguing women around the world. Various acts of violence against women are recognised 
as crimes in most societies, and affect women regardless of citizenship, religion, race, age, 
class, and ethnicity.88 Because of the pervasive nature of the problem, “[s]exual violence is 
a profound human rights violation and public health concern. It cuts across class and race, 
and occurs in peace and conflict settings. Perpetrators are most commonly men known to 
the victims, and often an intimate partner or, in the case of child sexual abuse, a trusted 
family or community member.”89 Because of the universality, violence against women as a 
gender-based problem is a significant policy area to evaluate. Further, it has remained a 
constant problem that women’s movements have addressed throughout time and place. 
Today, violence against women continues to be one of the major issues that are on the 
agenda of feminists in the United Kingdom.90 As a phenomenon, when “[a]sked how 
similar they [feminists] thought the important feminist issues of today were to those of the 
1970s, 84.5 [percent] responded that they were very similar or quite similar.”91 This shows 
that while women’s movements and feminist movements have evolved over time, many of 
the issues of importance remain similar. Because of this similarity over time, violence 
against women remains an important universal problem to be studied.   
As a political issue, violence against women has shifted from the local context to be seen 
as a more global social issue.92 Today, there are demands for “public solutions, including 
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the establishment of programs and services, including the involvement of the criminal 
justice system to hold men accountable for their violence.”93 In addition, professionals and 
scholars believe there should be action at the policy and legislative levels as violence 
against women is now recognised as a serious social problem.94 The following section will 
focus on feminist theories regarding violence against women in order to provide context 
for why violence against women is an important universal issue. Further, feminist theories 
are presented here because it was women’s movements and feminist movements that 
helped raise awareness regarding violence against women and show the universal 
experiences that women had specifically concerning domestic violence. This section is not 
intended to be an exhaustive account of feminist theories on violence against women, 
rather the section is presented as a way to contextualise the experiences of violence against 
women that are presented in the case study.  
 
Feminist Theories on Violence against Women 
Feminist theories on violence against women specifically focus on micro and macro-level 
experiences and how these experiences interact in various settings.95 Feminist theories on 
violence have been widely accepted amongst gender scholars, although to varying degrees. 
For the purpose of this thesis, feminism is understood to mean “all ideologies, activities 
and policies [whose] goal is to remove discrimination against women and to break down 
the male domination of society.”96 Further, in specific relation to bodies and space, Andrea 
Dworkin states “[t]wo elements constitute the discipline of feminism: political, ideological, 
and strategic confrontation with the sex-class system—with sex hierarchy and sex 
segregation—and a single standard of human dignity.”97 This is further articulated where 
“[t]he crimes committed against women because they are women articulate the condition 
of women.”98 But why is feminism important to the study of politics in general? Catherine 
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Redfern and Kristin Aune propose four reasons why feminism is significant, why it is not 
‘dead,’ and why women need it. First, feminism is a ‘survival mechanism’ in that it 
“prompts you to question the status quo, rather than assuming that the way things are is the 
best they can be. Feminism assures you that you’re not alone, that the problems you 
experience are shared by others.”99 Feminism is also about collective action and support 
networks, and—finally—feminism can help to politicise various issues. For example, 
“women’s political representation has moved from being seen as unacceptable to being 
‘actively encouraged.’ The responsibility for this success lies with the international 
women’s movement.”100 Moreover, feminists have drawn attention to the patriarchal 
nature of violence against women, where “arguments over a woman’s cooking, housework 
standards, money, sex, going out with friends and arguing back are regularly cited by 
offenders as provocations for their ‘explosions of anger’.”101 Because of feminist 
movements in general, there has been a vast amount of increased public awareness, 
lobbying, fund-raising, calls for legislation, and education programmes.102 
Specifically, feminist theories on violence against women emphasise how macro-level 
powers, such as patriarchy, contribute to micro-level manifestations of everyday violence 
against women.103 Often cited as beginning with Susan Brownmiller in 1975, patriarchy 
has been seen as a system of power, where males enjoy superior privilege and authority, 
simply by way of their performed gender.104 Using this definition, violence becomes a 
manifestation of patriarchy.105 Further to this, according to Gwen Hunnicutt, patriarchy 
manifests not only at the micro level between individuals, but also reveals itself at the 
macro level, such as within the government and the law.106 Further to this, “male violence 
within intimate relationships results from historic and current power differentials that keep 
women subordinate, primarily through the use of control, including physical, sexual, 
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economic, and psychological abuse, comprising tactics of intimidation and isolation.”107 
Moreover, traditional gender roles, imposed at the macro level, are said to play a part in 
how individuals manifest violent actions. For example, it is posited that those with more 
traditionally masculine identities, are expected to be more violent and show a range of 
‘aggressive’ traditionally masculine behaviours.108  
While there are varying feminist theories on violence against women, most of these carry 
the following assumptions: gender, patriarchy, and power are important features that 
explain men’s violence against women.109 These assumptions are furthered by introducing 
various aspects of control including: victim blaming, male privilege, coercion, threats, and 
emotional abuse, among other.110 In addition, “feminist theory emphasizes the value of 
direct experience as the place where theory should begin. The realm of personal 
experience, the ‘private,’ which has always been trivialised as unworthy of serious 
scrutiny, particularly for women, is an appropriate and important subject of public 
inquiry.”111 One important criticism of the feminist theories, primarily those focusing 
solely on concerns and voices of elitist white women, are the exclusion of women’s 
socioeconomic class, regardless of the findings that some women are more susceptible to 
violence than others, and some men are more liable to commit violent acts, or that those 
constructing the theories believed that they applied to all women, irrespective of race, 
class, etc.112 Additionally, some “have challenged the primacy of gender as an exploratory 
model of domestic violence and have emphasized the need to examine how other forms of 
inequality and oppression, such as racism, ethnocentrism, class privilege, and 
heterosexism, intersect with gender oppression.”113 For instance, the construction of black 
feminism in the United States and multiracial feminism elsewhere, where issues of 
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difference not only between women were spoken, but were also established in order to 
examine structures of dominance which can create these differences.114  
Because of this scrutiny, matters of difference have become important to consider when 
thinking of employing feminism and the feminist method in research. Sandra Harding 
exemplifies this point. She positions the argument stating that there are not necessarily 
‘gender relations’ as a general category, rather, gender relations exist at an intersection 
between gender, class, race, and other categories of difference.115 Patricia Hill Collins 
identifies this intersection as a ‘matrix of domination’ where “[p]eople experience race, 
class, gender, and sexuality differently depending upon their social location in the 
structures of race, class, gender, and sexuality.”116 While there are diverging issues within 
feminism, there is also common ground between the strands. Lewis Okun’s assertion in 
1986 continues to be relevant where he stated feminism is “the most important theoretical 
approach to conjugal violence/women abuse.”117 Okun does not state which feminism is 
most central, but rather identifies feminism in general as the most important approach. This 
common ground is the basis for my research. For the purpose of this thesis, 
acknowledgement of these differences is key, where the diversity between the varying 
strands of the feminist theory can be a strength. 
While one theory regarding violence against women cannot explain every aspect of the 
topic due to its widespread nature and overall complexity at its root, feminist theories use 
gender, patriarchy, and power as the main reasons why women are subjected to violence, 
in societies around the world.118 In addition, specifically feminist approaches to violence 
against women are “united by a common central underpinning: Intimate partner violence is 
fundamentally a gender issue that cannot be adequately understood through any lens that 
does not include gender as the central component of analysis.”119 Feminist theories and 
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activism are responsible for bringing violence against women from the private sphere of 
the family into the public realm, which in turn has led to waves of action in terms of 
legislative responsiveness and government action, making the political representation of 
women even more important to study.120 In terms of the political aspect of violence against 
women, “[f]eminist legal arguments about gender violence have developed from feminist 
insights about the way heterosexual intimate violence is part of a larger system of coercive 
control and subordination; this system is based on structural gender inequality and has 
political roots.”121 
 
Problems in the Literature: Gaps identified 
In terms of feminist theories regarding violence against women, Marysia Zalewski and 
Anne Sisson Runyan have stated, “[d]espite the clear identification of many violences, 
even the most ‘obvious’ violence can slip out of grasp quickly, both theoretically and 
legislatively. Though, perhaps, it is the very grasping at the violence and grappling with it 
that reproduces violence through (inevitable) failures to maintain clear and sharp 
boundaries around what counts as a violent deed.”122 This is especially true in the case of 
England and Wales where domestic violence itself is not a criminal offence.123 Therefore, 
because there is no specific offence of domestic violence, despite specific types of violence 
being identified, boundaries are not drawn and does not seemingly ‘count’ as violence. 
This is an important gap to explore because “[r]ecognizing the links between individual 
change and social change means going beyond theory and understanding the importance of 
political activity. In this way, theory emerges from practice and practice then informs and 
reshapes theory.”124 Evaluating this problem in the context of England and Wales is 
important because it will help illuminate any further gaps in regard to policy, practice, or 
rhetoric surrounding the issue of violence. 
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According to representation scholars, there continues to be a gap in certain areas of the 
literature in terms of institutional mechanisms, types of parliamentary proceedings, party 
allegiances, men as actors, and non-left and non-feminist actors.125 For example, it has 
been shown that in some cases, non-left, non-feminist, and male MPs sometimes claim to 
represent women and this continues to challenge theories which state that women need 
women representatives, because they may be more likely to act in the interests of other 
women.126 In addition, current research must expand the ‘sites’ where political 
representation is researched.127 For instance, not only should researchers examine 
parliaments, but they must evaluate the impact of other sites where action may take 
place.128 For example, “[t]hese various actors might be involved in several acts and might 
play different roles that constitute SRW: for example, parliamentary activities… 
prioritizing and ‘constructing’ women’s interests… and engaging in intra-party strategies” 
(authors’ emphasis).129 Not only are policies that concern women important, but so too are 
the implications in general. For example, in a recent report on British politics, districts with 
women MPs have more women that are more actively involved in politics, speaking 
perhaps to the symbolic effects of having women in politics.130 As stated by Childs, “[a]t 
the 2001 general election, the [Electoral Commission’s 2004 report] notes, women’s 
turnout was [four] per cent higher than men’s in seats that returned women MPs. Women 
represented by women were more likely to report that ‘government benefits people like 
me’ than men.”131  
Additionally, the question remains whether representative politics, as has been 
conceptualised, even matters. As Tormey details, there is “a growing body of evidence that 
suggests that many of us have become—or are becoming—disillusioned with politics and 
politicians, with our representatives and with representation.”132 Further, “[i]n place of a 
politics based on a practice of speaking and acting for others, we do not find a plethora of 
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forms and styles of what might be called immediate or non-mediated politics: direct action, 
flash protests, Twitter-led mobilizations, pinging, hacking, squatting, boycotting, buy-
cotting, occupying and other interventions of a direct, practical kind.”133 In the general 
sense, this may be true. But in terms of feminism and representative politics, women have 
always been disenfranchised from the system by way of representatives not representing 
them. The feminist women’s movement has always been engaged in these types of 
immediate or non-mediated politics, even before the question of whether or not the 
populace is becoming unrepresentable. Whether this is true, Tormey does observe one 
factor that is not going away: “power and privilege in the hands of the few remains 
unchanged.”134 
In a relatively short period of time, there has been a vast exploration of women and 
politics, beginning with what women do, to exploring critical actors and who actually acts 
on behalf of women. It is important to think of representation today as a process where acts 
and actors combine with ideas and interests and bring them forward to the political 
agenda.135 Because of the expansion of representation literature, this thesis seeks to further 
develop the knowledge surrounding SRW, in combination with how it impacts violence 
against women legislation in England and Wales, specifically concerning domestic 
violence.   
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The Case Study Method 
This thesis employs a case study of a seven-question framework surrounding SRW in 
England and Wales from 2010-2015. The case study itself centres on England and Wales 
and substantive representation, and the cases to be evaluated within the case study are key 
legislation passed by the national parliament. These cases include: The Crime and Security 
Act 2010, the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, 
and the Serious Crime Act 2015. This evaluation does not seek to determine or predict 
future behaviour of legislators, or those involved in the representation process, rather, this 
evaluation seeks to assess the behaviour that has already happened.136 The following 
section will provide a general overview of what a ‘case’ is, and what it means to do case 
study research in the social sciences.  
In the social sciences, a case is defined as a ‘bounded system’ or a unit of research, such as 
an event, a period of time, or a country.137 Because a case can be any unit or system of 
research, a case study then attempts to ‘catch’ the details and workings of a chosen case.138 
To this, social scientist Robert Yin states: “case studies investigate real-life events in their 
natural settings. The goal is to practice sound research while capturing both a phenomenon 
(the real-life event) and its context (the natural setting).”139 Case studies become useful 
when you are unable to separate the real-life event and the natural setting.140 This strength 
becomes important for this thesis because the case study deals with people in complex 
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settings. Since the data gathered will most certainly not be quantitative but rather 
qualitative, a case study then becomes the only method in which to evaluate these people 
and settings and draw conclusions from the qualitative data gathered.  
Case studies are also important for bringing together multiple sources of data, which 
remains important for the seven questions of the substantive representation framework, in 
addition to the exploration of the topic in general.141 Further to this, it is important to 
employ a ‘thick description’ in case study research whereby the layers of context and 
details are explored.142 This thick description will be aided by document analysis and 
observation. Specifically, in regard to the political representation of women, a ‘thick’ 
understanding for gender scholar Fiona Mackay means “analysing the complexity and 
contingency of ‘what is going on in political representation’ [which] requires a ‘thick’ 
conception of substantive representation. In short, a contextualised, inter-relational, whole-
system approach is needed, rather than a narrow focus on whether or not women 
representatives ‘act for’ women.”143 This thick description aids in understanding the ‘social 
world.’144 The goals of a case study are therefore to understand meaning and context 
within the case, to discover (possible) new theories or ideas within the case, to recognise 
under what conditions actions or events may occur, and finally to develop possible 
explanations of the explored processes.145  
It is also important to consider the political context under which this case study takes place 
in England and Wales. The United Kingdom comprises of England, Wales, Scotland, and 
Northern Ireland. Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland have devolved parliaments, unlike 
England. As stated by the national parliament, “[d]evolution in the UK created a national 
Parliament in Scotland, a national Assembly in Wales and a national Assembly in Northern 
Ireland. This process transferred, and continues to transfer, varying levels of power from 
the UK Parliament to the UK's nations - but kept authority over the devolved institutions in 
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the UK Parliament itself.”146 Simply, this means that those three territories are able to 
make laws which concern only their citizens. Although Wales has a devolved parliament, it 
mostly deals with matters such as housing, local government, and town and country 
planning, and does not have the same powers as the devolved parliament of Scotland and 
Northern Ireland for example, and is therefore included in this case study.147 In the case of 
Wales, the Westminster parliament in London, England holds primary legislative 
responsibilities while the Welsh Assembly retains secondary legislative responsibilities, 
and the Welsh MPs continue to hold voting power within the national parliament where 
“[p]rimary legislation is effectively the type of law passed currently at Westminster in that 
it lays down the scope of legislation. It might, for example, say that there must be a 
national curriculum in schools. Secondary legislation governs the way the laws work in 
practice. Following the above example, it might allow the minister in charge to decide 
exactly which subjects the national curriculum contains.”148 Therefore, while Wales, 
Scotland, and Northern Ireland have devolved parliaments, they continue to vote and serve 
in the national parliament in England, and many of these MPs are mentioned within the 
cases in the following chapters. Legislation from the devolved parliaments also serves as 
inspiration in many of the cases to follow. While devolution is not an issue to explore 
within this thesis, it is important to mention as the majority of this case study takes place 
by examining the national parliament in England. 
Therefore, a case study, using document analysis and observation, such as attending All-
Party Parliamentary Groups (APPG) meetings, will be employed in order to answer the 
following research question: what does SRW mean in England and Wales, regarding 
violence against women?149 To reiterate, this question will be explored through the 
following aims: implementing a formalised framework surrounding SRW, using this 
framework to research the impact of SRW on violence against women in England and 
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Wales, including identifying critical actors, drawing conclusions on SRW, producing 
meaningful research, and expanding future knowledge on the political representation of 
women, as well as its effects on violence against women. The next section will detail the 
feminist methods used within case studies, specifically regarding the political and 
substantive representation of women. Feminist methods will be described as they inform 
the research topic, research question, and case study.   
 
Feminist Research and Methodology 
Much of the current and former research regarding the political representation of women, 
and especially violence against women, has been carried out by gender scholars using 
feminist methodology, or ideas that guide the research practices and processes, such as 
having gender as the key tool of analysis. Feminist research “insists that the ‘personal is 
political’ and rejects, both in theory and in practice, the entire distinction between private 
and public spheres. …feminist politics may take place anywhere, and what was formerly 
understood as private life may be the most political of all sites of activity.”150 Thus, this 
research will use feminist ideas for theory on conducting research but will not solely focus 
on explicitly feminist goals of certain actors. For example, some political parties make 
claims to act on behalf of women, even when these claims may not be feminist.151  
Moving away from the public/private divide described above, as feminist scholars Brooke 
Ackerly and Jacqui True detail, feminist methods require an assurance of attention to: “(1) 
unequal power relations, (2) to relationships, (3) to boundaries of inclusion–exclusion and 
forms of marginalization, and (4) to situating the researcher in the research process.”152 
Specifically regarding gender and politics questions, Mona Lena Krook and Judith Squires 
state: “There is no distinctive feminist methodology, but there is a distinctive feminist 
approach to methodology and methods. More specifically, feminist research is driven by 
substantive political problems and is thus open to the deployment of a broad range of 
methodological frames.”153 Therefore, a feminist approach to research is ‘problem centric’ 
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and is not necessarily driven by strict, specific methods.154 In this sense, feminist research 
can use old problems, such as political representation, to ask new questions and reframe 
the answers regarding an issue from a feminist approach, giving attention to the four 
requirements above.155 
Specifically regarding political representation, feminist research has looked beyond the 
numbers, as stated by feminist scholar Marian Sawer to “research what kind of institutional 
supports can help legislators focus more effectively on gender equality issue[s], whether 
parliamentary committees, parliamentary commissions, women’s caucuses or 
parliamentary friendship groups with a specific gender equality mandate.”156 While not all 
feminist research is the same, much of the research overlaps in many ways. For example, 
most feminist research tends to be context-driven, with an attention to feminist theories, 
with gender at the foreground, or ‘nucleus’ of the analysis.157 Furthermore, feminist 
research and methods are not about women, but instead are for women.158 These foci have 
aided in the general research process by reinventing normative research to show previously 
ignored facets (such as in the case of gender).159 In all, feminist research and methods 
agree on many research standards that bind it together as ‘feminist.’160 These standards are 
detailed by author Sotirios Sarantakos as being: “that women have been 
marginalized…that male superiority is perpetuated despite policies, assurances and 
political promises…that there is still a long way to go to establish gender equality.”161 
Using feminist methods will aid in the case study by enriching it as a whole. The methods 
will help to ‘gender’ the conversation surrounding political representation in England and 
Wales, specifically regarding violence against women legislation, as well as bring attention 
to the potential marginalization of women in the political process. 
In order to fully understand what is meant by violence against women as a concept for 
purposes of this thesis, the next section will detail what exactly is meant by ‘violence 
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against women,’ as well as ‘domestic violence’ and why they require defining in the first 
place. 
 
Defining Violence against Women 
For some, gender-based violence and violence against women are interchangeable terms. 
However, they should be understood as different for the purpose of this thesis. As True 
clarifies, gender-based violence: 
Captures women’s experience of violence due to unequal gender power relations 
but not exclusively, since men are also victims of violence due to gender 
stereotyping and denigration when they fail to live up to dominant forms of 
masculinity. Thus, GBV [gender-based violence] affects both men and women, 
whereas VAW [violence against women] embraces those violent acts that are 
primarily directed toward women.162  
In this sense, violence against women is a subsection of gender violence, where in addition 
to violence against men, gender-based violence encompasses same-sex violence, female-
perpetrated violence, and violence against gay and lesbian individuals.163 Violence should 
be seen through the interpretation of gender and because women are more likely to be 
victims of gender violence, the term violence against women will be employed in this 
thesis.164 Further to this, it is important to consider that “[c]reating gender-symmetrical 
language risks rendering women invisible—and women are still by far the most common 
targets of sexual and domestic violence, still most in need of support services.”165 
An internationally-recognised definition of violence against women comes from the UN, 
described in General Assembly Resolution 48/104, establishing the Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence against Women (DEVAW) in 1993. In this document, violence 
against women is seen as an act (or series of acts) “that results in, or is likely to result in, 
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physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such 
acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or private 
life”166 The acts that the UN recognises under this definition include: familial violence, 
which encompasses the sexual abuse of children, marital rape, violence relating to dowry, 
battering, female genital mutilation, and non-partner violence.167 Including familial 
violence, DEVAW recognises violence occurring within the community, comprising of 
sexual harassment, sexual abuse, rape, forced prostitution and trafficking.168 Any form of 
violence perpetrated by the state, including physical, sexual or psychological is also 
recognised in the declaration.169 DEVAW was the first international declaration intended 
to address and deal with the issue of violence against women, and the UN-created 
definition is the most widely used amongst the international community.170  
Prior to DEVAW, definitions of violence against women originally only encompassed 
rape, assault, and murder.171 Scholars studying violence against women have introduced 
issues with the DEVAW definition, however. For example, the DEVAW definition does 
not reference economic or structural violence (or a type of violence that is not personal per 
se, but instead is ‘built into structure’).172 In addition, the DEVAW definition “appears to 
create a hierarchy of harms, with the primary focus on family violence, followed by 
violence within the general community, and finally violence perpetrated or condoned by 
the state.”173 Because of the discrepancies with the DEVAW definition, the latter will be 
considered in conjunction with the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa definition. The protocol defines violence against 
women as “all acts perpetrated against women which cause or could cause them physical, 
sexual, psychological, and economic harm, including the threat to take such acts; or to 
undertake the imposition of arbitrary restrictions on or deprivation of fundamental 
freedoms in private or public life in peace time and during situations of armed conflicts or 
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of war.”174 In addition, sexual violence can encompass intimate partner violence, severe 
intimate partner violence, current intimate partner violence, prior intimate partner violence, 
and non-partner sexual violence.175 In addition to these internationally-recognised 
definitions of violence against women, the United Kingdom-government definition of 
violence against women, specifically domestic violence must be considered. Most recently, 
in 2013, the government definition of domestic violence was updated to include the 
following:  
Any incident or pattern of incidents of controlling, coercive, threatening behaviour, 
violence or abuse between those aged 16 or over who are, or have been, intimate 
partners or family members regardless of gender or sexuality. The abuse can 
encompass, but is not limited to: psychological, physical, sexual, financial, 
emotional. … 
 
Controlling behaviour is a range of acts designed to make a person subordinate 
and/or dependent by isolating them from sources of support, exploiting their 
resources and capacities for personal gain, depriving them of the means needed for 
independence, resistance and escape and regulating their everyday behavior.  
… 
 
Coercive behaviour is an act or a pattern of acts of assault, threats, humiliation and 
intimidation or other abuse that is used to harm, punish, or frighten their victim.176 
For example, the government definition was introduced in 2013; however, controlling and 
coercive behaviour was not against the law until 2015 (discussed in Chapter 4) and as 
Elfyn Llwyd stated on February 26, 2014 in attempts to introduce a new legal framework 
regarding domestic violence, “there are gaps in the current law that are failing victims of 
domestic violence. Perpetrators are thus able to abuse their partners without facing arrest 
for that behavior.”177 
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Although the definitions presented above are not without their downfalls, such as their lack 
of statutory enforcement, they are important to include in order to understand exactly what 
is meant by the contemporary definitions of violence against women and domestic 
violence, in the international and the domestic context. The definitions above will be 
considered for the remainder of this thesis when violence against women and domestic 
violence are discussed.  
The next section of this chapter will present the concept of a critical path and critical 
actions. The creation of a consistent route for the expansion and assessment of research on 
SRW remains an important and so far, unsolved methodological issue within the field. 
There is a tendency to draw conclusions about the representation process as a whole based 
on the evaluation of different cases or issues—and using a variety of methods—which 
generates inconsistent and varying results. This thesis then, attempts to do two things: first, 
formulate the term ‘critical actions,’ by conceptualising them in reference to the above 
‘core tenets’ of SRW, as actions or steps taken by critical actors, initiated by a critical 
juncture, which lead to critical acts. Second, this thesis proposes bringing together these 
core tenets in order to construct a ‘critical path’ to trace and evaluate this representation 
process. Following this, this chapter sets out to describe, in detail, SRW framework and 
how this framework is used in the case study chapters of this thesis. 
 
A Critical Path 
The tremendous progress that has been made in regard to SRW can present a multifaceted 
yet sometimes difficult route on how to actually go about its evaluation and find consistent 
patterns across various issues, periods of time, or locations. Currently, in order to examine 
the process of what is actually ‘going on’ in SRW, the research focuses on the above 
various questions.178 Because these questions are intrinsically linked, the task of answering 
them and conducting empirical research can seem somewhat cluttered because there is no 
consistent path that is followed. In addition, there is the tendency for researchers to draw 
conclusions about the representation process as a whole, when in actuality researchers are 
evaluating different cases, issues or using different methods.  
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Other areas within the field of politics sometimes use a consistent type of path in order to 
evaluate various events which have already taken place, or to predict possible future 
occurrences. For example, in order to examine political institutions, scholars within the 
fields of institutionalism, new institutionalism or feminist institutionalism, use a type of 
‘path dependency’ to evaluate the changing nature of institutions where ‘the past 
influences the future’ and to serve as ‘a central explanatory variable in political 
analysis.’179 The field of representation lacks this sort of path. Because contemporary 
scholars of representation look beyond political institutions, it is important to introduce a 
way to evaluate the representation process in a strengthened sense, one which could 
provide important insights specifically regarding SRW.  
This thesis suggests then, that what continues to be missing in the conversation 
surrounding representation is the lack of focus on the actual steps—what I call critical 
actions—which are important in SRW. What is also missing is a logical pathway to trace 
these steps, in order to effectively evaluate what is ‘going on.’ Adopting the use of critical 
actions and a critical path will provide a more consistent way of understanding the 
representation process as a whole, and will fill the gap that persists between major 
concepts within the field including critical junctures, critical actors, and critical acts. The 
adoption of these notions will increase the researcher’s ability to trace a variety of 
occurrences across several instances of substantive representation, for example, when 
examining an issue across several time periods or legislatures. The proposed 
operationalised pathway helps expand the knowledge regarding the issue in a particular 
case study. The remainder of this chapter will use the literature to frame the contributions 
of this thesis: the idea of critical actions and a critical path. 
 
  
                                                        
179 Fiona Mackay, Meryl Kenny, and Louise Chappell, “New Institutionalism Through a Gender Lens: 
Towards a Feminist Institutionalism?,” International Political Science Review (2010): 573; James Mahoney, 
“Path Dependence in Historical Sociology,” Theory and Society (2000): 507. 
 45 
Path step Questions to be answered 
1. Critical juncture Why is SRW attempted?  
 
When does SRW occur? 
 
2. Critical actions by critical actors180 
a. Communicative critical action 
b. Symbolic critical action 
c. Substantive critical action 
How is SRW manifested? 
 
Who acts in SRW? 
 
Where does the substantive representation occur? 
 
In relation to which women is substantive 
representation expressed? 
 
3. Critical act What policies are being passed? 
 
Table 1: The critical path and questions to be answered 
 
Using the Critical Path 
Today, the research surrounding SRW addresses many aspects of the concept. In order to 
present and analyse the most important aspects of the representation process, this thesis 
brings together the core tenets of this representation in order to create a critical path and 
present a more systematic and step-by-step process, starting with the point of a critical 
juncture, where these critical actions can be traced—along with critical actors and critical 
acts—to effectively evaluate SRW. This thesis borrows the idea of a critical path from both 
institutionalism and also the field of business, and is being proposed here for use when 
evaluating SRW. For instance, in project management and business literature, a critical 
path is understood as:  
A technique… to identify the activities within a project that are critical to its 
success, usually by showing on a diagram or flow chart the order in which activities 
must be carried out so that the project can be completed in the shortest time.181  
While in this definition the critical path is developed prior to the project, this thesis 
proposes a redefinition of this concept in order to be utilised when evaluating the 
representation process after the representation has occurred. After all, this evaluation does 
not seek to determine or predict future behaviour of those involved in the representation 
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process, rather, this evaluation seeks to assess the behaviour that has already happened.182 
The utility and development of this concept can help guide the evaluation of the 
representation process, by proposing a specific way to trace and assess this process. The 
critical path will continue to consider the seven questions, however, instead of answering 
these questions in a randomised way, by employing the following critical path, the 
evaluation becomes more focused and explicable. 
By employing the concept of a critical path, the process can be seen as more inclusive, and 
less isolated in terms of answering the above seven questions. For example, the critical 
juncture is the beginning of the process where representation occurs. The critical juncture 
then leads to critical actions by critical actors, and follows with the outcome, or the critical 
act.  
All of these steps make up the representation process as a whole. Once this instance of 
substantive representation is assessed, the researcher can then look for the next critical 
juncture and begin the process again, following this cyclical progression. This is important 
because it increases the researcher’s ability to trace various junctures, actions, actors, and 
acts across several instances of substantive representation.  
The critical path is proposed as follows:  
(1) Identify where the critical juncture occurs.183 In addition to identifying where 
this critical juncture occurs, the following questions can be answered using this 
critical juncture:  
• When does SRW occur?  
• Why is SRW attempted?  
 
(2) After identifying the critical juncture, the critical actions from critical actors 
then need to be investigated and established. These critical actors can be 
identified by examining and answering the following questions, as 
conceptualised by Childs and Krook:184 
  
                                                        
182 Childs and Krook, “Analysing Women’s Substantive Representation,” 136. 
183 See: Jennifer Curtin, “Women, Political Leadership and the Substantive Representation: the Case of New 
Zealand,” Parliamentary Affairs (2008); Mona Lena Krook and Fiona Mackay, Gender, Politics and 
Institutions (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Sawer, “The Story of RU486 in Australia.” 
184 Childs and Krook, “Analysing Women’s Substantive Representation,” 139. 
 47 
•  ‘Who initiates policy proposals? 
• Who acts on these policy proposals? 
• Do they act individually or as part of a group? 
• If they join with others: Who? On what basis? How long? Why? 
• How do they set out to achieve policy change? 
• Do they provoke resistance or backlash? 
• Do they achieve policy change?’ 
 
Following the identification of critical actors, the following questions can be 
answered in order to establish these critical actions: 
• How is SRW manifested? 
• Who acts in SRW? 
• Where does the substantive representation occur? 
• In relation to which women is substantive representation expressed? 
 
(3) After the establishment of the critical juncture, critical actors, and critical 
actions, the critical act, can then be recognised. Importantly, this determination 
of these critical acts can be evaluated by asking: What policies are being 
passed? If no policies are being passed, that realisation can also be used to 
evaluate the representation process as well.  
 
Critical Path Framework Questions 
For purposes of this thesis, a seven-question critical path framework will guide the 
research, in regard to domestic violence in England and Wales. The following section will 
present the seven questions in detail, by specifying what the questions are actually asking, 
how the questions have been previously conceptualised, and how I will answer the 
questions in specific relation to England and Wales. The questions below are presented in 
the order according to the critical path conceptualised earlier in this chapter. The questions 
themselves were framed throughout previous research by Dovi (2007), Celis et al. (2008), 
and Lovenduski and Guadagnini (2010). 
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Why is SRW attempted? 
Frequently, in order to answer this question, researchers have focused on ‘women's issues.’ 
This focus however can cause ‘women’ to be seen as a singular group, with the same 
interests and goals. This can cause SRW to be synonymous with feminist conceptions of 
SRW.185 This problem can be eradicated by various means of examination including the 
consideration of ‘strategic gender interests,’186 ‘practical gender interests,’187 claims-
making, motivation, obligation, and opportunity.188 In terms of the interests themselves, in 
research it is theorised that ‘women’s issues’ cannot be condensed to a specific number of 
areas.189 However, one issue that all actors achieved consensus on in the United Kingdom 
was the issue of violence against women and because of this finding, it is deemed 
acceptable for the purpose of this thesis to use this single issue.190 Despite this, some 
political parties may take ‘ownership’ or ‘claim’ an issue, such as domestic violence, 
particularly around election time, promising action on the issue. To this point, as stated by 
Shaun Bevan and Zachary Greene, “elections alone do not explain changes in the 
distribution of policies across issues. Instead, the parties’ organizations, responses to 
economic conditions, and the size of the parliamentary delegation influence the stability of 
issue attention…”191 According to Bevan and Greene, it is not solely because of an election 
platform that actors choose to act on a particular issue, whether it be a declared party 
position or a personal one. Admittedly, this thesis largely does not focus on the party 
aspect of representation, as this case study revolves around a single issue that each political 
party has agreed is an important issue that must be addressed. Furthermore, this case study 
does not focus on the workings of a particular party, so that critical actors may be 
determined regardless of party affiliation. Lastly, it may be important for MPs to have the 
support of their fellow party members on more partisan issues, such as austerity spending, 
however, it will be interesting to see if this support is as necessary on an issue of 
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importance such as domestic violence or whether actors from other parties will join in 
debates and the drafting of legislation. 
The above categories of gender interests were first developed by Maxine Molyneux in 
1985 where she stated “we need to specify how the various categories of women might be 
affected differently, and act differently on account of the particularities of their social 
positioning and their chosen identities.”192 In terms of this thesis, interests and claims-
making regarding domestic violence were typically framed around notions of prevention, 
provision, and protection established by the government via inquiries, reports, or action 
plans. Furthermore, because this project focuses specifically on the issue of domestic 
violence within the English and Welsh context, these ‘categories of women’ are somewhat 
already distinguished from all women. This differentiation does not necessarily include 
only victim-survivors of domestic violence, but it can include those close to or affected by 
domestic violence in some way, such as those at risk, family members of victim-survivors, 
friends, etc. Many of the debates examined within the case study in Chapter 3 and Chapter 
4 speak about various categories of women and how different women may be affected by 
the various proposed policies. For example, in Case 2 Protection Against Stalking (PAS) 
conducted a study on victim-survivors’ experience with the criminal justice system, while 
the National Association of Probation Officers (NAPO) study focused on convicted male 
perpetrators of domestic violence. While both of these studies concentrated on different 
categories of individuals with differing interests and social positioning, PAS and NAPO 
were able to draw similar conclusions that changes were needed in terms of the criminal 
justice system in dealing with the issue of domestic violence.  
The claims-making suggestion, framed by Michael Saward, offers that “discourses are 
central features to SRW [substantive representation of women], in which acting for women 
involves claiming to represent women and framing issues as being of importance to 
women.”193 Therefore, the answering of this question does not focus solely on women’s 
interests as a general category, but instead on the conceptions of created and voiced 
interests, as well as representative claims, aims, and motivations.194 Specifically, the 
conceptions of motivation, obligation, and opportunity are most closely associated with 
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representatives within legislatures and how their claims-making coincides with these 
concepts. For Lovenduski and Guadagnini, these three notions can either be undertaken in 
isolation, or be used in combination. For example, “[m]otivation follows from interests and 
desire, obligation from legal and/or moral responsibility, and opportunity from a 
combination of capacity and position.”195  
When answering this question, the concept of ‘discourse’ becomes important when 
determining why an actor may claim to substantively represent women. A specific 
discourse, such as that surrounding domestic violence, can reinforce what we already know 
about a specific issue. This can be reflected in how debates are framed and how legislation 
is written. This can then highlight whether there is a gap in the popular discourse of an 
issue and the issue itself. For example, does the legislation actually address the primary 
issue, or does it only address the discourse spoken of from the legislators.    
This thesis does not employ a discourse analysis, yet a brief introduction of discourse and 
how it affects legislators’ approach to violence against women is needed. As stated by 
Christina Schäffner, “Discourse as a form of verbal interaction, as an actual instance of 
communication, is meaningful in a specific context of situation (and in culture). Discourse 
analysis as the examination of the structure and function of language in use thus involves 
the analysis of context and participants.”196 Throughout the case study it will be important 
to consider this idea, that language is meaningful and contextual, as a way to examine why 
an actor may claim to act for women. It is also important to consider whether the language 
used within debates, etc. throughout the case study reinforces the current language that is 
used regarding domestic violence, such as viewing women as victims deserving of 
protection, or whether the conversation is framed in an entirely different way. It will be 
important to examine whether the formal discourse within the legislature is actually the 
discourse that is being used by those working in non-profits organisations, etc. 
Therefore, as a researcher attempting to answer this question, it is significant to consider 
the following: ‘women’ as a group are situated at various intersections in society, including 
race and class and this can influence the identification of ‘interests.’197 Representation 
must be seen as a process of claims-making and include the many reasons for why an actor 
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may frame interests in a certain way.198 As noted, “the claims-making approach, 
importantly does not necessarily refute the possibility that women share a common set of 
interests; rather, its strength lies in highlighting the fact that numerous actors are involved 
in portraying and thus constructing what ‘women’s interests’ may be.”199 In order to find 
and analyse these claims, expressions and meanings of certain claims are evaluated, 
through the language of the various acts and actors, and also bring motivation, obligation, 
and opportunity into the discussion.200 
 
When does SRW occur? 
The question of political time has rarely been researched in regard to the political 
representation of women, but two things are essential to consider in regard to political 
time: juxtaposition and sequence.201 Juxtaposition includes other priority issues of 
legislators, immediacy of elections, public opinion regarding the issue being researched (in 
this case, domestic violence), the economic positioning of the country being studied (and 
whether resources are available), dates of debates, and whether the ‘political climate’ is 
amenable to the issue.202 Sequence, on the other hand, includes whether an act or 
proposition in regard to the issue being investigated received success or defeat 
previously.203     
In order to understand these two concepts, Childs and Lovenduski present two examples of 
how juxtaposition and sequence are important to evaluate when considering political time 
within SRW. They state:  
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A classic example of juxtaposition is the insertion of a ban on sex discrimination in 
the U.S. 1964 Civil Rights Act in which an amendment extending rights for women 
was added to the bill by southern Democrat Virginian congressman Judge Howard 
Smith who hoped (wrongly) that this would sufficiently increase opposition to the 
bill to prevent its enactment (Meehan 1985). Sequence is illustrated by the 
extension of the public sector duty, previously limited to racial minorities and 
disabled people, to promote sex equality in the British Equal Rights Act of 2010 
and the successive Equality and Anti Discrimination Directives of the European 
Union that extended the rights of women (and other groups) over a period of three 
decades.204  
In the case of England and Wales, it is important to use juxtaposition and sequence as 
starting points for which to answer this question. For example, it became important to look 
at when the specific cases of legislation were introduced and in relation to other parts of 
the proposed bill. Further, it was important to explore the public consultations given by the 
government in order to discover whether the issues consulted were followed up on in the 
proposal of legislation. Readings, other parliamentary inquiries, and discerning whether 
there was a victory or defeat in regard to the legislation was important to assess SRW. 
Researching the political time of certain issues helps to contextualise the issue in regard to 
other issues and, if there was a defeat in certain instances, what was the sequence 
following this defeat? Was it reintroduced or did the issue lapse? All of these issues are 
important to the framework.  
 
Who acts in SRW? 
This question attempts to discover who is acting on behalf of women and is a major reason 
for why it is important to evaluate SRW. Conventionally, the focus of this question has 
been on the actions of female representatives and their stated preferences and policy 
priorities in state legislatures. Today, however, identifying critical actors is seen to be more 
important in gaining the larger picture of representation as a whole.205 To further this point, 
Lovenduski and Guadagnini state: “Representation is performed by elected and appointed 
actors, movements, and individuals operating in different and changing circumstances at 
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different stages of policy debates.”206 In answering this question, there are important points 
to consider: first, those that represent women do not have to be women in parliament; they 
can instead be men in parliament, movement actors, ministers or cabinet members, or other 
members of civil society, such as those involved in charities or other non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs).207 As stated in the literature review of this thesis, the question of 
whether women represent women is a long-standing question within the literature 
regarding the political representation of women. A secondary question is if men can 
effectively represent women, and whether it is problematic for men to claim to represent 
women in the first place. While it has been argued that men and women in politics behave 
in similar ways, others note there are differences.208 As Manon Tremblay notes, “it is 
worth noting that having more women elected into parliament is important not only in 
order to provide role-models for girls and women, and symbols of what females can 
achieve, but also to change the attitudes, opinions and behaviour of men in political 
parties.”209 This is important because it not only shows the symbolic nature of actors 
outside of the policymaking arena, but also within it. 
Secondly, critical actors can be non-left and do not have to be feminist.210 Right-leaning 
and conservative parties also claim to act for women, which raises the question of what 
‘acting for’ women actually means in this context.211 For example, the 2015 Conservative 
party manifesto claimed that the party would prioritise combating the issue of violence 
against women and girls in England and Wales.212 Instead, critical actors are characterised 
by their actions and claims of representing. Another example is Labour-leader Jeremy 
Corbyn. In a Labour published document entitled ‘Working with Women,’ Corbyn 
acknowledged that “[w]omen continue to face discrimination and sexism– hampering life 
chances and collectively damaging our society and our economy.”213 He further states that 
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he would end cuts to public services that affect women the most, including those services 
which help women who experience violence.214  
Therefore, the criterion for choosing who critical actors are is two-fold. As stated by Celis 
and Silvia Erzeel, actors in this sense “exhibit specific attitudes and behavior: they are 
attitudinally strongly motivated to promote women’s interests in parliament and are highly 
active in representing women’s issues.”215 In addition to the importance of identifying 
critical actors, so too is the determination of these actors as ‘claims-makers.’216 Criteria 
that have been assigned to this category include elected and nonelected actors who make 
claims on behalf of women or women’s perceived interests.217  
In order to determine the critical actors in the English and Welsh context, I observe the 
actions of: female and male legislators, movement actors, relevant policy agencies, cross-
party groups, parliamentary committees, sponsors of bills, sponsors and signatories of 
Early Day Motions (EDMs), and various charity actors, such as those in Women’s Aid, 
who help bring issues with domestic violence in England and Wales to the forefront of 
discussion in both the everyday context but also within the policymaking arena. This 
observation is done by analysing the following, in regard to the above criteria: government 
documents, legislative evaluations, daily Hansard debates, parliamentary debates, and 
publications by various organisations. These resources are analysed in order to determine 
who is gendering the debate or gendering interests. Questions considered for this section 
included asking what the role of parliamentarians are, and what the role of parliament more 
generally is. 
 
How is SRW manifested? 
The posing and answering of this question draws attention to the actual actions that take 
place during the representation process. Much of the literature on substantive 
representation today focuses on critical actors.218 While the actions of critical actors are 
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observed, they are rarely explicitly spoken of in terms of their key importance, or 
criticality. Instead, the emphasis is typically on the actors and the outcomes of the 
representation. But the question remains: what is happening between the actors and the 
point of actual policy change? To borrow from March and Olsen, there is sometimes 
observation without attention to explication, where we observe the actors and the 
outcomes, but do not attempt to explain the process itself.219  
‘Actions’ can be defined generally as the act of doing. As stated above, critical actions are 
defined here as actions or steps taken by critical actors, initiated by a critical juncture, 
which lead to critical acts. This thesis conceptualises critical actions as what has been 
defined in previous literature as critical acts, although they are in fact, actions and not 
necessarily outcomes. Instead, I argue that critical acts can be seen as the outcome of 
representation, or the point of actual policy change, as some scholars have pointed out.220 
Critical actions can be categorised within three types of actions: communicative critical 
actions, symbolic critical actions, and substantive critical actions. Communication critical 
actions encompass verbal or written responses or acknowledgement of an issue. Symbolic 
critical actions include actions such as voting, taking part in a parliamentary debate, 
broadening the political agenda, or supporting bills. Substantive critical actions encompass 
actions of accomplishment, such as the government launching a consultation or 
introducing bills or an issue for debate. Substantive critical actions are more measurable 
actions, whereas the communicative and symbolic are more figurative and ceremonial. 
It is important to posit the question of how one arrives at these critical actions. To borrow 
examples from Celis, actions, formerly categorised as critical acts, include: “Voting, 
introducing and supporting bills, speaking for women, broadening the political agenda, 
formulating women’s interests, gendering debates and policy content, lobbying the state, 
[and] feminist policy analysis.”221 Rather than seeing these activities as critical acts, we 
can use the definition presented above to describe these instead as critical actions. Further, 
these actions do not have to lead directly to a new law or policy change per se, in order to 
be considered a critical action. Instead, critical actions are steps of enablement, rather than 
‘successful’ policy outcomes. For example, a proposed bill may not become a new law or 
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piece of legislation, but the claims of a representative, i.e. voting or introducing the 
legislation itself, can still be regarded as critical actions because it could lead to further 
action or the issue being addressed in the future. Furthermore, some actions may not be 
considered ‘critical’ at the time of the event, but could become critical when utilising the 
critical path framework and evaluating previous instances of representation. When 
considering the definition of SRW, the definition is contingent on the acting (critical 
actions), not necessarily the success of the acting. To this, it becomes apparent that the 
knowledge of critical actions and critical acts are required, with attention being paid to 
what Celis describes as a ‘kaleidoscope of actions’ where “acting for women is not limited 
to a specific act in parliament, but is defined as broadening the definition of what is in the 
‘interest of women.’”222 Therefore it is not one act, but many critical actions that help to 
guide this research.  
These critical actions are also identified by the ‘processes of framing’ where “[w]omen’s 
representatives put forward gendered ideas in attempts to frame or reframe a debate so that 
its discourse is gendered or regendered.”223 However, this process does not have to be done 
by female representatives. Gendering a debate, or gendering a frame can be done by male 
actors as well. Women may descriptively represent women, but men can also represent 
women. More specifically, ‘frames’ are conceptualised as statements made by actors.224 In 
addition to statements, frames also include a ‘diagnosis’ and ‘solution.’225 Framing 
therefore is how these frames are defined and preserved.226 In addition to framing by 
representatives, framing occurs by movement actors and also within WPAs: “Movement 
actors attempt to establish and maintain consultative relationships with policy agencies; 
policy agencies seek movement support and occasionally establish consultative groups that 
include movement actors.”227 For example, movement actors add to policy inquiry, where 
this is seen as both lobbying and framing.228  
In order to answer this question in regard to England and Wales, many actions are 
considered. These include: voting records and policy priorities of both men and women in 
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the Westminster parliament, lobbying and activism by parliamentarians, the women’s 
movement, and WPAs, in addition to the frames and policy initiatives made by relevant 
charity organizations, such as Women’s Aid. Additionally, public debates, the drafting of 
bills, political party manifestos, public consultations initiated by the government, speeches 
in which claims are made, the introduction of an issue to parliament, independent 
parliamentary inquiries, and parliamentary standing orders are consulted. 
 
In relation to which women is substantive representation expressed? 
Similar to other questions within the framework which invoke a symbolic assessment, 
discussing which women are represented within a certain context raises important issues 
surrounding how representation is evaluated and which women are actually being 
represented, due to the contentious topic of ‘women’s interests’ and whether or not they 
actually exist. Because of this, it is assumed that not all women are represented equally, 
either descriptively within the legislature, or as a citizen. Further to this, women do not 
solely identify as ‘women’ as a standalone term. There are intersecting identities to which 
women subscribe—or are prescribed by society—including: race, class, ethnicity, religion, 
disability, age, party and group memberships, employment, ideology, and feminist and 
non-feminist sentiment.229  
Additionally, it must be agreed that women’s interests—as much as they exist—are not the 
same as feminist interests.230 While many of the studies conducted on SRW tend to begin 
from a generally feminist standpoint, it is acknowledged that:  
Focusing on how conservative representatives can and do make claims ‘for women’ 
presents an important opportunity to shed light on the role of other actors in SRW, 
as well as to understand the representative relationship between conservative 
representatives and conservative women in society, and to capture the broader 
processes of responsiveness towards women.231 
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In addition, it remains important to recognise the responsiveness described above in regard 
to which women these conservative actors may claim to act for. 
Further to this, as much as a government claims to speak on behalf of ‘women,’ women are 
affected differently by way of their intersectional identities, as shown by previous data.232 
This point is further illustrated by Joyce Outshoorn and Johanna Kantola where they state: 
“On the whole, different governments and agencies have been slow to recognize diversity 
among women and to take it into account in policy… Many agencies still tend to take 
women as an undifferentiated category.”233 Given this, it is interesting to see and evaluate 
which women are represented within the process of representation, due to governments’ 
historic lack of understanding of women’s various identities. Instead of focusing 
specifically on whether or not women’s interests are represented, attention is paid to which 
women are represented by the various claims made in the representation process.234 In 
England and Wales, this amounts to asking whether different women are considered, with 
attention paid to the various intersecting identities of women. What types of women are 
these government interventions aimed at, and in relation to which women were concerns 
expressed by various actors? 
 
Where does the substantive representation occur? 
Traditionally, researchers have focused on national parliaments when examining where 
SRW occurs, while excluding other possible sites of substantive representation, which is 
why this question is important for this thesis. These sites of representation include different 
levels of government (local, regional, national, and supranational), political forums (civil 
society, NGOs, WPAs, and cabinets), and possibly via social media or public protest.235 
For example, Sawer examined the Australian national parliament but also studied 
Australian political forums such as The Parliamentary Group on Population and 
Development.236 Sawer stated “[t]he passage of the co-sponsored RU486 Bill [regarding an 
abortion drug] was widely viewed as a win for women. Apart from the policy outcome, the 
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campaign involved mutual recognition and close interaction between women inside and 
outside parliament.”237 This quote shows how SRW was strengthened by the involvement 
of different actors, but also the interaction between various sites of action as well.  
In the English and Welsh context of this thesis, the question is answered by evaluating the 
following sites of potential representation, including within the national parliament from 
2010-2015. These years have been chosen as they are inclusive of the five individual 
pieces of legislation chosen to be evaluated in the case study chapter, with the first being 
the Crime and Security Act 2010 and the last being the Serious Crime Act 2015. The 
national parliament context also includes the political forums mentioned above, especially 
WPAs which operate within the government context but also in conjunction with civil 
society and women’s movements, such as the former Women’s National Commission, 
which played an important role in helping to bring about the ‘go’ orders in Case 1 of this 
case study. Therefore, the sites of action do not necessarily need to be solely within the 
parliamentary context, but can be within other government contexts. 
Other important sites to consider include WPAs. WPAs have been conceptualised as “[a] 
structure that meets both of the following criteria: 1) any agency or governmental body 
formally established by government statute or decree, and 2) any agency or governmental 
body formally charged with furthering women’s status and rights or promoting sex-based 
equality.”238 WPAs are the reaction of politicians to demands from women’s movements 
and are therefore positioned between the women’s movement and government, especially 
in regard to research on European countries.239 According to McBride and Mazur, WPAs 
are formal and official organisations created by the state, and as such are state agencies.240 
In the United Kingdom, specifically England and Wales, WPAs have shifted from 
specifically women-based agencies, to diversity and equality agencies based on various 
facets of discrimination other than sex, including ethnicity and race, religion, age, sexual 
orientation, and disability.241 As stated by Judith Squires, “[f]rom the late 1990s onward, 
the ‘separate strands’ approach to equality—in which sex, race and, more recently, 
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disability equality were pursued independently—has gradually been replaced by a more 
integrated concern with ‘diversity,’ placing its gender equality approach into a wider 
equalities framework.”242 For some, this shift only further complicates the degree of WPAs 
to deal specifically with sex-based inequality.243  
In terms of violence against women, Weldon theorises that WPAs’ capacity is weakened if 
it is a ‘subdepartment,’ because the issue of violence against women must compete with 
the other policy aspects of the department.244 Conversely, there are others who embrace the 
approach. For example, former Trade and Industry Secretary and Minster for Women 
Patricia Hewitt stated “tackling discrimination in the 21st century requires a joined-up 
approach that puts equality in the mainstream of concerns. As individuals, our identities 
are diverse, complex and multi-layered. People don’t see themselves as solely a woman, or 
black, or gay and neither should our equality organizations.”245 In addition, the Equal 
Opportunities Commission (EOC), founded in 1976 with the passing of the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975, supported this shift, as well as the Women and Equality Unit 
(WEU) and the Women’s National Commission (WNC). To be sure, this merger between 
WPAs and diversity agencies may be beneficial regarding some issues, although the 
merger could be harmful, rather than beneficial in situations detailed above by Weldon. 
Regardless of the approach differences, women’s policy agencies and organisations, such 
as the EOC, Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), the Centre for Women and 
Democracy, and the Hansard Society, have found that in all sectors of society, including 
politics and decision-making, the United Kingdom is mostly run by men.246 Furthermore, 
“[f]eminist analyses of the state and public policy have also shown that women’s policy 
agencies and their agents are antidotes to the resistance of established institutions 
accustomed to reproducing dominant patterns of gender roles and patriarchy.”247 The 
extent to which women’s policy agencies are effective or not in terms of bringing attention 
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to violence against women in the United Kingdom will be reviewed throughout the case 
study. 
In addition to the national parliament and WPAs, regional governments will also be 
considered. For example, the Welsh government recently passed the Violence Against 
Women, Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence (Wales) Bill, making it the first in the 
United Kingdom to focus explicitly on the topic of violence against women.248 Other sites 
of action include civil society, charities, associations, and conferences which include the 
issue of violence against women and domestic violence, such as the Labour Party’s 
Women Conference. To conclude, Celis writes, “representation is surely not limited to 
parliaments and elected politicians; it takes place in different arenas and several actors 
claim to represent women. In particular, women's movements and women's policy agencies 
offer alternative—and perhaps more effective—sites of representation.”249 These sites of 
action are able to bring attention to issues and articulate the need for change. For example, 
a particular women’s movement may be able to articulate and frame gendered interests in a 
more prolific way by bringing together varying perspectives, as detailed by Weldon.250 
This way of representation can be conceptualised as being more effective because it takes 
into account actually articulated interests rather than the perceived interests of a 
represented group. Despite the above developments, much of the investigation on 
representation continues to use debates in national parliaments as the key source for 
exploring where SRW occurs. This thesis therefore uses debates in national parliaments, 
but also brings together other various sites of action including women’s policy agencies, 
organisations, and civil society. 
 
What policies are being passed? 
While vital to this framework, this question becomes rather straightforward to answer 
when evaluating SRW. The answering of this question is seen as the culmination of the 
representation process as a whole, encompassing the critical acts that are detailed in 
Chapter 2. While imperative to identify what new policies or offences were passed in the 
policymaking process, it is also important to examine what proposals or recommendations 
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were made and those that were not accepted during the legislative process. For example, 
there were 30 recommendations made by the Justice Unions’ Parliamentary Group inquiry 
on stalking in Case 2, yet many of these recommendations were not taken into account 
when the updated bill was being debated. Those recommendations that were presented to 
the House of Lords chamber for example, were either dismissed or tabled. The policy 
failures therefore are just as important to evaluate as the policy successes. For this reason, 
‘failures’ are considered as well when I assessed this question. It is important at the 




To conclude, the methods to be undertaken in this case study include attention to power 
relations, relationships, and the marginalization of women in political life, as well as in 
non-political situations. The cases chosen focus on problem-centric approaches to research, 
by using violence against women as the underlying issue to explore, with gender as the 
nucleus for analysis. The seven specific questions presented above will help to present a 
more detailed approach by looking beyond traditional methods and questions discussed 
previously. These questions help guide the research process, especially in asking what 
SRW means in England and Wales, specifically regarding domestic violence legislation. 
Additionally, this chapter has demonstrated how the study of representation is ever-
changing and has attempted to contribute to those changes by breaking down critical acts 
into critical actions, and also borrowing the idea of instituting a pathway in order to assess 
and draw conclusions on SRW. This chapter has introduced these changes in order to bring 
attention to the process of representation and how critical actors perform these critical 
actions, which then lead to critical acts, with consideration being paid to how the field 
would benefit from analysing the critical path in terms of future evaluation. This 
framework proposes a revelation, where it increases the researcher’s future ability to 
highlight and trace the core tenets of representation across several instances of substantive 
representation, whether it be in regard to specific issues, representatives, or states. 
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Chapter 3: Evaluating SRW in England and Wales: The Crime and 
Security Act 2010 and the Protection from Freedoms Act 2012 






This chapter will engage with the critical path framework conceptualised in Chapter 2, by 
examining and evaluating the first two cases of domestic violence legislation in England 
and Wales during the period of 2010-2015. This case study is comprised of bills that have 
passed through the formal parliamentary process and received Royal Assent, becoming 
acts of law. The point of analysis for this case study begins with the Crime and Security 
Act 2010 because of the government strategy that was released on November 25, 2010 in 
which a new plan of action regarding violence against women and girls was undertaken. 
This government plan sought to move beyond “an approach which is purely centred on the 
criminal justice system, [where] it envisages a role for all relevant public sector 
organisations, ranging from central government departments and public service delivery 
bodies through to local government and the voluntary sector.”252 The legislation to be 
evaluated for this chapter includes: The Crime and Security Act 2010 and the Protection of 
Freedoms Act 2012. Again, this evaluation does not seek to determine or predict future 
behaviour of legislators or those involved in the representation process; rather, this 
evaluation seeks to assess the behaviour that has already happened.253  
To restate, the research question asks what SRW means in the context of England and 
Wales. The sub-questions guiding this research question are: 1) When does SRW occur; 2) 
why is SRW attempted; 3) who acts in SRW; 4) how is SRW manifested; 5) where does 
the substantive representation occur; 6) in relation to which women is substantive 
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representation expressed; and 7) what policies are passed or debated. Furthermore, the 
main aims of this thesis include: employing a formalised framework surrounding SRW by 
answering the above questions and utilising the proposed critical path, using this 
framework to research the impact of SRW on violence against women legislation in 
England and Wales, drawing conclusions on SRW, and expanding future knowledge on the 
political representation of women, as well as its effects on violence against women. The 
next section of this chapter will discuss why laws and legislation are important to examine, 
followed by the evaluation of the first two case studies. 
 
Why Are Laws and Legislation Important? 
Before introducing the first two cases of legislation in this chapter and assessing the 
representation process of both, it is important to discuss why laws and legislation are 
important to evaluate at all. By classification in England and Wales, “[c]riminal offences 
define acts (or omissions) which are so harmful that the wrong is thought to be against the 
state rather than the individual who has suffered the act; the state prosecutes and, on 
conviction by a court, the state punishes, by deprivation of liberty, fine or other means.”254 
While criminal offences in England and Wales are thought to be against the state, and are 
therefore ‘worthy’ of punishment, “one must not equate the adoption of laws with 
enforcement, the existence of progressive policies with effective implementation, or the 
establishment of women's agencies and NGOs with empowerment.”255 On the other hand, 
it is also true that laws and legislation, or the lack thereof, are a direct reflection of the 
social environment and culture at the time. In many instances, laws can be ‘behind the 
times,’ such as in the example of the cases below. In each of these cases, there was an 
outside push to change the law. These pushes can be observed vis-à-vis public government 
consultations or examples of other countries changing their domestic law and these 
changes being used as impetuses for change within England and Wales. This shows that 
even when the social environment has progressed to a certain extent, the laws are slow to 
catch up. 
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The way that the issue of violence against women was historically framed in terms of 
legislation in England and Wales was a reflection of the power relations and hierarchy 
between men and women. This ‘residue’ of the past continues, where the same type of 
problems, specifically regarding domestic violence, continue.256 To paraphrase Dworkin, 
laws are important not because they are always implemented and enforced, but because 
laws themselves determine how we function in society and how we understand what 
happens to us.257 Acts of violence then, are interpreted by way of the law. For example, 
“[l]aws create male dominance, and maintain it, as a social environment. Male dominance 
is the environment we know, in which we must live. … Laws shape our perceptions and 
knowledge of what male dominance is, of how it works, of what it means to us.”258 This 
argument, that laws help to create and foster male dominance, is important to this case 
study, where I will be evaluating the representation of women, but also specifically 
whether legislation regarding domestic violence is actually furthering this male dominance 
as a social condition vis-à-vis the way the issue is framed during the representation 
process. For example, is domestic violence raised as an issue because of the traditional 
male notion of protecting women, or is the policy area discussed as a way to further 
women’s equality within the wider society? Further to this, “[i]ndividuals are positioned as 
they are because of laws and constraints, resources and opportunities and the lack of these; 
and from those positions they engage in unequal encounters, running particular sets of 
risks.”259 In this sense, it is not so much about what the law is criminalising; instead it is 
about how a piece of legislation either improves or upholds certain attitudes about a 
particular act—in this case, an act of violence—and either changes or reinforces citizens’ 
positions in society. Therefore, laws are significant in the way that they are a reflection of 
society as a whole, and it is significant in turn how women may internalise this 
individually. As stated by Robert Buckland MP (Con) in terms of legislation: “The journey 
does not end here.”260 
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Case 1: The Crime and Security Act 2010 
Stage Date Hansard reference 




19 November 2009 Vol. 501 Col. 141 
Second reading 
 





26 January 2010 
28 January 2010 
2 February 2010 
4 February 2010 
9 February 2010 
23 February 2010 
 
Hansard Public Bill Committee 
 
 
Report and Third reading 
 
8 March 2010 Vol. 507 Col. 32-121 




9 March 2010 Vol. 718 Col. 142 
Second reading 
 
29 March 2010 Vol. 718 Col. 1225-1278 
Committee 
 
7 April 2010 Vol. 718 Col. 1540-1570 
Report and Third reading 
 
7 April 2010 Vol. 718 Col. 1750 
Royal Assent – 8 April 2010 House of Lords Hansard Vol. 718 Col. 1738 
House of Commons Hansard Vol. 508 Col. 1256 
 
Table 2: Hansard references for the Crime and Security Act 2010261 
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Party (with more than one representative; as of 6 January 2009)262 
Labour 350 
Conservative 193 
Liberal Democrat 63 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 9 
Scottish National Party (SNP) 7 
Sinn Fein 5 
Independent 5 
Plaid Cymru 3 




Men 520/646 (80 percent) 
Women 126/646 (19.5 percent) 
Table 3: 54th House of Commons composition (2005-2010) 
 
The Crime and Security Act 2010 
The Crime and Security Act 2010 was introduced in the House of Commons on November 
19, 2009 as the Crime and Security Bill. The bill had four main stated themes under which 
various issues were considered. These were: ‘safer streets,’ ‘preventing crimes against the 
vulnerable,’ ‘shutting down criminal and exploitative markets,’ and ‘justice for victims and 
their families.’263 Under the theme of preventing crimes against the vulnerable fell the new 
Domestic Violence Protection Notices (DVPNs). The DVPNs were a new government 
remedy, coined as ‘go’ orders, in which there is ‘immediate exclusion [for the determined 
perpetrator] from the home’ for an initial 48 hours, while a hearing is pending.264  
These notices differ from other criminal justice options, such as those within the Family 
Law Act 1996 and the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, because the ‘go’ orders 
involve an immediate removal, namely a ‘cooling off’ period, where other options can be 
weighed by the victim or the perpetrator themselves. As stated in the Home Office 
Research Report 76, the initial aim was “to give victim-survivors time, space and support 
to consider their options by placing conditions on perpetrators, including 
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restricting/removing perpetrators from households, and preventing contact with, or 
molestation of, victim-survivors.”265 
On the suspicion that there is domestic violence taking place, a senior police officer can 
make the perpetrator leave the common home immediately, which they share with an 
associated person, while a court hearing is pending.266 Legally, these notices aim to 
“secure the immediate protection of a victim of domestic violence… from future violence 
or a threat of violence from a suspected perpetrator.”267 Because victim-survivors of 
domestic abuse are often fearful of the consequences of phoning the police or unwilling to 
take further action against the perpetrator of abuse, a police officer called to the scene of a 
domestic incident is not required to gain consent from the complainant in order to issue the 
notice.268 Once the notice is issued, “the DVPN may explicitly: prohibit [the perpetrator] 
from evicting or excluding [the victim] from the premises; prohibit [the perpetrator] from 
entering the premises; require [the perpetrator] to leave the premises; or prohibit [the 
perpetrator] from coming within a certain distance of the premises… for the duration of the 
DVPN.”269 Further, a breach of the DVPN allows for the perpetrator to be arrested without 
a warrant.  
The issuing of a DVPN automatically initiates a hearing in the magistrate’s court for a 
Domestic Violence Protection Order (DVPO), lasting no less than 14 days, and no more 
than 28 days.270 In order for a DVPO to be granted by the court, there are two conditions 
which must be met. In instances where a DVPO is applied for, “[t]he court must be 
satisfied on the balance of probabilities that [the perpetrator] has been violent, or 
threatened violence, towards an associated person, [the victim]. The second condition is 
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(2013): 4. 
266 HM Government, “Crime and Security Act 2010 Explanatory Notes,” 13; suspicion in this sense includes 
cases where “the authorising officer has reasonable grounds for believing that, firstly, [the perpetrator] has 
been violent or has threatened violence towards an associated person, [the victim], and that, secondly, the 
issue of a notice is necessary in order to secure the protection of [the victim] from violence or the threat of 
violence (HM Government 2010, 13). In the UK, an associated person is defined under the Family Law Act 
1996 as persons “who are, or have been, married to each other or civil partners of each other; who are 
cohabitants or former cohabitants; who live, or have lived, in the same household, otherwise than merely by 
reason of one of them being the other’s employee, tenant, lodger or boarder; who are relatives; who have 
agreed to marry one another or to enter into a civil partnership agreement (whether or not that agreement has 
been terminated); [and] who have or have had an intimate personal relationship with each other which is or 
was of significant duration” (HM Government 2010, 13-14). 
267 HM Government, “Crime and Security Act 2010 Explanatory Notes,” 13. 
268 HM Government, “Crime and Security Act 2010 Explanatory Notes,” 13. 
269 HM Government, “Crime and Security Act 2010 Explanatory Notes,” 13. 
270 HM Government, “Crime and Security Act 2010 Explanatory Notes,” 13. 
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that the court thinks the DVPO is necessary to secure the protection of [the victim] from 
violence, or the threat of violence, from [the perpetrator].”271 Similar to the provision 
present within the DVPN, a breach of the DVPO allows for the perpetrator to be arrested. 
Further, following a breach of the order, the perpetrator is held in custody until there is a 
hearing.272  
After the bill received Royal Assent on April 8, 2010, a pilot scheme was initiated for 15 
months in 2011/2012 in order to assess the effectiveness of the programs in Greater 
Manchester, West Mercia, and Wiltshire.273 The Home Office Research Report 76 found 
that of 487 DVPNs issued, 414 full DVPOs were authorised, with very few breaches 
reported to the police (one percent).274 While there were problems observed in the three 
pilot sites, such as the accessibility to senior police officers to issue the initial DVPN, 
increased paperwork, and timing restrictions to apply for the full DVPO, the programs 
were generally seen as positive by the police, courts, support personnel, and importantly, 
the victim-survivors.275 As stated in the report, “[m]ost of those interviewed felt safer, and 
reported that DVPOs provided them with time and space to consider their options. … 
victim-survivors were relieved to find that the police had the power to remove the 
perpetrator from their home, and indicated that they would call the police again.”276 As 
stated in the report, the DVPNs and subsequent DVPOs helped to fill a gap for victim-
survivors by providing protection and support from potential future abuse and because of 
this protection, the researchers recommended that the scheme be applied more widely in 
England and Wales, with increased police training on these matters, monitor DVPOs and 
any breaches of those protection orders.277 Because of the preliminary reduction in re-
                                                        
271 HM Government, “Crime and Security Act 2010 Explanatory Notes,” 15. 
272 HM Government, “Crime and Security Act 2010 Explanatory Notes,” 15. 
273 Home Office, “Evaluation of the Pilot of Domestic Violence Protection Orders,” 4. 
274 Home Office, “Evaluation of the Pilot of Domestic Violence Protection Orders,” 5. 
275 Home Office, “Evaluation of the Pilot of Domestic Violence Protection Orders,” 5.  
276 Home Office, “Evaluation of the Pilot of Domestic Violence Protection Orders,” 5-6; in the interviewing 
phase of the 2013 Home Office evaluation, two-stage telephone interviews were conducted with 16 victim-
survivors who had experienced violence for many years (Home Office 2013, 27).  
277 Home Office, “Evaluation of the Pilot of Domestic Violence Protection Orders,” 7; the complete list of 
recommendations includes: “Streamline processes of recording DVPNs, and material for courts; consider 
lowering the level of approval for [DVPNs] from police superintendent to inspector; explore how to increase 
recognition of extended routes into DVPOs; embed DVPNs into routine responses; enhance police training to 
demonstrate the range of cases in which DVPOs can be used; provide training and advice to specialist and 
general legal advisers and magistrates; issue guidance to clarify the relationship between ‘no contact’ 
conditions, non-molestation and child contact arrangements; monitor DVPOs, particularly if they are used as 
a first or second police response to domestic violence cases” (Home Office 2013, 7). In terms of re-
victimisation, there were 2.6 fewer repeat incidents on average based on ‘police call-outs’ (Home Office 
2013, 6). 
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victimisation, the pilot scheme was expanded, and the new powers were implemented in 
England and Wales on March 8, 2014 to all 43 police forces. In a report by the Home 
Office in 2016, police forces reported 3,337 applications for DPVNs, with 3,072 of those 
applications granted full DVPOs from implementation to December 31, 2014.278 Given the 
statistics for the first ten months of the program, it shows that many victim-survivors were 
initiating these DVPNs and many of those applied for and were granted DVPOs. Longer-
term data shows that this trend continues. For example, 17 forces returned data from 
January 1 to July 31, 2015 where 1,384 DVPOs were granted.279 For purposes of wider 
implementation, various considerations were proposed by the Home Office, including the 
criminalisation of DVPO breach, however, initial findings from various police forces show 
that many victim-survivors are initiating these new notices.280  
The remainder of this chapter section will detail how the Crime and Security Act came to 
being, by tracing the path specifically in regard to clauses 24-33 concerning domestic 
violence and critical DVPNs and DVPOs. The critical path for this case begins with the 
House of Commons Home Affairs Committee proposition of adding ‘go’ orders to English 
and Welsh legislation in May 2008, ending with the bill being passed and granted Royal 
Assent on April 8, 2010. 
  
                                                        
278 Home Office, “Domestic Violence Protection Orders (DVPO): One Year On – Home Office Assessment 
of National Roll-Out,” (2016): 3. 
279 Home Office, “One Year On – Home Office Assessment of National Roll-Out,” 3. 
280 Home Office, “One Year On – Home Office Assessment of National Roll-Out,” 5. 
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Tracing the Critical Path 
Date Event Path step 
May 2008 House of Commons Home 
Affairs Committee proposition of 
Domestic Violence Protection 
Notices (DVPNs); international 
comparisons included Poland, 




July 2008 Government response to the 
committee proposition: receptive 
to learning from other countries 
 
Communicative critical action 
 
Critical actor: Government 
 
March 2009 Government consultation where 
DVPNs were mentioned; 
international comparisons: 
Austria, Switzerland, Germany, 
Poland; welcomed by Refuge 
 
Substantive critical action 
 
Critical actor: Government 
March-June 2009 Women’s National Commission 
(WNC) start focus groups of 
women and girls on what would 
make them feel and be safer 
(report released in July) 
 
Substantive critical action 
 
Critical actor: WNC 
 
September 2009 Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO) working group 
report for the Home Secretary; 
key loophole identified: DVPNs; 
international comparisons: 
Austria and Germany 
 
Communicative critical action 
 
Critical actor: ACPO 
September 2009 Alan Johnson MP (Lab) 
announced the government’s 
plans to introduce the protection 
notices and protection orders 
 
Critical actor: Alan Johnson MP 
(Lab) 
November 19, 2009 House of Commons first reading 
(Bill 3)281 where Alan Johnson 
MP (Lab) proposed the DVPNs 
 
Critical actors: Alan Johnson 
(Lab) and other Labour 
supporters 
 
January 18, 2010 House of Commons second 
reading 
 
Critical actors: Alan Johnson 
(Lab) and other supporters (Lab 
and Lib Dem) 
 





                                                        
281 The readings of the bill have been added for context, so that the reader knows when the parliamentary 
hearings were heard, alongside the critical actions. 
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Date Event Path step 
March 9, 2010 Lord West (Lab) announced his 
support of the bill during the 
House of Lords first reading (Bill 
45); mentions political time 
 
Critical actors: Lord West (Lab) 
and other spoken supporters 
including Baroness Hamwee (Lib 
Dem), Lord Sheikh (Con), 
Baroness Stern (Cross Bencher), 
Lord Dholakia (Lib Dem), and 
Lord Skelmersdale (Con) 
 
March 29, 2010 House of Lords second reading 
 
 
April 7, 2010 House of Lords report and third reading 
 
April 8, 2010 Royal Assent 
 
Critical act 
Table 4: The critical path to the passing of the Crime and Security Act 2010 
 
The Critical Juncture 
In May 2008, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, a cross-party group of 
MPs, published a report entitled ‘Domestic Violence, Forced Marriage, and “Honour”-
Based Violence,’ after their inquiry into the various types of violence against women in the 
United Kingdom.282 Overall, the inquiry determined that: 
The [g]overnment’s approach to all forms of domestic violence remains 
disproportionately focused on criminal justice responses at the expense of effective 
prevention and early intervention. … We therefore recommend that the 
[g]overnment adopts a national strategy on domestic violence, or on violence 
against women more generally, to include an explicit emphasis on prevention.283 
Specifically in terms of the ‘go’ orders, the report proposed that the British government 
consider adding this legislation after respondents to the eConsultation and organisations 
such as Men’s Advice Line (MALE) advocated for the orders.284 MALE explicitly detailed 
that these would be an ‘inexpensive’ and ‘dynamic short-term measure’ in order to 
separate a victim and perpetrator.285 As one respondent detailed on this measure: “As it 
                                                        
282 These committee members were: Keith Vaz (Lab; chairperson), Tom Brake (Lib Dem), Jeremy Browne 
(Lib Dem), Karen Buck (Lab), James Clappison (Con), Ann Cryer (Lab), David TC Davies (Con), Janet 
Dean (Lab), Patrick Mercer (Con), Margaret Moran (Lab), Gwyn Prosser (Lab), Bob Russell (Lib Dem), 
Martin Salter (Lab), Gary Streeter (Con), and David Winnick (Lab). 
283 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, “Domestic Violence, Forced Marriage, and “Honour”-
Based Violence: Sixth Report of Session 2007-08” (2008): 6. 
284 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, “Sixth Report of Session 2007-08,” 107-108. 
285 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, “Sixth Report of Session 2007-08,” 107-108. 
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stands hundreds of thousands of women and children every year have to flee their homes 
from domestic abuse…the men in the majority of cases remain at home. Emergency 
accommodation should be made available for perpetrators so that women don’t have to be 
the ones to leave.”286  
The committee also detailed that other European countries have created legislation 
establishing these ‘go’ orders, such as Poland, Austria, Germany, and Switzerland.287 
While each of these countries has initiated different legislation surrounding the ‘go’ orders, 
the committee thought it important that England and Wales use these examples as to why 
they could be important to consider for possible legislation. Specifically, in the Austrian 
and German cases, these orders have “been seen as a progressive step in relation to the 
protection of victim’s human rights [with] favourable conclusions in both countries. The 
Austrian approach has been adopted as best practice legislation by the Council of Europe 
[sic].”288 
Various issues were addressed by the committee in regard to how these would operate and 
be legislated. For example, one issue was to what extent does the state, in this case police 
officers, mediate the situation and weigh the wishes of the victim in terms of whether the 
victim wishes to have the perpetrator removed.289 The question becomes whether the 
judgement of the police officer should supersede the desires of the victim. To reconcile 
this, the committee looked to the Austrian provision and found that in the first stage, the 
victim has no influence, in theory, whether a protection notice can be issued, but in the 
second stage, when it becomes time to issue the protection order, this is done in 
consultation with the victim.290 As stated by Birgitt Haller in reference to the Austrian 
case, “This two phase approach makes clear that the state feels responsible for safety in 
private lives and that it is aware of the problematic situation of victims who are involved in 
a violent relationship and who are put under pressure by the offender.”291 This distinction 
                                                        
286 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, “Sixth Report of Session 2007-08,” 107; while there are 
Sanctuary Schemes in the UK, “[t]he implementation of Sanctuary Schemes across the country has been 
variable and as such, the schemes have received a luke warm response. … some local authorities are using 
the schemes as ‘cheap’ alternatives to emergency housing, simply providing a spare lock or bolt” (House of 
Commons Home Affairs Committee 2007-08, 74, 75). 
287 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, “Sixth Report of Session 2007-08,” 107. 
288 Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), “Tackling Perpetrators of Violence against Women and 
Girls: ACPO Review for the Home Secretary” (2009): 50. 
289 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, “Sixth Report of Session 2007-08,” 108. 
290 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, “Sixth Report of Session 2007-08,” 108. 
291 Birgitt Haller, “The Austrian Legislation against Domestic Violence” (2005): 3. 
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between a victim’s autonomy to make their own choice in reference to these notices is 
important because at times, a victim may be under duress, or pressure as Haller states, to 
make a decision about this ‘go’ order. The victim may also feel guilt or feel badly for 
making the perpetrator leave their shared home. 
Weighing these options and potential risks, the committee made the recommendation to the 
government that ‘go’ orders be introduced, with the above difficulties in mind when 
determining the best course of action. The committee stated:  
We recognise that it is important to ensure that, as far as possible, the victim is 
involved in the decision to remove the perpetrator from the home. However, it 
seems to us that a compromise arrangement is possible, with an initial decision to 
remove the perpetrator taken by the police, and subsequent decisions taken in 
consultation with the victim. Feedback from victims, through our eConsultation, 
suggests that they would welcome such a scheme.292 
This proposal from the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee for the government 
to put forward these ‘go’ orders is what I argue is the critical juncture, or ‘window of 
opportunity,’ beginning the critical path for the Crime and Security Act 2010.293  
 
Critical Actions 
In response to the Home Affairs Committee report, the government issued a reply in July 
2008. In specific reference to the proposition of the ‘go’ orders, the government agreed 
with the committee’s recommendation and stated that they recommended the notices be 
introduced to parliament.294 In agreeing to the introduction of these ‘go’ orders, the 
government reply stated that they were “open to learn from the good practice and 
experiences of other countries, which we keep under review.”295 
                                                        
292 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, “Sixth Report of Session 2007-08,” 108; as stated by the 
Home Affairs Committee, a six week eConsultation was set up between January and February 2008 to “hear 
directly from the victims and survivors of domestic violence” (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee 
2008, 26). The eConsultation received over 240 postings from victim-survivors and various support 
personnel. 
293 Sawer, “The Story of RU486 in Australia,” 322. 
294 HM Government, “The Government Reply to the Sixth Report from the Home Affairs Committee: 
Session 2007-08 HC 263: Domestic Violence, Forced Marriage and ‘Honour’-Based Violence” (2008): 34. 
295 HM Government, “The Government Reply,” 34. 
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By March 2009, before the ‘go’ orders had been introduced into legislation, the 
government undertook another consultation in regard to violence against women. The aims 
of the consultation were proposed as: recognising the success that had been done on the 
issue of violence against women and girls, including victim support, raising awareness 
surrounding the issue, specifically the scale of the violence, as well as the nature of why it 
occurs.296 In addition, the government wanted the consultation to assess proposals on 
future policy in regard to the prevention of violence against women, and lastly, to build 
community confidence that the government was ready and willing to ‘listen and respond’ 
to those who participated in the consultation.297 As stated in the consultation, the 
government relayed that they were “committed to a vision of society in which women and 
girls feel safe and confident in their homes and communities, to live freely, contribute to 
society, and prosper in their daily lives.”298 The question is not whether the government 
wants to prevent domestic violence or other forms of violence against women; the matter 
that is often disagreed upon is how to actually go about this prevention, provision, and 
protection that the domestic abuse charity Refuge has been advocating for since the 
1980s.299  
In terms of how the ‘go’ orders fit within this consultation, they were specifically 
mentioned under the question of ‘how best can we keep track of the most serious 
offenders, and reduce the risks those individuals pose?’300 More specifically, ‘what new 
powers would help the police to control serial perpetrators?’301 The consultation proposed 
these ‘go’ orders as a solution to this question, citing again examples from Austria, 
Switzerland, Germany, and Poland. In their response to the consultation, the domestic 
abuse charity Refuge supported and welcomed the proposal to include ‘go’ orders in the 
criminal justice response to violence against women, and interestingly had already 
proposed these orders in 2003 in response to the ‘Safety and Justice: The Government’s 
Proposals on Domestic Violence’ consultation.302 Further, Refuge asked an essential 
question of ‘where would the perpetrator go?’ The question is important because if the 
                                                        
296 HM Government, “Together We Can End Violence against Women and Girls: A Consultation Paper” 
(2009): 2. 
297 HM Government, “A Consultation Paper,” 2. 
298 HM Government, “A Consultation Paper,” 3. 
299 Refuge, “Together We Can End Violence against Women and Girls: A Consultation Paper” (2009): 4. 
300 HM Government, “A Consultation Paper,” 19. 
301 Refuge, “Together We Can End Violence against Women and Girls: A Consultation Paper,” 27. 
302 Refuge, “Together We Can End Violence against Women and Girls: A Consultation Paper,” 27. 
 76 
perpetrator is not taken into account, it may deter officers from issuing the ‘go’ orders if 
there is no concrete or certain answer on where the perpetrator would go, and in order to 
not create confusion, police officers could decide not to issue the protection notice. As 
Refuge mentioned, “the perpetrator usually goes straight back to the home, even after the 
police have removed him.”303 These ‘go’ orders then, would be able to provide protection 
in the criminal sense, where breaches would be considered a criminal offence.304 It will be 
important to see whether this was discussed at the parliamentary level, and whether the 
question was resolved. Overall, the consultation sought to create a model for the 
government to address “the issue across government, focusing attention on prevention, 
provision, and protection; the key themes for government action, which we will use to 
drive public debate and discussion on what more we could do.”305  
To aid in informing the cross-government consultation, the Women’s National 
Commission (WNC), a major women’s policy agency, began leading focus groups of 300 
women and girls in July 2009 to “gather women’s and girl’s views on what would make 
them feel and be safer, and on proposals to prevent violence against women and girls. The 
focus groups were designed around the themes used in the cross-government consultation: 
prevention, provision and protection.”306 From these focus groups, taking place from 
March-June 2009, one of the recommendations that the WNC proposed was the inclusion 
of removal orders into legislation, under the category of ‘protection.’307 As stated in the 
published report, “[w]omen wanted more effective access to protection after reporting 
incidents of violence to the police and there was widespread support amongst women for 
the police to immediately remove perpetrators when attending an incident.”308 This 
proposal from women within the focus groups is an important development in the 
policymaking process, as it shows that the ‘go’ orders were proposed, initiated, and 
recommended by various government and non-government bodies and through various 
avenues.309 
                                                        
303 Refuge, “Together We Can End Violence against Women and Girls: A Consultation Paper,” 28. 
304 HM Government, “A Consultation Paper,” 19. 
305 HM Government, “A Consultation Paper,” 4. 
306 Women’s National Commission, “Still We Rise: Report from WNC Focus Groups to Inform the Cross-
Government Consultation ‘Together We Can End Violence against Women and Girls” (2009): 4. 
307 Women’s National Commission, “Still We Rise,” 7. 
308 Women’s National Commission, “Still We Rise,” 66. 
309 In order to thicken the government’s consultation on violence against women and girls, they sought 
specific responses from: the WNC in the form of focus groups; the National Children’s Bureau (NCB), 
focusing on healthy relationships and schools, the impact of social attitudes, and early signs and support in 
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Returning to the Austrian Protection Against Domestic Violence Act 1996 and the German 
Protection from Violence Act 2002, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) 
released a review for the Home Secretary in September 2009 detailing the Austrian 
government’s take on ‘go’ orders and how they were a ‘progressive step’ towards 
protection.310 ACPO provided support for the ‘go’ orders and stated that “[t]here is strong 
evidence from other countries that ‘emergency injunctions’ have a positive impact on the 
safety of victims, at least in the cases of domestic violence. The approach relies on the 
availability of third-sector support for victims, and an increase in the availability of the 
relevant advocacy/support would need to be considered.”311 Prior to a ‘course of conduct’ 
being discussed in England and Wales, at least in terms of illegal conduct, Austria detailed 
domestic violence as a course of conduct which specifically underlies and is at the heart of 
this form of violence.312 In Austria, actors pointed out that this course of conduct often 
involves ‘repeat victimisation’ and because of this, victims may feel pressured or coerced 
into not taking action against a perpetrator.313 To counter this, the police have to remove 
the perpetrator from the home and following this, the victim is contacted by an 
‘intervention centre’ to provide them with support and/or advocacy.314 After the ‘go’ order 
has been issued, a hearing can then take place where an interim injunction can be applied 
for, for a period of 14 days to three months.  
As stated by Haller, the success and application of the act “strongly depends on the persons 
involved in the intervention process, on their commitment and on their attitudes.”315 
Because, according to Haller, success of these orders depends essentially on step two, it 
will be interesting to see whether this was taken into account for the British version of 
these ‘go’ orders. The question remains whether the orders would be successful without 
the support from these intervention centres. In comparison to the findings in Austria, what 
could the protection notices offer victims of domestic violence in England and Wales? In 
the same review for the Home Secretary, ACPO detailed a research report entitled 
                                                        
the case of violence; a Home Office review on the response to rape victim-survivors via the criminal justice 
system conducted by Sara Payne MBE, and finally, a review by Baroness Vivien Stern CBE into rape 
complaints in England and Wales. Apart from the WNC report, ‘go’ orders were not mentioned in the other 
responses, and for this reason, they are not included in the critical path for the Crime and Security Act 2010, 
although they were important for the government consultation as a whole. 
310 ACPO, “Review for the Home Secretary,” 50. 
311 ACPO, “Review for the Home Secretary,” 53. 
312 ACPO, “Review for the Home Secretary,” 50. 
313 ACPO, “Review for the Home Secretary,” 50. 
314 ACPO, “Review for the Home Secretary,” 50.  
315 Haller, “The Austrian Legislation against Domestic Violence,” 8. 
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‘Domestic Violence Consumer Strategy Team Policy Options Paper to the Consumer 
Strategy Board’ by then-Department of Constitutional Affairs (DCA). The research quoted 
by ACPO found that these ‘go’ orders could potentially protect over 25,000 victim-
survivors of domestic abuse that were not currently protected under existing measures.316 
To this, ACPO stated: “There is strong evidence from other countries that ‘emergency 
injunctions’ have a positive impact on the safety of victims, at least in the cases of 
domestic violence. The approach relies on the availability of third-sector support for 
victims, and an increase in the availability of relevant advocacy/support. …”317 Given 
these developments, at the September 2009 Labour Party Annual Conference, then-Home 
Secretary Alan Johnson (Lab) announced the government’s plans to introduce the 
protection notices and orders. In his speech, Mr. Johnson spoke of crime in the general 
sense, and then turned his attention to misery ‘behind closed doors.’318 In response, Mr. 
Johnson stated “[t]hat is why I am bringing forward measures… to stop the aggressor from 
returning… [d]uring this time, support will be provided for the victim including 
counselling and practical options for getting away from a violent partner.”319 
Why these orders were not proposed after Refuge and the DCA suggested them in 2003 
and 2004 is unknown, especially after the DCA found that so many victim-survivors could 
be protected. Regardless of this, after the critical juncture in May 2008 with the Home 
Affairs Committee proposing ‘go’ orders in their report, they were finally introduced 
within the Crime and Security Bill (House of Commons Bill 3) on November 19, 2009.320 
The bill was introduced by Mr. Johnson, with support from then-Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown (Lab), Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling (Lab), David Miliband MP 
(Lab), Jack Straw MP (Lab), and David Hanson MP (Lab), with the DVPNs proposed in 
clauses 21-30.321  
During the second reading of the bill on January 18, 2010, Mr. Johnson proposed that the 
protection notices would provide ‘greater protection to the victims of domestic violence,’ 
                                                        
316 ACPO, “Review for the Home Secretary,” 52. 
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318 “Alan Johnson's speech to Labour Conference,” last modified 2009, http://www2.labour.org.uk/alan-
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320 “House of Commons Debates 19 November 2009: Column 141,” last modified November 19, 2009, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmhansrd/cm091119/debtext/91119-
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and tackle crime overall.322 In response specifically to the proposal of DVPNs, some MPs 
did argue whether they were necessary, or what good they would do. Others contended that 
they were absolutely essential. Chris Grayling (Con) used the term ‘Labour baggage,’ 
stating: “A Conservative Government would certainly… seek to do more to combat 
domestic violence. There are things in the [b]ill that are meant well. Given the usual 
Labour baggage that comes with them I am sceptical about whether they will actually 
make a difference, but they are superficially innocuous.”323 Liberal Democrat Home 
Affairs Spokesperson Chris Huhne responded that these notices would ‘tackle’ and 
‘protect’ victim-survivors, but that the success of the DVPNs depends especially on the 
support and counselling services for victims, linking back to what Haller and ACPO noted 
in their evaluation of the Austrian protection notices.324  
As stated above, the question is not whether the government wants to prevent domestic 
violence or other forms of violence against women; instead, the disagreement often comes 
by way of whether new legislation is the answer, or whether new legislation is even 
necessary. No one is essentially ‘for’ domestic violence, with MPs specifically beginning 
any debate about measures regarding violence against women with a standard statement of 
‘we all agree that domestic violence is a very serious issue…,’ yet measures such as the 
protection notices, fairly straightforward legislation, are met with tension.325 This is 
especially evident, for example when Humfrey Malins (Con) questioned whether there was 
even a gap in the legislation, as had been discussed previously. He stated: “On domestic 
violence protection notices, I wonder whether there really is a serious gap in the law that 
needs to be filled. Do we not already have sufficient criminal charges to enable the 
mischief to be dealt with under existing laws?”326 This is the standard question regarding 
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this issue: are the laws not already sufficient? This question was asked by Mr. Malins, but 
also by Elfyn Llwyd (PC), who stated that there were already existing provisions.327  
The way in which these serious cases are described as ‘mischief’ shows that for some, the 
issue is not vital, regardless of the fact that domestic violence costs the United Kingdom 
billions of pounds a year, specifically over £15 billion in 2009 alone.328 Mr. Malins went 
on to say that “[s]uch a notice could have some nasty results for the person who received 
it,” with disregard for the victim of this abuse, or the fact that these ‘go’ orders were 
introduced with serial perpetrators in mind, with an estimated 25,321 serial perpetrators 
known to police in 2009.329 Further mentioned was the reliance on ‘hearsay evidence,’ 
giving too many powers to the police, and begging for MPs to ‘stick to what is real,’ with a 
focus on mostly physical violence.330 Mr. Malins further went on to detail how “[i]t is 
frustrating for the police to turn up and be told by, usually, the woman, ‘[y]es, he thumped 
me, but I don't want to go ahead.’”331 Again, the language used trivialises serious abuse, 
and in turn makes the legislation appear insignificant and petty. Opposition to Mr. Malins 
comprised of many MPs, including Mr. Johnson, Mr. Huhne, Mr. Hanson, Robert Flello 
(Lab), Angela Smith (Lab), and Tony McNulty (Lab). Mr. Flello specifically stated why 
they are important, pointing to the creation of an immediate ‘safe space,’ citing police 
officers first hand, in the case of serial perpetrators: “I know where this house is; this is not 
the first time I have been called out here.”332 
Following the second reading, the third reading of the bill took place on March 8, 2010 
with both cooperation and dissonance regarding the DVPNs. In regard to the exclusion 
from the home for 48 hours, James Brokenshire (Con) suggested that the initial protection 
notice be in place for seven days, so that a ‘substantive’ hearing could be held, with Mr. 
Malins warning not to ‘give the police too many powers,’ implying that the evidence heard 
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for the DVPO would be based solely on the police.333 Mr. Malins further questioned the 48 
hour period by asking: “Is the subject of the notice still thrown out of their house?”334 This 
statement reverts back to the trivialisation of abuse by suggesting that the perpetrator of 
this abuse does not need to vacate the home. Regardless of this, none of the objections 
brought up or amendments were tabled, and the bill then went to the House of Lords for its 
first reading (HL Bill 45), where it was read and introduced. 
At the second reading in the House of Lords on March 29, 2010, Lord West (Lab) 
announced his support for the bill, stating that it would “enable the victim and their 
children to stay in the family home rather than seek help from a refuge. It will give them 
the breathing space and support they need to consider their options.”335 Baroness Hamwee 
(Lib Dem) pledged support, but also questioned whether the orders were completely 
necessary, but did state that she ‘welcome[d] the provisions.’336 Instead of raising these 
issues in a patronising tone, she stated: “A refuge, good as it may be, is not home. The 
person at fault should leave, not the victim or the children of the relationship.”337 In one of 
the first instances of obvious political time (introduced in Chapter 2), Baroness Hamwee 
referred to the ‘panicky’ tone of the bill, alluding to May 6, 2010 general election. In 
regard to the bill, she stated: “I read it as having a rather panicky tone. It asks what can be 
thrown into the pot of the criminal justice system and called ‘security’ to give it some 
gravitas.”338 It is important to see whether the issue of time and the general election is 
addressed again, in reference to the passing of this bill, and whether perhaps the peers 
accepted the bill, even if there are stated problems with it. 
Lending further support of this bill was Lord Sheikh (Con), Baroness Stern (Cross 
Bencher), Lord Dholakia (Lib Dem), and Lord Skelmersdale (Con), with Lord West 
reiterating the DVPNs and DVPOs should not be seen as a ‘substitute for prosecution.’339 
While offering support, Lord Skelmersdale brought up the concerns of Refuge, particularly 
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what would be done with perpetrators who are issued a DVPN and must vacate the home 
for at least 48 hours.340 Whether this was addressed in the final stages of the bill, or the 
following guidance, will be essential to note. 
In the House of Lords, there were fewer instances of dissidence and disagreement, perhaps 
due to the issues with the bill being solved during the readings in the House of Commons. 
In another instance of time being brought in to the discussion, Baroness Stern indicated:  
My Lords, since Parliament is soon to be dissolved, the Bill will not provide us 
with many days of sitting here, sometimes until late at night, pressing the Minister 
on the various clauses and engaging in spirited debate with him. … It is also to be 
regretted that there will not be time for detailed consideration of each of the 
proposals before us tonight, as there is much to consider.341 
Could this point, that there was not time for ‘detailed consideration’ be an indicator that 
there could be weak parts of the bill that would be accepted regardless of its flaws, because 
of the upcoming dissolution of parliament and the general election? This question will be 
further considered below and in the findings section of this chapter. 
 
The Critical Act 
The third reading of the bill, including the committee and report stage took place on April 
7, 2010, with no amendments to the DVPN and DVPO clauses (24-33). This could be 
attributed to what Lord West pointed out as the ‘pressures to wash-up,’ alluding again to 
the dissolution of parliament and the general election.342 The following day, on April 8, 
2010, the bill received Royal Assent, becoming the Crime and Security Act 2010. This 
assent indicates the critical act, and the end of the critical path in this case, with the 
dissolution of parliament taking place on April 12, 2010, and the general election on May 
6, 2010. 
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Interestingly, in this case, the role of political time seemed to provide momentum, 
especially in the House of Lords, to ‘wash-up’ and make sure the bill was passed. Not only 
was parliament dissolving, and the general election taking place less than a month after the 
Royal Assent, the government was also preparing to release its strategy on violence against 
women and girls on November 25, 2010. The plan, entitled ‘Together We Can End 
Violence against Women and Girls: A Strategy’ was based on the public consultation from 
March 2009 and the WNC focus groups from March-June 2009, among others.343 
According to the strategy, it drew on “the outcomes of one of the largest public 
consultations ever undertaken on this issue,” proposing an “integrated approach to tackling 
this problem and supporting its victims across the three key areas of prevention, provision, 
and protection.”344 Under the protection section of the strategy, the introduction of the new 
DVPNs and DVPOs were mentioned as a way to help support victim-survivors from 
‘report to court.’345 The same language in the strategy was used from previous reports and 
debates, detailing the creation of ‘breathing space.’ One important statement from the 
strategy about these specific notices and orders detailed how there are over 600,000 calls 
each year to the police for aid from domestic violence victims, and from the testimonies 
they received, they stated that “the first response a victim receives from the police is 
crucial to setting the tone of their overall experience. Where that first response is 
dismissive or disbelieving the impact can be devastating.”346  
 
Findings: Case 1 
In the case of the Crime and Security Act 2010, the evaluation of representation presented 
various findings, some of which agree with the previous literature examined in Chapter 1, 
and some of which does not. For example, the government action in this case was 
prompted by the Home Affairs Committee report, which was driven by the eConsultation, 
specifically concerning the ‘go’ orders. In addition to this, other European countries were 
pointed to as catalysts of change, as well as guides of good practice. The British version of 
the ‘go’ orders were almost identical to the Austrian version, put in place in 1996.  
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The WNC played an important role as well, not only in helping to initiate the ‘go’ orders, 
but also for their role in influencing the new government strategy, released in 2010. ACPO 
and Refuge were also influential in the proposal of the protection notices, as well as almost 
exclusive spoken Labour party support for the notices once put forward in parliament. In 
addition to virtually exclusive Labour support, the critical actors observed were frequently 
part of a group, and were mostly men. It is important to keep this finding in perspective, so 
as not to assist in what is referred to as the ‘pedestal effect’ or ‘economy of gratitude’ 
where “The ‘going rate’… on men’s contributions to this [labour] is so low, men who 
make even token contributions stand out as rare men who are then showered with praise 
and gratitude.”347 This, of course, is not meant to diminish men’s efforts in regard to the 
issue of domestic violence, but it serves as a reminder of the fact that women comprise a 
very low number of representatives in the national parliament overall, and therefore it is 
not unusual to see these critical actors mostly being men. 
In terms of the perpetrator question raised by Refuge and Lord Skelmersdale, the interim 
guidance provided by the government for the pilot scheme stated that “consideration 
should be given to providing him/her with contact details of suitable local emergency 
accommodation.”348 That is as far as the guidance went in terms of suggesting where the 
perpetrator would go. Therefore, that could be seen as a failure to follow-up on questions 
raised during the preliminary phases of the legislation. As far as the second step during the 
DVPN/DVPO process, in terms of the intervention centres and support, once the DVPO 
has been granted (stage four), Independent Domestic Violence Advocates (IDVA) are to 
give guidance and support to the victim (stage 6).349 This only takes place however, after 
the DVPO has been granted and not necessarily after the initial DVPN is issued. 
Further, as stated in Chapter 2, the concept of political time is often under-researched with 
little attention being paid to the concept at all; however, from this case and the critical path 
above, political time seemed to play a vital role in the swift passing of this bill, especially 
in the House of Lords.  
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Case 2: The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 
Stage Date Hansard reference 




11 February 2011 Vol. 523 Col. 598 
Second reading 
 





22 March 2011 
24 March 2011 
29 March 2011 
5 April 2011 
26 April 2011 
3 May 2011 
10 May 2011 
12 May 2011 
17 May 2011 
 
Hansard Protection of Freedoms 
Bill Public Bill Committee 
 
 
Report and Third reading 10 October 2011 
11 October 2011 
 
Vol. 533 Col. 80-152 
Vol. 533 Col. 201-300 
Commons Consideration of 
Lords Amendments 
 
19 March 2012 Vol. 542 Col. 527-589 (537-557) 




12 October 2011 Vol. 730 Col. 1732 
Second reading 
 
8 November 2011 Vol. 732 Col. 167-228 (174) 
Committee 
 
29 November 2011 
6 December 2011 
13 December 2011 
15 December 2011 
12 January 2012 
 
Vol. 733 Col. 131-232 
Vol. 733 Col. 622-685 (648-664) 
Vol. 733 Col. GC277-GC330 
Vol. 733 Col. GC351-GC392 
Vol. 734 Col. GC1-GC74 
Report 31 January 2012 
6 February 2012 
 
15 February 2012 
 
Vol. 734 Col. 1500-1556 
Vol. 735 Col. 11-35, 47-86, 107-
120 (75-86) 
Vol. 735 Col. 791-864 
Third reading 12 March 2012 
 
Vol. 736 Col. 19-33 
Lords Consideration of 
Commons Reason and 
Amendments 
 
24 April 2012 Vol. 736 Col. 1714-1745 (Col. 
1734-1745) 
Royal Assent – 1 May 2012 House of Lords Hansard Vol. 736 Col. 2114 
House of Commons Hansard Vol. 534 Col. 1731 
Table 5: Hansard references for the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012350 
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The second case to be presented as part of the larger case study in this thesis is the 
evaluation of representation concerning the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, updating the 
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 to make stalking a specific criminal offence. This 
section will introduce definitions and understandings of stalking, generally and specifically 
within the context of England and Wales, detail the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 
in order to contextualise the background of the current legislation and why it needed 
updating, and explain the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. In addition, this section will 
offer an evaluation of why representation was attempted, and what that representation 
means in terms of SRW. This case has been chosen because stalking is recognised in 
England and Wales as a crime of violence against women, and also domestic violence, yet 
it is not fully understood by society, under the law, or by those tasked with enforcing the 
law.351 It is stated that “[s]talking is a crime that rips relationships apart and shatters lives. 
But for too long it has remained a hidden crime, a crime which victims have been reluctant 
to report out of fear that they wouldn’t be taken seriously.”352 Further to this, it has been 
indicated that public perceptions regarding stalking in the United Kingdom were similar to 
the perceptions of domestic violence twenty years ago.353 
The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 did not use the term ‘stalking’ in the language 
of the legislation, therefore there were no legal ramifications specifically regarding 
stalking prior to 2012.354 The explicit avoidance of the inclusion of the term ‘stalking’ is 
thought to be attributed to the fact that legislators wanted the language of the legislation to 
appear ‘wide-ranging’ and give the impression that any type of harassing conduct could be 
addressed by the act.355 Stalking is generally understood to mean “malicious and repeated 
following and harassment of another person that threatens his or her safety,” in addition to 
“a course of conduct directed at a specific person that involves repeated physical or visual 
proximity, [and] non-consensual communication or verbal, written or implied threats.”356 
As of 2015, both harassment and stalking in England and Wales do not have specific or 
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strict definitions, according to the Crown Prosecutor Service (CPS).357 Instead, there are 
various examples of behaviour that could be categorised as either harassment or stalking. 
These could include unwanted communication or following a person.358 In England and 
Wales, the behaviours attributed to stalking do not have to be those with overt threatening 
tendencies. For example, monitoring an individual’s use of the telephone or email can be 
behaviour indicative of stalking that an individual may not know is even occurring.359 
Stalking has been referred to as ‘emotional terrorism’ due to the sometimes covert nature 
and pattern of the crimes, where behaviours do not have to be physically violent.360 
 
The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 
There are few pieces of legislation which include both civil and criminal offences in the 
British legal system. The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 is an example which does 
include both civil and criminal offences. The lower level criminal offence (section 2) 
warrants punishment through the magistrate’s court for a ‘course of conduct,’ or at least 
two offences, of harassment and can lead to imprisonment (six months), fines (up to 
£5,000), and/or a restraining order.361 The higher level criminal offence (section 4) 
warrants punishment through either the magistrate’s court or the crown court and includes 
a possible penalty of imprisonment (five years in the Crown Court), fines (unlimited in the 
Crown Court), and/or a restraining order.362  
In the 1998 Home Office Research Study 203, conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the act, evidence was presented regarding 74 harassment cases. Of these cases, 48 percent 
of perpetrators were charged and convicted under the lesser-level section 2 offence, and 
only four percent of those received imprisonment.363 The majority (37 percent) instead 
received a ‘conditional discharge’ sentence.364 The higher-level offence, Section 4, saw 
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only 11 cases, with eight percent of those convicted being sentenced to prison.365 Again, 
the majority of cases either received a ‘bound over’ punishment or a conditional 
discharge.366 The civil offence (section 3) created the prospect for the complainant to 
receive an order of protection, where a breach of this order can result in arrest, fines, and 
imprisonment for the perpetrator.367 In the same study, 56 percent of perpetrators that were 
convicted received a restraining order, with one observed breach where the perpetrator 
received a £250 fine, and a bound over punishment for six months.368 It was detailed that: 
“The criminal and civil remedies were not necessarily intended to cover mutually 
exclusive types of behaviour and it is perfectly possible for victims to pursue a civil action 
in circumstances in which they might equally have reported the matter to the police and 
sought the arrest of the offender.”369 This ability to pursue either a criminal or civil offence 
presented confusion in terms of what type of remedy was best suited for certain offences. 
For example, police officers tended to favour the criminal law option, whereas those 
involved in the courts favoured the civil option.370 For police officers, because of the 
vagueness, they would use the act but were unsure whether it was appropriate or not.371 To 
this, one prosecutor stated why he favoured the civil option: “Just one person’s word 
against another, that is not beyond reasonable doubt, that is just a balance of probabilities 
and would be better suited [to civil law].”372  
In regard to the legislation and domestic violence, “[a]lthough the legislation was 
introduced to tackle stalkers, research suggests that it has been used far more to deal with 
domestic violence than the stalking of strangers scenario that the legislators had in 
mind.”373 For example, in the Home Office study mentioned above, only four percent of 
cases were strangers to each other, with the main cause of the behaviour being cited as the 
ending of an intimate relationship.374 In these cases, 41 percent of respondents were 
acquaintances of their stalker, and another 41 percent of cases were previously involved in 
                                                        
365 Harris, “Home Office Research Study 203,” 36. 
366 Harris, “Home Office Research Study 203,” 36. 
367 Harris, “Home Office Research Study 203,” 5. 
368 Harris, “Home Office Research Study 203,” 38-39. 
369 Harris, “Home Office Research Study 203,” 5. 
370 Harris, “Home Office Research Study 203,” 44. 
371 Harris, “Home Office Research Study 203,” 44. 
372 Harris, “Home Office Research Study 203,” 44. 
373 Mandy Burton, Legal Responses to Domestic Violence (London: Routledge-Cavendish, 2008), 62; see 
also: Harris, “Home Office Research Study 203.” 
374 Harris, “Home Office Research Study 203,” vi. 
 89 
an intimate relationship.375 In the cases mentioned, males were disproportionately the 
perpetrators (80 percent), with the most common forms of harassment being named as 
damage to property, threats, violence, unwelcome gifts, and other ‘distressing behaviour’ 
such as silent phone calls and following the complainant.376 In one case study, the 
complainant and perpetrator were in a long-term relationship, which ultimately ended 
because of his violent behaviour. Following the end of the relationship, he began “a course 
of behaviour which caused both distress and embarrassment to the victim.”377 This course 
of behaviour included shouting threats and abuse outside her home, threatening letters, 
silent phone calls, property damage, physical assault on the street in one instance, and also 
love letters.378 It was also found by this study that victim-survivors were not aware of the 
1997 act, and had therefore tolerated the distressing behaviour or violence for a prolonged 
period of time.379 This is a serious problem and shows a lack of concern by the government 
for not publicizing or disseminating the proper information about the harassment offences 
under the act. It will be interesting to see whether this problem was rectified under the 
update. To summarise, while the act created a criminal offence for both harassment and for 
creating fear through a course of conduct, many shortcomings have been revealed within 
the current legislation, especially since no specific offence of stalking was created.380 
Looking back, there was an overall muddled nature surrounding the act and whether 
charges were appropriate in regard to either section 2, section 3, or section 4. The statistics 
presented in the research study further show this confusion, as instances of harassment 
could be charged ‘either-way’ and were most often deferred to the lesser section 2 offence. 
In all of the cases, there were few sentences of imprisonment, showing that harassment 
was seen as a less-serious crime, warranting only fines. The next section of this chapter 
will detail the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, and the critical path that was taken to 
update the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. 
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The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 
The Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (sections 2A and 4A) updated the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997, the main piece of legislation regarding harassment in England and 
Wales. Briefly, there were seven key areas considered under the Protection of Freedoms 
Act 2012, which were the (1) regulation of biometric data, (2) regulation of surveillance, 
(3) protection of property, (4) counter-terrorism powers, (5) the safeguarding of vulnerable 
groups, (6) the freedom of information, and (7) miscellaneous and general.381 After the 
Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 received Royal Assent on May 1, 2012, the act covered 
many areas of the law that were either neglected, outdated, or previously missing 
altogether. Part 7 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, under ‘miscellaneous and 
general’ introduced the new offence of stalking (section 2A) through a ‘course of conduct’ 
including but not limited to, ‘following a person’ or ‘watching or spying on a person’ and 
can be punishable by a fine or up to six months in prison.382 This offence of stalking was 
further extended to include a ‘fear of violence or serious alarm or distress’ (section 4A) 
and can carry a punishment from a fine to up to five years imprisonment.383 While stalking 
is now a specific criminal offence, it was not considered from the beginning when the bill 
was initially introduced in the House of Commons on February 11, 2011 (refer to Table 5 
in this chapter). As will be discussed in further detail below, the proposal to include a 
stalking offence was not mentioned or proposed until the bill reached the second reading in 
the House of Lords on November 8, 2011 by Baroness Royall (Lab). Further specifics of 
this legislation and the representation process will be considered below when the critical 
path is detailed in order to evaluate SRW for this case. 
 
Tracing the Critical Path 
Date Event Path Step 
May 2011 Justice Unions’ Parliamentary 




Critical actor: Elfyn Llwyd MP 
(PC); Justice Unions’ 
Parliamentary Group panel 
participants 
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Date Event Path Step 
September 2011 Then-Shadow Home Secretary 
Yvette Cooper MP (Lab) put 
forward the case for legislation at 
the Labour Party Women’s 
Conference 
 
Communicative critical action 
 
Critical actor: Yvette Cooper MP 
(Lab) 
 
November 2011 Launch of Home Office public 
consultation on stalking 
 
Substantive critical action 
 
Critical actor: Theresa May MP 
(Con) 
 
November 8, 2011 Loophole in legislation regarding 
stalking addressed during the 
second reading of the bill; 
Scotland act mentioned 
 
Symbolic critical action 
 
Critical actor: Baroness Royall 
(Lab) 
 
November 10, 2011 Protection Against Stalking 
(PAS) survey report on the 
criminal justice system 
Communicative critical action 
 
Critical actor: PAS 
 
November 23, 2011 Then-Prime Minister David 
Cameron MP (Con): 
acknowledged gap in the law on 
stalking 
 
Communicative critical action 
 
Critical actor: David Cameron 
MP (Con) 
December 2011 NAPO publication on male 
perpetrators of stalking 
Communicative critical action 
 
Critical actor: NAPO 
 
December 6, 2011 House of Lords committee 
meeting: mentioned Scotland and 
Sweden stalking laws; introduced 
amendments to specifically 
criminalise stalking 
 
Substantive critical action 
 
Critical actor: Baroness Royall 
(Lab); Lord Sharkey (Lib Dem) 
 
February 2012 Parliamentary inquiry on stalking 
law reform published 
 
Communicative critical action 
March 12, 2012 House of Lords third reading: 
mentioned Scotland stalking laws 
 
Symbolic critical action 
March 19, 2012 Commons consideration of Lords 
amendments: Scotland act 
mentioned; challenge to 
amendments and debate 
 
Symbolic critical action 
 
Critical actor: Stella Creasy MP 
(Lab)  
March 19, 2012 Support and description of the 
amendments for the House of 
Lords: Scotland stalking laws 
mentioned 
 
Symbolic critical action 
 
Critical actor: Theresa May MP 
(Con) 
April 24, 2012 Lords consideration of Commons 
reason and amendments; more 
challenges, debate, and 
acceptance of the stalking 
offence in the bill 
 
Substantive critical action 
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Date Event Path Step 
May 1, 2012 Royal Assent 
 
Critical act 
Table 6: The critical path to updating the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 
The Critical Juncture 
Before the move forward to update the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, the 
devolved parliament of Scotland introduced a new stalking offence in 2010. The timing of 
this followed Paladin’s National Stalking Awareness Week in April, in order to raise 
awareness. Rhoda Grant MSP (Lab) introduced the amendment into the Scottish 
parliament in June 2010, where she stated:  
Action Scotland Against Stalking has made it clear that the approach that was taken 
in the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 in England and Wales, which does not 
name the crime of stalking, has kept stalking hidden in the same way as breach of 
the peace has done in Scotland. (…) By calling that behaviour stalking, we 
recognise it and mark it as unacceptable.384 
This statement by Ms. Grant demonstrates that the 1997 act lacked any real influence on 
stalking in England and Wales, as it continued to mask the actual crime of stalking by not 
naming it for the violence that it is. For example, prior to the update to the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997, there was little recourse for victim-survivors who were upset or 
frightened by behaviour that was not considered illegal, although it was distressing.385 
Further, instead of these instances being seen through a course of conduct, they instead 
were treated as single incidents, or as a ‘breach of the peace.’386 In addition, Ms. Grant 
points out that Action Scotland Against Stalking played an important role in bringing this 
insufficiency to light. After the amendment was proposed, the Criminal Justice and 
Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 was passed. This act named stalking as a criminal offence 
and also acknowledged that stalking entailed a course of conduct; something that had 
previously been lacking. Once the crime of stalking was named as such by a regional 
parliamentary body in Scotland, the pressure to do the same in England and Wales began 
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to intensify. This critical act in Scotland, revealed a critical juncture in England and Wales 
to do the same.  
It was revealed in May 2011 that the Justice Unions’ Parliamentary Group and its chair, 
Mr. Llwyd, would hold an independent inquiry on stalking. The group undertook the 
‘Independent Parliamentary Inquiry into Stalking Law Reform.’387 This group, comprised 
of members from various political parties, was one of the first cross-party groups that was 
not a formalised committee within the parliament.388 The panel included seven Labour 
party members, three Conservative party members, two Liberal Democrats, two cross 
benchers, and one member of the Plaid Cymru party. Within this committee, there were 
five male members of the panel and ten female members. Party members were not the only 
participants of the panel. The inquiry brought together various lawyers, psychologists, 
organization managers, university faculty, victim-survivors, parents of victims, 
commissioners, barristers, police officers, probation officers, and members of various 
charity organizations including Action Scotland Against Stalking, and Women’s Aid.389 
These oral and written evidentiary sessions, and the 30 recommendations made in the 
inquiry, laid the foundation for what would become the update to the 1997 Act. In regard 
to chairing the panel, Mr. Llwyd stated: “The inquiry has been the most enriching and 
worthwhile experience of my political life, and I am delighted to see the result.”390 
The inquiry identified the main problems with the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. 
Firstly, section 2 was only punishable through the magistrate’s court and therefore the 
police had limited power in regard to search and seizure of the perpetrator’s home.391 
Secondly, section 4 of the act was seldom used. This was also demonstrated by the 1998 
Home Office Research Study, mentioned above. Only 170 defendants out of 2,000 
prosecuted were given a custodial sentence from 2010-2012.392 Finally, any breaches of 
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section 3 by the perpetrators were often dealt with as new incidents, instead of as a course 
of conduct. In reference to these problems, the inquiry determined the following: “Patterns 
of behaviour were missed. Sentences handed down, if custodial, tended to be expressed in 
days and there was no evidence of perpetrators receiving treatment or participating in 
programmes.”393 The lack of treatment and participation in programmes was attributed to 
the short period of incarceration that perpetrators received, as well as the non-existence of 
appropriate programmes in general.394 Further to this inquiry, the majority of victim-
survivors stated that they had little confidence in the criminal justice system, and the 
researchers found that the training of professionals was inadequate.395 These failings were 
reasons why representation occurred in terms of updating the Protection from Harassment 
Act 1997. The key reason often pointed to with specific regard to modifying the Protection 
from Harassment Act 1997 is the fact that it was cited as ‘not fit for purpose’ by the Justice 
Unions’ Parliamentary Group’s inquiry into stalking law reform.396 For instance, the 
inquiry found that “a holistic approach was needed for reform and that amendments to the 
1997 Act would not be enough to express the concerns of victims. There was therefore all 
party support for fundamental changes in attitudes towards the offence and behaviour of 
stalking.”397 
Also during this time, reports by PAS and NAPO were released in 2011. These 
organizations wanted to bring attention to the deficiencies and limitations present within 
the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, specifically concerning the victims of 
stalking.398 The PAS study focused on victim-survivors’ experiences with the criminal 
justice system, while the NAPO study centred on 79 convicted male perpetrators. These 
campaigns highlighted the need for change. For example, the research conducted by PAS 
found that there were grave problems with responses to stalking and harassment from both 
the criminal justice system and the police in general.399 These problems led to a lack of 
protection for victims and survivors. This attention led to an opportunity to do something 
about the inadequate legislation in England and Wales. 
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Critical Actions 
Once the legislation in Scotland was passed, and the parliamentary inquiry into stalking 
was complete, these instances were used as important motives for England and Wales to 
follow suit and update the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. At the Labour Party 
Women’s Conference in 2011, then-Shadow Home Secretary Yvette Cooper (Lab), stated:  
Almost one in five women in their lifetime experiences persistent harassment and 
threats. Intimidating, threatening, persecuting. Stalking. 
Yet stalking itself is not defined as a criminal offence. (…) 
We strengthened the law. But it doesn’t go far enough and it still isn’t strong 
enough. So we should campaign to change it now to make stalking a criminal 
offence and help protect women’s lives.400 
This important statement helped cement the Labour party’s policy on stalking, illuminate 
the seriousness of the behaviours listed, and name those behaviours for what they are: 
stalking. Interestingly, popular perceptions of stalking and harassment have been described 
as being ‘coloured’ because of media attention concerning various celebrities or well-
known individuals. For example, “[t]he victims have included members of the royal family 
as well as various celebrities and television presenters.”401 The media attention 
surrounding these high profile cases have been widely reported; however, other cases such 
as the case of Tracey Morgan, have “received considerable publicity and it was in the wake 
of this case that the government decided to frame legislation to address the problem.”402 
Therefore, while the high profile cases have coloured the conversation in a way that labels 
‘stalkers’ as ‘people with mental illnesses,’ the research shows that many cases of stalking 
and harassment are perpetrated by ex-partners or those known to the victim-survivors.403 
While opinions of the general public cannot be widely measured, one in five women and 
one in ten men are victims of stalking in the United Kingdom. Further, the British Crime 
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Survey identified stalking as “one of the most common types of intimate violence, with the 
2010/11 BCS showing that 4.1 [percent] women aged 16-59 and 3.2 [percent] of men aged 
16-59 [have] experienced stalking in the last year.”404 The Home Office also held a 
consultation on stalking, showing the increased importance of this topic within the wider 
public. For example, 56 percent of respondents did not believe that stalking legislation at 
that time was sufficient in dealing with the problem.405 These instances show that stalking 
and harassment was a major problem for many, and because of this, the update to the 
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 could benefit many victim-survivors. 
As stated above, these behaviours named in the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 
were not named as stalking, and instead were referred to as harassment. In addition, this 
statement helped to ‘gender’ the conversation regarding stalking, declaring that at least one 
in five women experience not only harassment, but persistent threats and stalking. It shows 
the pattern of harassment, and attempts to end the bias that occurs when stalking 
behaviours are seen as isolated, individual incidents, especially under the law. This 
declaration helped put the case forward for changes in legislation in England and Wales.  
The month of November in 2011 was an important month for stalking law reform. The 
Home Office decided to launch a public consultation on stalking, with proposal and 
support by then-Home Secretary Theresa May (Con) in hopes of finding more effective 
ways to protect victims of stalking.406 More specifically it was stated that “almost 15 years 
on from the original legislation, we are launching a consultation into the operation of the 
current law and how we can protect stalking victims more effectively. This includes 
whether there should be a specific criminal offence in legislation which is clearly labelled 
‘stalking.’”407 The results of this consultation, released in July 2012, were clear. These 
results included the following: 69 percent of respondents found that local level agencies 
and public knowledge surrounding stalking and stalking behaviours were not sufficient and 
69 percent did not believe local level agencies received adequate training on stalking.408 
Additionally, 56 percent of respondents found that current legislation was not adequate in 
dealing with stalking, and 51 percent of respondents stated that a specific offence of 
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stalking needed to be considered by the government.409 Lastly, 76 percent stated that more 
perpetrators needed to be brought to account, and 85 percent believed victims needed to be 
better protected.410 These results are important because of the variety of those that 
responded to the consultation. The participants included policing agencies, legal 
professionals, members of the British Psychology Society, charity and voluntary groups, 
central and local government agencies, NGOs, trade unions, and individuals.411 The results 
and respondents show that it was believed that stalking law reform was necessary across 
the board. It was not only victims that sought this change, but all of those involved. 
Further to this, Baroness Royall addressed the loophole in the legislation on November 8, 
2011 during the second reading of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, where she 
mentioned the new Scottish act, stating:  
Stalking behaviour is consistently unidentified and underestimated by the criminal 
justice system. The lack of legal definition of a stalking offence means that the 
police, probation officers and the courts will look at offences in isolation; as a 
result, patterns of behaviour are often not spotted until a serious offence is 
committed. (…) I know that the Minister [Lord Henley] is a fan of the Scottish 
model for other provisions within this Bill, so I hope he will support changes to the 
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 that are similar to those introduced in 
Scotland last year and that would make stalking a specific offence, thereby naming 
and defining this poorly understood crime.412 
This was an extremely important claim made by the baroness, as she attempted to bring 
attention to three things: first, she stated that stalking is both unidentified and 
underestimated because of the lack of a legal definition; second, she identified the gap 
where a course of conduct was not previously taken into account; and third, she brought to 
attention to the fact that this course of conduct is often ignored or unidentified until a 
serious offence such as murder has taken place. Importantly, David Cameron MP (Con), 
then-Prime Minister, acknowledged this gap in a separate parliamentary debate on 
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November 23, 2011, stating that victim-survivors of stalking needed proper legal 
protection.413 
Using the opportunity to speak on behalf of the victims of stalking, on December 6, 2011 
during a committee hearing Baroness Royall introduced an amendment with hopes of 
updating the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. This amendment sought to specifically 
name and criminalise stalking, increase statutory penalties for perpetrators, and allow 
offences to either be tried in the magistrate’s court or Crown Court under section 4. For 
instance, if there was not enough evidence to convict under section 4 the perpetrator could 
be convicted under the section 2 offence.414 This would also allow search powers for police 
for offences under section 2, which at the time was not a police power.415 With regard to 
her motives for introducing these amendments, she stated:  
We have debated on many occasions the freedoms of defendants and, in some 
cases, criminals, but now we have the opportunity to debate the protection of the 
freedoms of victims of stalking, many of whom are women, who are insufficiently 
protected at present by the legal arrangements. (…) The current law is patently not 
working and the state is failing victims, 80 per cent of whom are women, according 
to data from the National Stalking Helpline.416 
After Baroness Royall introduced these amendments, a back and forth occurred, due to 
some mentioning that these laws already existed, such as the Lord Henley, then-Minister of 
State (Con). He stated: “I reassure the House that legislation does currently exist to cover 
this criminal behaviour and that, as I made clear earlier, the work that we are doing with 
the police and the CPS means that they have guidance on the 1997 Act, which sets out that 
stalking and cyberstalking are covered by the Act.”417 Regardless of this, Baroness Royall 
continued to push these amendments through the House of Lords. She stated:  
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It is staggering that the Government are proposing to retain the fear of violence 
distinction, despite such evidence. It is also staggering because in Scotland we have 
a clear legal precedent for a single offence of stalking without fear of violence. The 
Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act, which was introduced in 2010, 
created a single offence of stalking, triable either way, with a maximum sentence of 
five years' imprisonment. It is then up to prosecutors and the courts to decide at 
what level the case should be heard.418  
This divergence, she further argued, perpetuated the main problem that existed within the 
Protection from Harassment Act 1997 and would thus continue if the legislation was not 
updated. However, in order to allow the amendments to move forward, Baroness Royall 
accepted Lord Henley’s proposals.419 These amendments advanced to the House of 
Commons, where they became new offences to ‘sit alongside’ the already existing offences 
within the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, with the support of Stella Creasy MP 
(Lab). Prior to this, Ms. Creasy attempted to eradicate the distinction of section 2 and 
section 4 offences by ‘seriousness.’ Previous evidence has shown that because the burden 
of proof was so high to convict under section 4 and prove fear of violence, most were 
charged under section 2 and did not serve adequate sentences for the crimes of stalking that 
they committed because of this ‘seriousness’ differentiation. Ms. Creasy stated:  
As many experts have pointed out, this distinction risks retaining one of the 
problems with the existing legislation: it is extremely unusual for someone to be 
found guilty under section 4 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. (…) As 
NAPO and PAS have pointed out, allowing the offence to be triable either way 
would have two advantages. First, if evidence came out during a magistrates court 
trial indicating that the matter was more serious than first thought and may warrant 
a sentence of more than six months, the case could be sent to the Crown court for 
sentence. Secondly, many stalkers who do not threaten violence and who may be 
tried under section 2A for less serious matters are, nevertheless, highly 
persistent.420 
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This is an important recommendation to the Lords amendment, as it attempted to change 
the nature of the legislation itself by allowing offences to be tried ‘either-way,’ instead of 
simply tacking on offences to ‘sit alongside’ the current harassment legislation. As Ms. 
Creasy stated, keeping the legislation how it was in its current state would continue to be 
inadequate in terms of combatting stalking by providing adequate justice for victims and 
perpetrators. There was a vote in the Commons on this recommendation and it was 
defeated, 286 Noes to 200 Ayes.421 Instead, the Lords amendment was accepted by Ms. 
May on March 19, 2012 and was further accepted in the House of Lords on April 24, 2012.  
 
The Critical Act  
The act receiving Royal Assent on May 1, 2012 was the point of actual policy change, and 
thus constitutes the critical act. Although the updated offences in the act were accepted, 
many of the recommendations suggested by the Justice Unions’ Parliamentary Group 
inquiry have not yet been taken into account. For example, there is still no registry for 
serial perpetrators of stalking and harassment, nor is there a Bill of Rights for victims or an 
update to the Bail Act 1976 to disallow bail for violent perpetrators. Further, those who 
breach protection and restraining orders often do not receive a custodial sentence for those 
breaches, as is recommended by the inquiry.422 
 
Findings: Case 2 
The conversation surrounding stalking during the debate regarding the Protection of 
Freedoms Act 2012 has added to and is expressed within the wider rhetoric on violence 
against women in the United Kingdom. The legislation does not go far enough however, or 
attempts to change the culture regarding how stalking and harassment is treated under the 
criminal justice system, as Baroness Royall and Ms. Creasy specified. This representation 
however, can lead to potential future changes, especially given the recommendations made 
by the parliamentary inquiry. For example, after the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 was 
updated, a government action plan was introduced where the government promised to 
bring more awareness to the topic of stalking and harassment, as well as improve training 
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of police and those who work within the criminal justice, in addition to the introduction of 
the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Stalking and Harassment. Moreover, PAS vowed to 
monitor the implementation of the new legislation, in order to hold representatives to 
account for their actions.  
Furthermore, in terms of interests and why this representation was attempted, the strategic 
gendered interests as defined in Chapter 2, had already been realised through the initial 
adoption of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, as the Protection of Freedoms Act 
2012 was not wholly new legislation; rather, it created a new offence to ‘sit alongside’ the 
harassment offences. The practical gender interests however, according to Molyneux, were 
‘voiced by women who experience them.’423 These interests were voiced by women who 
had experienced stalking and harassment and were not protected under the then-provisions 
of the 1997 Protection from Harassment Act. As stated by Tracey Morgan, a victim who 
had previously campaigned for legislative change and also contributed to the parliamentary 
inquiry: “Victims are never taken seriously, from police forces to courts to the whole 
criminal justice system. The victims I hear from are saying the same things I was 15 years 
ago—what’s changed? We need to do more. This is about murder prevention.”424 This 
statement is just one example of the affirmation of practical gender interests at work when 
considering why SRW was attempted in this case. These practical interests also invoke the 
notion of motivation (interests) by actors and representatives but also the notion of 
obligation (a feeling of responsibility).  
The representation which occurred in order to update the Protection from Harassment Act 
1997 included many sites of action, critical actors, and critical acts. The 1997 act was 
ineffective, and the national parliament took the lead from the regional parliament of 
Scotland in order to specifically criminalise and name the offence of stalking. The fact that 
the amendments proposed by Baroness Royall were almost identical to the Scottish 
provision backs up the notion that the national parliament took notes and followed suit 
from one of the regional parliaments in the United Kingdom. From the onset of this bill 
becoming an act, one can see that the parliament is not the first step in the process, nor is it 
the only step. As stated in Chapter 1, the literature surrounding the political representation 
of women has mostly started from the examination of the makeup of the national 
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parliament. However, only very rarely is legislation conceived of and completed solely in 
the parliament. Many sites of action, as well as levels of action, are interacting throughout 
the process. Important implications of this case include the new legislation that was 
presented in Scotland in regard to stalking, where Scotland was mentioned 15 times by 12 
different actors and on five of the six dates where stalking was discussed within the 
parliament. Further, many actors from various political parties played an important role in 
accepting the new stalking offence amendment, but the amendment to the bill itself was 
proposed by a female parliamentarian, Baroness Royall. Prior to this, Ms. Cooper put the 
case forward for new legislation, and Rhoda Grant was the Scottish MP who proposed the 
criminal offence of stalking in Scotland. Juxtaposed to these actors, was the important role 
that Mr. Llwyd played in first deciding to hold a parliamentary inquiry on stalking. This 
decision was the critical juncture that followed from the critical act in Scotland. This is 
important because it helped push the issue to the forefront of the parliament, where the 
critical act was achieved in 2012. There was also cross-party cooperation, as demonstrated 




Chapter 4: Evaluating SRW in England and Wales: The Criminal Justice 






This chapter will evaluate the critical path framework conceptualised in Chapter 2, by 
examining and assessing the last two cases of domestic violence legislation in England and 
Wales. This case study is comprised of bills that have passed through the formal 
parliamentary process and received Royal Assent, becoming acts of law. The point of 
analysis for this chapter begins with the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 and ends 
with the Serious Crime Act 2015. To reiterate from Chapter 3, this evaluation seeks to 
assess the behaviour that has already happened within the policymaking process. 
To restate, the research question asks what SRW means in the context of England and 
Wales. The sub-questions guiding this research question are: 1) When does SRW occur; 2) 
why is SRW attempted; 3) who acts in SRW; 4) how is SRW manifested; 5) where does 
the substantive representation occur; 6) in relation to which women is substantive 
representation expressed; and 7) what policies are passed or debated. Furthermore, the 
main aims of this thesis include: employing a formalised framework surrounding SRW by 
answering the above questions and utilising the proposed critical path, using this 
framework to research the impact of SRW on violence against women legislation in 
England and Wales, drawing conclusions on SRW, producing meaningful research, and 
expanding future knowledge on the political representation of women, as well as its effects 
on violence against women.   
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Case 3: The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 
Stage Date Hansard Reference 




5 February 2014 Vol. 575 Col. 276 
Second reading 
 
24 February 2014 Vol. 576 Col. 47-127 
Committee 11 March 2014 
13 March 2014 
18 March 2014 
20 March 2014 
25 March 2014 
27 March 2014 
1 April 2014 
 
 
Report and Third reading 12 May 2014 
17 June 2014 
 
Vol. 580 Col. 455-542 
Vol. 582 Col. 963-1083 
House of Lords 
 
Introduction 18 June 2014 
 
Vol. 754 Col. 836 
Second reading 30 June 2014 Vol. 754 Col. 1537-1572, 1583-
1630 
 
Committee 14 July 2014 
21 July 2014 
23 July 2014 
28 July 2014 
30 July 2014 
 
 
Report 20 October 2014 
22 October 2014 
27 October 2014 
 
 





Commons Consideration of Lords 
Amendments 
 
1 December 2014  
Lords Consideration of Commons 
Reasons and Amendments 
 
9 December 2014  
Commons Consideration of Lords 
Insistence and Reasons, Lords 
Non-Insistence and Amendment in 
Lieu of those Amendments 
 




Stage Date Hansard Reference 
Lords Consideration of Commons 
Amendments 
 
21 January 2015  
Royal Assent – 12 February 2015  
 
Table 7: Hansard references for the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 
 
Party (with more than one representative; as of 1 May 2015) 
Conservative 302 
Labour 256 
Liberal Democrat 56 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) 8 
Scottish National Party (SNP) 6 
Independent 5 
Sinn Fein 5 
Plaid Cymru 3 
Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) 






Men 502/650 (77 percent) 
Women 148/650 (22.8 percent) 
Table 8: 55th House of Commons composition (2010-2015) 
 
The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 
The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 was introduced in the House of Commons on 
February 5, 2014. The bill sought to change several aspects of the English and Welsh 
criminal justice system and was broken into four sections: criminal justice, young 
offenders, courts and tribunals, and judicial review. These aspects included ‘sentencing; 
cautions; prisoners’ release and recall; and the detention of young offenders.’425 The bill 
sought to further reform ‘courts proceedings and costs; establish a new system of strict 
liability in contempt proceedings; create new offences for juror misconduct; make changes 
to the conduct and funding of judicial review claims; and amend the law on extreme 
                                                        




pornography.’426 Initially, so-called revenge pornography was not mentioned during the 
introduction of the bill, or during its time in the House of Commons.427 Any offences 
relating to revenge pornography were not introduced as part of this act until July 21, 2014 
during the House of Lords Committee meeting.428 Once the offence of revenge 
pornography was introduced in the House of Lords and received Royal Assent, the act then 
“create[d] an offence disclosing private sexual photographs or films with intent to cause 
distress.”429 The revenge pornography offence fits within the first part of the act, under the 
criminal justice section, within the subdivision of ‘offences involving intent to cause 
distress etc.,’ comprising of clauses 33-35, which state: “It is an offence for a person to 
disclose a private sexual photograph or film if the disclosure is made—(a) without the 
consent of an individual who appears in the photograph or film, and (b) with the intention 
of causing that individual distress.”430 
Outside of the legislative realm, what does so-called revenge pornography actually mean? 
What are its societal and personal effects? And how does it fit within contemporary 
understandings of domestic abuse in the United Kingdom, specifically England and 
Wales? To begin, the term itself is contested. Some prefer to call revenge pornography 
‘non-consensual pornography’ or the ‘non-consensual sharing of intimate media.’431 As 
Mary Anne Franks specifies, the term itself is abusive; it shows how perpetrators “want to 
do harm by getting ‘revenge’ and [have] others join in.”432 Even calling this non-
consensual practice ‘pornography’ is problematic, as the photos or videos do not have to be 
overtly sexual. As pointed out by Erika Rackley and Clare McGlynn, the photo could be of 
the perpetrator’s ex-partner changing clothes, and by grouping this type of non-consensual 
activity in with other forms of pornography, remedies aimed at combatting this issue fail to 
get at the heart of what ‘revenge pornography’ is really about.433 It is specifically about the 
                                                        
426 “Have Your Say on the Criminal Justice and Courts Bill.” 
427 This thesis refers to this behaviour as ‘revenge pornography’ because it is the language that is most widely 
accepted and used by the government in England and Wales. Its actual definition will be addressed below. 
428 The reasons for this will be detailed at a later point in the chapter. 
429 HM Government, “The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015,” (2015): 2. 
430 HM Government, “The Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015,” 34-35. 
431 “RightsUp Podcast: Old Problems, New Media: Revenge Porn and the Law,” last modified May 8, 2015, 
http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/rightsup-podcast-ep1-old-problems-new-media-revenge-porn-and-the-law/; Scottish 
Women’s Aid, “Non-Consensual Sharing of Intimate Media: A Report,” (2015). 
432 “RightsUp Podcast: Old Problems, New Media: Revenge Porn and the Law.” 
433 “RightsUp Podcast: Old Problems, New Media: Revenge Porn and the Law.” 
 107 
sharing of this private content, and a breach of trust and privacy, not about the content 
itself.434 
At the heart of revenge pornography is the destruction of the inner-self and one’s outer life. 
For example, victims express feelings of depression, post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD), anxiety, inability to sleep, nightmares, and the inability to leave the house. This 
breach of trust and privacy can also affect a victim’s professional life, where they could be 
fired or are unable to get an interview in the first place.435 It could also affect their social 
interactions with their family, current partners, and friendships due to the victim blaming 
that often comes with the offence.436 This is exemplified in a 2015 report by Scottish 
Women’s Aid where victims experienced ‘far reaching and long-lasting’ suffering. One 
victim stated: “During my marriage we took pics and videos. I left because he was abusing 
me and raping me. Every day I worry that he has put those images on the net, every day I 
regret ever doing this with him.” 437 Further harassment can occur if perpetrators link these 
photos to a victim’s social media profiles when revenge pornography websites attempt to 
extort a fee from victims who wish to have their photos removed.438 
On a societal level, revenge pornography is about violence and misogyny, the 
‘perpetuation of harm to women in public spaces,’ the ‘inter-relatedness of online and 
offline spaces,’ and power relationships.439 In the same report by Scottish Women’s Aid 
mentioned above, 35 percent of respondents were between the ages of 19-25, 83 percent 
identified as female, and over 80 percent of perpetrators were current or ex-partners. 440 
The fact that the overwhelming majority of victims were women, and the perpetrators were 
current or ex-partners shows that this type of violence is an intrinsic part of domestic 
abuse, controlling behaviour, and a distinctive breach of trust.441 
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As already stated and described, the issue of revenge pornography is a complicated one. 
Because we live in the age of the internet, questions surrounding privacy, free speech, 
online safety, and internet regulations are often raised.442 For example: how widespread is 
this problem? Who is responsible? Is it the responsibility of the perpetrators who upload 
the photos, those who host the website, internet service providers (ISPs), search engines, or 
those who view and disseminate the content? The issue is rather new, as far as wide scale 
media coverage of it, and also the laws surrounding it, because of the increased use and 
spread of the internet and social media. Examples of revenge pornography, however, 
existed before the widespread use of the internet and especially before the rise of Twitter, 
Facebook, and Snapchat. An example of this is the stolen and leaked video of Pamela 
Anderson and then-partner Tommy Lee engaged in various sexual acts in 1995, or the 
leaked video of Paris Hilton and then-partner Rick Salomon in 2003. More recently, we 
have seen the hacking of various celebrity personal web accounts for purposes of stealing 
personal photos and information. Examples of this include Rihanna (2009), Tulisa 
Contostavlos (2012), Jennifer Lawrence and Kate Upton (2014), among countless others. 
At the time of these celebrity ‘leaks,’ revenge pornography may not be what came to the 
minds of the wider public, but today, these examples are considered revenge pornography, 
specifically because of the motives behind the stealing and releasing of the content.  
Another question often asked is why did the offence of revenge pornography need 
introducing in the English and Welsh context? In addition to celebrity instances of revenge 
pornography, the first-known website ‘dedicated’ to revenge pornography, 
IsAnyoneUp.com, was noticed in 2010. While the website was shut down in 2012, the UK 
Safer Internet Centre says there are now 20-30 of these websites operating in the United 
Kingdom.443 The rise of these websites in only a few short years shows the increased 
prevalence of this type of violence. In just one year, the Revenge Porn Helpline, 
established by the government after the passing of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 
2015, received 3,500 calls from 635 individuals.444 79 percent of these individuals were 
women.445 Apart from the selection of celebrity cases presented above, there were also 
high-profile cases which garnered an immense amount of media coverage, including the 
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September 10, 2012 suicide of teenager Audrie Pott in California, the October 10, 2012 
suicide of teenager Amanda Todd in Canada, and victims Marianna Taschinger and Hollie 
Toups from Texas and Holly Jacobs from Florida. These cases led to a growing societal 
awareness of the impact of revenge pornography. As the UN has specified, these ‘high 
profile incidences’ that draw a large amount of attention, are catalysts for legal and 
legislative responses.446 Despite this, “[r]esponses, however, have yet to fully address the 
many degrees and impact of violence, trauma and loss that women, girls and children are 
routinely exposed to and that go unreported.”447  
Because much of the focus has been United States-centred, the US has been at the 
forefront of attempting to combat the issue. For example, in 2013, California passed SB-
255, banning revenge pornography and gained widespread attention because of it. As of 
March 20, 2016, 27 states have laws against revenge pornography, and 10 states have 
legislation pending.448 Prior to this, only New Jersey had an invasion of privacy law from 
2003. According to a UN report in 2015, there are six different types of violence that occur 
online: hacking, impersonation, surveillance/tracking, harassment/spamming, recruitment, 
and malicious distribution.449 Revenge pornography falls under the ‘malicious distribution’ 
section, where it is detailed that “there is a gendered expectation for girls to provide nude 
images that draws on already existing social norms and scripts about heterosexuality, male 
entitlement and female attractiveness.”450 Because of the inherent gendered nature to 
violence against women, especially online abuse against women, the UN has stated that 
“[t]he increasing spread of the Internet frames the urgency for effective legal and social 
controls on attitudes and criminal behavior online” [sic].451 
The increased awareness and prevalence brought to light the fact that there was no specific 
law in the entire United Kingdom outlawing revenge pornography, prior to 2015. For 
instance, the Malicious Communications Act 1988 only covers rude and threatening letters. 
The Protection from Harassment Act 1997 covers a ‘course of conduct,’ not one-off 
incidents, and the Obscene Publications Act 1959 does not cover revenge pornography as 
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the content is not always classified as ‘obscene.’452 Further, “revenge pornography is not 
directly considered in the Director of Public Prosecutions’ guidance for prosecutions 
involving social media communications.”453 Because revenge pornography had been 
mostly overlooked in regard to legislation in England and Wales, a new offence targeting 
this behaviour was introduced during the House of Lords Committee stage on July 21, 
2014, and the bill received Royal Assent on February 12, 2015. The detailed critical path 
framework will be presented in the remainder of this chapter, followed by an analysis of 
the legislation, and what still needs to be done in terms of revenge pornography. 
 
Tracing the Critical Path 
Date Event Path step 
February 13, 2013 SB-255 introduced in California 
to criminalise the ‘non-





June 6, 2013 Article on revenge pornography 
published 
 
Communicative critical action 
 
Critical actor: Scottish 
Women’s Aid 
 
July 8, 2013 Stop Revenge Porn website 
launch 
 
Symbolic critical action 
 
Critical actor: Scottish 
Women’s Aid; Holly Jacobs of 
the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative 
October 1, 2013 SB-255 was approved in 
California 
 
Substantive critical action 
June 10, 2014 4th day of debate following the 
Queen’s Speech; Julian Huppert 
MP (Lib Dem) calls for new 
criminal sanction (col. 443-444) 
regarding revenge pornography; 
mentions Women’s Aid, 
National Stalking Helpline, and 
UK Safer Internet Centre as 
evidence of problem 
 
Symbolic critical action 
 
Critical actor: Julian Huppert 
MP (Lib Dem) 
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Date Event Path step 
June 19, 2014 Maria Miller MP (Con) calls for 
a new criminal offence of 
revenge porn 
 
Symbolic critical action 
 
Critical actor: Maria Miller MP 
(Con) 
 
June 30, 2014 Early Day Motion 192 by Julian 
Huppert MP (Lib Dem) to show 
concern for the problem of 
revenge pornography and garner 
support from fellow MPs 
 
Substantive critical action 
 
Critical actor: Julian Huppert 
MP (Lib Dem) 
 
June 30, 2014 Lord Marks (Lib Dem) proposed 
adding a new clause regarding 
revenge pornography to the 
legislation during the House of 
Lords second reading (col. 
1549) 
 
Substantive critical action 
 
Critical actor: Lord Marks (Lib 
Dem) 
 
July 1, 2014 Support from Minister of Justice 
Chris Grayling (Con) for the 
revenge pornography offence 
Symbolic critical action 
 
Critical actor: Chris Grayling 
MP (Con) 
 
July 4, 2014 Support from Yvette Cooper and 
the Labour Party 
Symbolic critical action 
 
Critical actor: Yvette Cooper 
MP (Lab) 
 
July 9, 2014 Maria Miller MP (Con) asked 
about revenge pornography 
being recognised as a criminal 
sexual offence during Prime 
Minister’s Questions (col. 285) 
 
Symbolic critical action 
 





Date Event Path step 
July 21, 2014 House of Lords committee; 
offence of revenge pornography 
introduced by Lord Marks (Lib 
Dem) (col. 968) 
Substantive critical action 
 
Critical actor(s): Lord Marks 
(Lib Dem); Baroness Berridge 
(Con); Baroness Bolton (Con); 
Baroness Grender (Lib Dem); 
Baroness Thornton (Lab); 
Baroness Barker (Lib Dem) 
 
October 20, 2014 Lord Marks (Lib Dem) 
addressed revenge pornography 
and updated and amended the 
clause during the House of 
Lords report phase (col. 518) 
Substantive critical action 
 
Critical actor: Lord Marks (Lib 
Dem); Baroness Barker (Lib 
Dem); Baroness Brinton (Lib 
Dem); Baroness Grender (Lib 
Dem); Baroness Thornton 
(Lab); Lord Faulks (Con) 
 
December 1, 2014 Ping Pong (HC to HL; col. 115); 
stressed the need for education 
Symbolic critical action 
 
Critical actor: Julian Huppert 
MP (Lib Dem); Andrew Selous 
(Con) 
 
February 12, 2015 Royal Assent Critical act 
 
Table 9: The critical path to the passing of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 
 
The Critical Juncture 
As has been shown in both Case 1 and Case 2, the critical path has illuminated many more 
‘steps’ and actions than would normally be assessed when simply evaluating the Hansard 
legislative processes, for example when you compare Table 7 and Table 9. The remainder 
of this chapter will attempt to trace the critical path for the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 
2015, beginning with a critical juncture. In this case, the critical juncture is posed as the 
introduction of SB-255 in California on February 13, 2013. After the suicide of teenager 
Audrie Pott on September 10, 2012, much of the US took notice of the detrimental effects 
that social media and revenge pornography could have on an individual’s life. Pott has 
been cited as the inspiration behind this bill (now law in California), introduced by 
California State Senator Anthony Cannella (Republican). As Aaron Sankin of the 
Huffington Post wrote: “The bill was inspired by the death of Audrie Pott, a 15-year old 
student from Saratoga, Calif. who committed suicide after she was allegedly sexually 
assaulted by a trio of teenage boys while passed out at a party. Before Pott’s tragic death, 
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graphic photos of the incident were circulated around her high school.”454 The bill made 
the non-consensual sharing of photos and videos a misdemeanour, with the potential to 
serve up to a month in jail or pay a $1,000 fine.455 The introduction (and later passing) of 
this bill in California helped to draw wider attention to the problem of revenge 
pornography, and allowed for the conversation surrounding revenge pornography to be 
discussed more widely in the international and global community. Following the critical 
juncture where California introduced new revenge pornography legislation, the topic 
became more discussed than ever. The Everyday Sexism Project targeted Facebook and 
their acceptance of rape jokes and misogyny on May 28, 2013, the first article on revenge 
pornography was written on the Scottish Women’s Aid website on June 6, 2013, and the 
Stop Revenge Porn website was launched on July 8, 2013 by Scottish Women’s Aid and 
Holly Jacobs of the Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, a US-based website which seeks to 
criminalise revenge pornography, educate the wider public, and provide support to 
victims.456 On October 1, 2013, SB-255 was approved in California and revenge 
pornography officially became an illegal practice. In England during this time, Hannah 
Thompson discovered that her ex-partner had disseminated private photos of her on a 
public blog.457 She contacted the police, and after learning that nothing could be done, she 
began contacting her MP. Her case, and her willingness to come forward has been cited, in 
addition to SB-255, as the inspiration for the new offence that was introduced in England 
and Wales to the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015.458 
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Critical Actions 
Following the Queen’s Speech on June 4, 2014, Dr. Julian Huppert MP (Lib Dem) called 
for a new criminal sanction during the fourth day of debate in regard to revenge 
pornography on June 10, 2014. He stated:  
I was approached by someone about the issue of revenge porn, which is happening 
more and more often. People take naked or indecent images of partners and then, 
once the relationship ends, they share them online, publishing them very widely—
to the great mental torment of the people concerned. It is mostly but not always 
women who have agreed to have an explicit photo taken, but never agreed for it to 
be broadcast to all and sundry on the web as a means of revenge. It destroys 
people’s lives because of the psychological effect, the shame and the great 
humiliation caused when these images can be seen by anyone.459 
Mr. Huppert went on to state that existing laws did not cover this behaviour and proposed 
that something needed to be done. To this, he called for a new offence, and left it to the 
House. During the debate, Huppert also mentioned that those involved, including 
Women’s Aid, the National Stalking Helpline, and the UK Safer Internet Centre accepted 
that revenge pornography was only getting worse. Despite this call from Huppert, prior to 
the report and third hearing phase of the bill, the offence was not considered in the House 
of Commons. Huppert stated on June 17, 2014 during the report and third hearing that he 
would ‘send in [his] ideas’ to be deliberated at a later date.460 During this time, Maria 
Miller MP (Con) also called for a new criminal offence of revenge pornography. The 
former Minister for Women and Equalities stated:  
Just a few week ago I was contacted by one of my constituents who told me about a 
new form of online abuse. She described in her email how people, mostly women 
have nude and sexually explicit pictures of themselves posted online without their 
knowledge and without their consent, on dedicated websites readily promoted by 
search engines like Google and Yahoo.461 
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She went on to state that current legislation pre-dates this problem and referenced the scale 
of the problem in the US, and pointed to the fact that California, Texas, and Utah had 
passed new legislation in regard to revenge pornography.462 
Following this call, Mr. Huppert tabled an EDM, in order to show his concern about the 
problem of revenge pornography and garner support from fellow MPs to “urge the 
Government to bring forward legislative proposals to criminally sanction individuals who 
breach the privacy of others through these vengeful acts.”463 Sponsors of the EDM 
included Tim Farron MP (Lib Dem), Sir Peter Bottomley MP (Con), Sir Alan Meale MP 
(Lab), Greg Mulholland MP (Lib Dem), and Dr Julian Lewis MP (Con), and included 36 
additional signatures from MPs.464 The party breakdown of the signatures included: 15 
Liberal Democrats, 12 Labour members, five Conservative members, two Independents, 
one Alliance member, and 1 Democratic Unionist Party member.465 The EDM 
communicates that “this House is deeply concerned at the growth of revenge porn… notes 
that whilst the images are often taken with full consent, their dissemination is not… [and] 
understands that there is no specific legislation to deal with the problem.”466 On the same 
day that the EDM was posed by Huppert, revenge pornography was mentioned in the 
House of Lords’ second reading by Lord Marks (Lib Dem).467 Lord Marks proposed 
adding a new clause to the legislation to include the criminalising of revenge pornography, 
and gave thanks to Huppert for suggesting it in ‘the other place’ and to Miller as well.468 
The move received support from Mr. Grayling on July 1, 2014, and also from Ms. Cooper 
on July 4, 2014.469 Further, in order to hear the views on revenge pornography from Mr. 
Cameron, Ms. Miller posed a question during Prime Minister’s Questions (PMQs) on July 
9, 2014. She stated: “The Safer Internet Centre estimates that up to 30 websites host 
[United Kingdom] online revenge pornography images, another form of sexual abuse. 
Does the Prime Minister agree that posting such material must be recognised for what it 
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is—a criminal sexual offence against its victims?”470 Following this question, the PM 
responded:  
My right hon. Friend is right. This is an appalling offence and a dreadful thing for 
someone to do, and it clearly has criminal intent. I am very glad that she is 
championing this cause, and I hope that having looked in detail at the amendments 
she is suggesting, we can take up this cause. Part of what she achieved in 
government—the very good work that she did in office—is making sure that we do 
far more to deal with porn and internet porn.471 
Despite the fact that Mr. Cameron equated ‘porn’ and ‘internet porn’ with the offence of 
revenge pornography, his answer during PMQs showed his support and willingness to 
accept an offence of revenge pornography under the law, by exposing the criminal intent of 
the perpetrator.  
With support from MPs and the PM, the offence of revenge pornography was introduced 
during the House of Lords committee meeting on July 21, 2014. Lord Marks introduced 
the offence (tabled by Baroness Berridge (Con) and Baroness Morris (Con)) claiming that 
the offence ‘follows the trauma of relationship breakdown’ and that ‘this practice should 
be criminalised.’472 He gave thanks of support from other peers, including Baroness 
Berridge and Baroness Bolton. Initially, the offence was introduced as an “[o]ffence of 
publishing a sexually explicit or pornographic image without consent.”473 However, Lord 
Marks addressed three concerns with the proposed language of the amendment. For 
instance, he stated that the offence was about the publication of the photos or videos, and 
not about a motive of ‘sexual gratification,’ as is implied by the use of the term 
‘pornographic.’474 This concern was echoed by Baroness Grender MBE (Lib Dem), where 
she indicated “[t]he inflicting of pain and humiliation is the only motive, and the individual 
who publishes such images should know that when they do it, they are committing a 
crime.”475 To this, Baroness Kennedy QC (Lab), Baroness Barker (Lib Dem), and 
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Baroness Thornton (Lab) reiterated that the concern of the bill and amendments should be 
about consent, and not necessarily about the motivation of the perpetrator’s actions.476  
Secondly, Lord Marks specified that the photos or videos did not have to be of the victim 
engaged in a sexual act, as inferred by the usage of ‘sexually explicit.’ To this he stated: 
“For an image to cause real distress, it is not necessary for the subject of the image to be 
actually engaged in a private act. … It does not seem to us that a sexual act should have to 
be portrayed in the image before an offence could be committed.”477 Thirdly, he indicated 
that using ‘exposed’ or ‘semi-exposed’ was also unnecessary, although he added it may be 
difficult then to identify images as falling within the context of revenge pornography. 
Ultimately, Lord Marks made an important point: “Long gone are the days when we 
should regard physical harm as a necessary ingredient of an offence against the person.”478 
This is a significant distinction, and as we have seen throughout these three cases, that 
domestic abuse does not have to entail any physical elements, and is often accompanied by 
psychological and emotional abuse. The use of so-called revenge pornography, and other 
online abuses, is another tool that perpetrators can use to abuse and control their partners 
or ex-partners.  
During the meeting, Baroness Berridge addressed revenge pornography not only as a 
criminal offence, but as a sexual offence, and proposed that it be classified as such.479 This 
was echoed by Baroness Morris that revenge pornography should be classified as a sexual 
offence instead of simply a criminal offence, as it ‘fails to recognize the sexual nature of 
the crime’ and also fails to view revenge pornography as a ‘virtual form of sexual 
assault.’480 Importantly, Baroness Berridge pointed to the work done by Laura Higgins at 
the UK Safer Internet Centre, and by Women’s Aid, Welsh Women’s Aid, and Scottish 
Women’s Aid. Citing the UK Safer Internet Centre, revenge pornography has become a 
‘consumer product,’ with 20-30 known revenge pornography websites in the United 
Kingdom alone.481 She specified: “Apparently it has become a consumer product on pay-
per-view. Many of the websites attract huge volumes of traffic, and the more often an 
image is looked at, the more likely it is that when you Google search your own name, the 
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first thing that will come up in connection with your name is these images that have been 
posted, which is particularly degrading.”482 This behaviour points to the fact that revenge 
pornography was (and continues to be) an important problem, where the ‘law has not quite 
kept pace with the internet.’483 Legally, there were few resources or mechanisms, as 
Baroness Berridge described, for victims to even have their photos removed once they 
discovered them. For inspiration to address this growing problem, she directed her fellow 
peers to view the legislation in the US, but also in Israel, which made revenge pornography 
a sexual offence on January 6, 2014.484  
A further significant point made during the committee meeting was by Baroness Thornton 
where she detailed that while a specific offence was needed to help combat revenge 
pornography, so too was a “strong political will to tackle the underlying culture that creates 
and legitimises sexual violence, abuse and harassment in all its forms. That requires not 
only a government commitment to headline-making legislative reform but to ensuring 
effective implementation of any new offence and bringing forward compulsory sex and 
relationship education in our schools.”485 For her, what is happening in schools and in 
society, is not good enough. The problem needs to be combatted in different and more 
effective ways, such as through education. This was one of the first points within the 
debate where a wider culture of violence was specifically mentioned.  
After the committee meeting, the House of Lords held their reporting stage on October 20, 
2014. Again, Lord Marks was the peer to bring up the revenge pornography offence. He 
named (and thanked) Baroness Grender, Baroness Brinton, and Baroness Barker for their 
work on the issue, as well as Mr. Huppert for raising the issue in the House of 
Commons.486 Given the debate during the committee meeting addressed above, the clause 
regarding revenge pornography was updated and amended. It read: “Publication of private 
sexual images (1) [i]t shall be an offence for a person to publish a private sexual image of 
another identifiable person without their consent where this disclosure causes distress to 
the person who is the subject of the image.”487 This new definition adds in the words 
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‘private’ and ‘distress’ while removing the language of the photo or video having to be 
‘pornographic,’ as raised by Lord Marks and others. It also uses the language of ‘sexual 
images’ versus the previous wording of ‘sexually explicit.’ 
Following the introduction of the clause by Lord Marks, Baroness Brinton again used the 
opportunity to describe how revenge pornography fits within a web of other types of online 
abuse, citing its potential long-term damage.488 While she stated that only eight police 
forces out of 43 collected data regarding revenge pornography complaints, there were 
some figures. For instance, in 2012 there were 35 complaints; 58 complaints for 2013, and 
53 complaints for the first half of 2014.489 These figures not only show the growth of the 
problem in these eight areas, but the growth that is undoubtedly occurring throughout the 
rest of England and Wales and beyond. It shows how necessary this legislation is, but also 
how important it is to understand and combat domestic abuse in general. As Baroness 
Brinton reiterated, “[i]t is an abuse of power designed to cause distress, and with the nature 
of social media today, the perpetrator can hand it on and on to others, including 
professional revenge porn sites whose participants often then choose to troll the original 
victim, their family and their work colleagues.”490 Baroness Thornton also echoed this 
position by stating that the legislation was a positive step, but not necessarily the only or 
last step that needs to be taken to eradicate domestic abuse, and specifically revenge 
pornography.491 
In addition, Baroness Thornton brought up whether this offence would be classed as a 
sexual offence versus simply being categorised as a criminal offence. Lord Faulks QC 
(Con) addressed questions about this. He stated: “Research in previous cases has shown 
that revenge porn—the emphasis here being on ‘revenge’—is perpetrated with the 
intention of making a victim feel humiliated and distressed rather than to obtain sexual 
gratification, which is what defines an offence as sexual.”492 Therefore, because of that 
reasoning, the offence would not be classified as a sexual offence, such as voyeurism. 
Although, it could be argued, and was argued by those in the House of Lords that revenge 
pornography is a sexual offence, and should be categorised as one. It is important to point 
out that during the meeting, Baroness Berridge spoke of the agreement among both the 
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government benches, and the back benches on this issue, in addition to mentioning 
Women’s Aid, Ms. Miller, and academics who advised the MPs over the course of the bill 
process.493 Lord Faulks also showed appreciation to ‘stakeholders’ such as the National 
Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) and Victim Support.494 
Following the report in the House of Lords, the bill then went to the House of Commons 
for a series of ‘ping pong’ sessions for consideration of the various amendments. The 
offence of revenge pornography was dealt with during the December 1, 2014 hearing. 
There was much agreement that the offence was a good move forward for the government, 
and for England and Wales. Andrew Selous MP (Con) and Mr. Huppert welcomed the 
offence that was introduced in the House of Lords, but stressed the need for education so 
that individuals do not commit these offences in the first place.495 Mr. Huppert stated: “We 
need a system where, particularly through education, we get people to understand what 
consent is about: what can be agreed to and what cannot be agreed.”496 This is especially 
crucial, yet interesting, that the government has decided that sex and relationship education 
is not statutory, and students can be withdrawn if their parents choose.497 This is quite the 
opposite of what many MPs have declared, as well as various organisations and charities in 
the United Kingdom, that this type of education is essential if the issue of domestic abuse, 
and violence against women and girls more widely, is to be combated.498  
 
The Critical Act 
Unlike other issues that may be more contentious within the ping pong sessions of debate, 
such as the National Health Service (NHS) or defence spending, the consideration of the 
revenge pornography offence was rather straightforward, with MPs mostly showing 
appreciation for those who had helped push the issue along. For instance, Ms. Miller 
expressed that she had campaigned on behalf of victims who had contacted her for help.499 
In addition, she thanked Baroness Morris and Baroness Berridge from the House of Lords, 
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Women’s Aid, the UK Safer Internet Centre, and Ban Revenge Porn. Mr. Huppert thanked 
Baroness Grender, Baroness Brinton, Baroness Barker, and Lord Marks for their help in 
tabling the amendments to include revenge pornography in the bill. Huppert paid 
appreciation to victims as well, especially Ms. Thompson, where he stated: “I pay tribute 
to the victims. I have spoken to many of them, but in particular I pay tribute to Hannah 
Thompson who has played a very key role in speaking out publicly. That was a very brave 
thing to do about something that feels very shaming. We should remember her work and 
pay tribute to her.”500 After the other ping pong stages, the bill was approved and received 
Royal Assent on February 12, 2015. In regard to the new legislation, Mr. Selous detailed 
that “[p]arliament needs to be relevant. It needs to deal with the issues presented to us, and 
this is a good example of Parliament and the Government doing exactly that.”501 
While many, such as Dr. Ann Olivarius of McAllister Olivarius law firm, hailed the new 
offence as a victory in the fight against domestic violence and violence against women, the 
legislation was not perfect.502 For example, the offence was not approved as a sexual 
offence, as was suggested. There was to be no independent review of the legislation and its 
implementation, as was inquired about. Although the Revenge Porn Helpline was 
established by the government, the current law has no stipulations for websites to remove 
these images; it simply provides a means of punishment for the perpetrator.503 Further, 
there is no onus on social media companies such as Facebook and Twitter to combat the 
issue, nor is there a civil remedy for damages.504 Additionally, victims of revenge 
pornography have to be able to prove that the offence was committed out of ‘revenge’ with 
intent to cause distress; perpetrators cannot be punished if the photos were intended to 
show a ‘good time.’505 As stated in a blog on contemporary United Kingdom feminism, 
“[a]s it stands, the law fails to capture the objectification of women’s bodies for the mere 
purpose of entertainment and mockery. This is problematic, because it is this form of 
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everyday sexism in the domain of speech about sex that constitutes the very core of 
revenge porn.”506 Lastly, as Scottish Women’s Aid points out, the threat of distributing 
these images and videos needs to be covered as well.507  
In terms of change, Women’s Aid has continued to fight for compulsory sex and 
relationship education, as many MPs and peers have suggested, as it is important to combat 
the culture of violence in the United Kingdom. There also needs to be more support for 
survivors. As outlined in the problems with the legislation, we can see that it continues to 
be perpetrator-centred, with little recourse for victims. Victims and survivors are 
represented during the parliamentary debates, but provisional services are sometimes 
forgotten when it comes to actually drafting the legislation. Further, as can be seen from 
the critical juncture in this case, it is important to have international collaboration in terms 
of the perpetrators and the websites which post these photos and videos. For example, 
someone’s photos could have been posted on a website hosted outside of England and 
Wales, and there is an increased difficulty in getting those pictures removed, because the 
law does not apply outside of England and Wales. Therefore, some form of collaboration 
could be effective, however that is outside the scope of this research. 
 
Findings: Case 3 
Overall, while the Criminal Justice and Courts bill became an act under the law, it is 
important to look more closely at how the process connects to the wider framework. In 
terms of naming critical actors, MPs played an obvious large role in the passing of the 
Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. There were actors from the Liberal Democrat party 
(five), Conservative party (five), and the Labour party (two). There was also a mixture of 
representation by sex as well. Four of these actors were men, and eight were women. 
Interestingly, the issue of revenge pornography was raised in the House of Commons by 
Mr. Huppert, and the offence itself was introduced in the House of Lords by Lord Marks. 
Other than MPs, there were also various organisations involved in bringing this issue to 
attention, including Scottish Women’s Aid, the National Stalking Helpline, UK Safer 
Internet Centre, and Women’s Aid. Victim-survivors of so-called revenge pornography 
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helped to create various initiatives including Stop Revenge Porn and the Cyber Civil 
Rights Initiative. Because of their action, victim-survivors are regarded as critical actors. 
This helped bring attention and awareness to the issue of revenge pornography. Would this 
issue have been brought up at all if representatives were not contacted by victims and 
asked for help, for instance, in regard to Ms. Miller and Mr. Huppert? This leads to the 
sites of representation which included both houses of parliament. There was also 
international influence by way of the critical juncture in California, and also influence 
from political forums, such as the organisations mentioned above.  
This legislation was introduced and the critical juncture took place simply because it was 
not covered under then-legislation. The issue was framed as being important to women, 
both victims and potential victims. While ‘women’ were often spoken of, they were 
presented as an undifferentiated group. In terms of practical gendered interests, awareness-
raising helped to initiate the strategic gendered interests, where legislation became the 
solution. Further, from the evaluation of the parliamentary debates, EDMs, surveys, 
reports, and news articles, it is evident that legislators felt an obligation or responsibility to 
propose legislation, and were not solely motivated from personal experience or 
opportunity. Regarding this obligation, the representation can be seen as effective for the 
most obvious reason that the legislation received Royal Assent and was passed into law. 
However, looking more deeply, we can see that party differences were also bridged, even 
if all suggestions for the new legislation were not taken into account. As stated above, the 
Liberal Democrat party were responsible for introducing the legislation, but the 
Conservative party and members of the Labour party also aided in moving the legislation 






Case 4: The Serious Crime Act 2015 
Stage Date Hansard Reference 




5 June 2014 Vol. 754 Col. 21 
Second reading 
 
16 June 2014 Vol. 754 Col. 643-699 
Committee 2 July 2014 
8 July 2014 
15 July 2014 
 
Vol. 754 Col. 1721-1770 
Vol. 755 Col. 119-189 
Vol. 755 Col. 511-563 
Report 14 October 2014 
28 October 2014 
 
Vol. 756 Col. 119-165 
Vol. 756 Col. 1069-1171 
Third reading 5 November 2014 
 
Vol. 756 Col. 1621-1641 
House of Commons 
 
Introduction 6 November 2014 
 
 
Second reading 5 January 2015 
 
Vol. 590 Col. 54-124 
Committee 13 January 2015 
15 January 2015 
20 January 2015 
22 January 2015 
 
Official Report, Public Bill 
Committee 
Report and Third reading 23 February 2015 
 
Vol. 593 Col. 50-162 
Ping Pong 
 
Lords Consideration of Commons 
Amendments 
 
2 March 2015 Vol. 760 Col. 44-86 
Royal Assent – 3 March 2015 House of Lords Hansard Vol. 760 Col. 87 
House of Commons Hansard Vol. 593 Col. 811 
Table 10: Hansard references for the Serious Crime Act 2015 
 
The Serious Crime Act 2015 
The Serious Crime Bill was introduced on June 5, 2014 and became the Serious Crime Act 
on March 3, 2015. As stated in the legislation notes, “[t]he principle objective of the Act is 
to ensure that law enforcement agencies have effective legal powers to deal with the threat 
from serious and organised crime.”508 The six parts of the act include the following: 1. 
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Proceeds of Crime, 2. Computer Misuse, 3. Organised, Serious and Gang-Related Crime, 
4. Seizure and Forfeiture of Drug-Cutting Agents, 5. Protection of Children and Others, 
and 6. Miscellaneous and General. 509 Part five, ‘Protection of Children and Others,’ is the 
part of the act that is focused upon for this case. Part five specifically amends “the criminal 
law in relation to the offence of child cruelty, provides for new offences in respect of 
sexual communication with a child and the possession of ‘paedophile manuals,’ amends 
the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to remove references to child prostitution and child 
pornography, makes further provision for combating female genital mutilation and 
provides for a new offence in respect of domestic abuse.”510 The new offence in reference 
to domestic abuse is the criminalisation of ‘controlling or coercive behaviour.’ This 
behaviour applies to both intimate relationships (previous or current) and family 
relationships (in reference to parents and children). This case will be specifically focused 
on the intimate relationships aspect. Under the Serious Crime Act, an offence is committed 
if behaviour is repetitive or continuous, is controlling or coercive in nature, and has a 
‘serious effect’ on the victim where “(a) it causes B to fear, on at least two occasions, that 
violence will be used against B, or (b) it causes B serious alarm or distress which has a 
substantial adverse effect on B’s usual day-to-day activities.”511 As will be described in 
further detail below, coercive control in reference to domestic violence was first mentioned 
during parliamentary hearings in reference to children and how parents use coercive and 
controlling behaviour to exercise dominance over children.512 It has been recognised that 
this type of coercive and controlling behaviour can lead to ‘risky or anti-social behaviour,’ 
which is why this specific offense was added to the Serious Crime Bill. It was women’s 
groups, such as Women’s Aid, that drew attention to the legislative gap where this 
controlling behaviour was not criminalised, specifically regarding intimate relationships. 
The focus on intimate relationships however, was not added to the bill until after the 
committee phase of the legislation on January 20, 2015. These steps will be discussed 
further during the discussion of the critical path; however, it is important to present these 
explanations from the onset. 
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It is important for the purpose of this case study to further explain what constitutes 
coercive and controlling behaviour in a domestic violence context. In terms of coercive 
control, it has been an academic concern since at least 1996. There is little to no evidence 
that coercive control, as such, was regarded as a serious academic or public policy concern 
prior to 1996. For instance, the UN referenced ‘coercion’ in their Declaration on the 
Elimination of Violence Against Women plenary meeting in 1993, it was not widely 
considered in the same light that coercive and controlling behaviour is referred to today. 
While the concept of coercive control has been written about for decades, it has only 
recently become a policy concern for many countries around the world, including the 
United States. Similar to the way that domestic violence in general has been slow to 
‘catch-on’ as far as being a central policy concern for national governments, so too has the 
specific notion of coercive control. It has however gained importance within the last 10 
years, particularly in the United Kingdom, due to the work of various organisations and 
campaigns, such as Women’s Aid and Refuge.  
Evan Stark is often credited as one of the academic and practical starting points regarding 
coercive control. In a 1996 article, Stark and Anne Flitcraft stated: “Physical abuse is 
almost always embedded in a pattern of coercion characterized by the use of threats, 
intimidation, isolation, and emotional abuse, as well as a pattern of control over sexuality 
and social life, including a woman’s relationships with family and friends; material 
resources… and various facets of everyday life.”513 Control tactics, as described by 
Michael Johnson, include the use of children as leverage, punishment, threats, isolation, 
emotional abuse, and sexual and economic control.514 Stark further classifies these tactics 
into three categories: intimidation, isolation, and control.515 Significantly, “[t]he main 
means used to establish control is the microregulation of everyday behaviors associated 
with stereotypic female roles, such as how women dress, cook, clean, socialize, care for 
their children, or perform sexually [sic].”516 According to Stark, this microregulation is 
what distinguishes coercive and controlling behaviour from most other crimes of sexual 
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violence and abuse (although he does acknowledge that this control relies on societal 
sexual inequality and the vulnerability that accompanies this inequality, and in that way it 
is similar to other forms of violence and abuse).517 Additionally, “[t]he most important 
anomalous evidence indicates that violence in abusive relationships is ongoing rather than 
episodic, that its effects are cumulative rather than incident-specific, and that the harms it 
causes are more readily explained by these factors than by its severity.”518 Further, 
coercive control is identified as being ‘gendered’ because it is influenced and underpinned 
by traditional gender stereotypes, specifically surrounding what is associated with the 
stereotypic female roles mentioned above, and also male privilege and the relationship 
between subordination and domination within relationships.519 This refers to “both the 
power/privilege exerted through coercive control in individual relationships and to the 
political power created when men as a group use their oppressive tactics to reinforce 
persistent sexual inequalities in the larger society.”520 This reference to political power is 
important because it shows how coercive control, while exercised in individual 
relationships, aids in the overall sexual inequalities that continue to be present within 
society. These inequalities can be observed whether you focus on the wage gap, 
representation in local and national government, or access to justice, among other issues. 
Therefore, it can be argued that if coercive and controlling behaviour were able to be 
prevented or protected against, other forms of violence against women and domestic 
violence could be lessened or eradicated, and this could lead to the reduction in overall 
sexual inequality within society.  
Prior to the incorporation of coercive control into government policy on domestic violence 
and abuse, Stark stated that the “policy, legal, and criminal justice response to partner 
abuse is based on a ‘violent incident model’ that equates abuse with discrete assaults and 
gauges severity by the degree of injury inflicted or threatened.”521 This focus on physical 
assault and severity, according to Stark, undermined the effectiveness of the response to 
domestic violence in general, where it is now mostly understood that domestic abuse is a 
pattern of coercion.522 A critique of the reliance on the criminal justice response to 
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domestic violence is understood because of its dependence on punishment, where courts 
were moved to the “center of the societal response to partner abuse.”523 Rather, this 
response is focused on “its frequency and duration, not its severity. Thus, when the 
response is gauged to severe violent acts, most abuse goes either unrecognized or 
unpunished.”524 It is for this reason that the incorporation of coercive control is important 
in furthering the understanding of domestic violence within the context of coercion and 
control. It moves the conversation away from focusing on primarily physical violence, and 
towards a holistic understanding of domestic abuse. Prior to this incorporation, “most of 
the tactics abusers use in coercive control [had] no legal standing, [were] rarely identified 
with abuse, and [were] almost never targeted by police or the courts.”525 The detailed 
critical path will be explored below, followed by an analysis of the legislation, and the 
preliminary findings from the four cases presented in this chapter. 
 
Tracing the Critical Path 
Date Event Path step 
December 2007 Scotland: Violence against 
women definition to include 




June 2008 House of Commons Home 
Affairs Select Committee report 
on domestic violence, ‘honour’-
based violence, and forced 
marriage 
 
Communicative critical action 
March 2011 Violence Against Women 
Action Plan released by 
government  
 
Communicative critical action 
December 2011 Home Office consultation on 
government definition of 
domestic abuse; consider 
reference to ‘coercive control’ 
 
Communicative critical action 
Critical actor: Nick Clegg MP 
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Date Event Path step 
September 2012 Then-Shadow Home Secretary 
Yvette Cooper MP (Lab) raised 
the issue of coercive control 
during speech 
Symbolic critical action 
Critical actor: Yvette Cooper 
MP (Lab) 
 
September 2012 Government expanded 
definition to include coercive 
control; not legally binding 
 
Substantive critical action 
March 2013 New government definition in 
effect; not legally binding 
 
Substantive critical action 
February 26, 2014 Standing Order No. 23 (DV: 
Legal Framework) introduced to 
specifically criminalise 
domestic violence and include 
coercive and controlling 
behaviour 
 
Substantive critical action 
Critical actor: Elfyn Llwyd 
(PC) 
 
June 16, 2014 Raised issue of coercive control 
during second reading in the 
House of Lords 
Substantive critical action 
Critical actor: Lord Paddick 
(Lib Dem) 
 
June 18, 2014 First Early Day Motion on 
coercive control (EDM 142) 
introduced by Elfyn Llwyd MP 
(PC) 
 
Substantive critical action 
Critical actor: Elfyn Llwyd MP 
(PC) 
 
August 20, 2014 Home Office consultation on 
whether to strengthen the law 
on domestic abuse (757 
responses) 
 
Communicative critical action 
October 28, 2014 House of Lords report phase; 
tabled amendment regarding 
coercive and controlling 
behaviour due to results of the 
consultation 
Symbolic critical action 
Critical actor: Lord Wigley 
(PC); Baroness Howe (CB); 
Lord Rosser (Lab); Baroness 
Stedman-Scott (Con); Lord 
Bates (Con) 
 
December 18, 2014 New offence of coercive and 
controlling behaviour detailed 
in ministerial statement 
Communicative critical action 
Critical actor: Theresa May 




Date Event Path step 
January 5, 2015 Confirmed the tabling of 
amendments during the House 
of Commons second reading 
Symbolic critical action 
Critical actor: Theresa May 
(Con); Elfyn Llwyd (PC); Fiona 
Mactaggart (Lab); Maria Miller 
(Con) 
 
January 20/22, 2015 House of Commons Committee 
(6th and 7th Sittings) 
Symbolic critical action 
Critical actor: Robert Buckland 
(Con); Elfyn Llwyd (PC); 
Seema Malhotra (Lab) 
 
January 20, 2015 Clause 9 added to the bill Substantive critical action 
 
January 23, 2015 House of Commons Bill 160 
(Clause 73 introduced) 
 
Substantive critical action 
 
February 25, 2015 House of Lords Bill 96 Substantive critical action 
 
March 2, 2015 Ping Pong (Lords Consideration 
of Commons Amendments) 
Symbolic critical action 
Critical actor: Lord Bates 
(Con); Baroness Smith (Lab) 
 
March 3, 2015 Royal Assent Critical act 
 
Table 11: The critical path to the passing of the Serious Crime Act 2015 
 
The Critical Juncture 
Prior to the inclusion of an offence of coercive control in the Serious Crime Act 2015 in 
England and Wales, the devolved parliament of Scotland was working to improve their 
own stance and action on violence against women and domestic violence. For instance, in 
2007 the Women’s Coalition in Scotland, comprised of the Women’s Support Project, the 
Zero Tolerance Trust, Engender, Rape Crisis Scotland, and Scottish Women’s Aid, 
appealed to the Scottish government to “pledge its commitment to addressing violence 
against women over the next four years.”526 This pledge, introduced via Shirley-Anne 
Somerville MSP (SNP), “call[ed] on the Scottish government to adopt a broad definition of 
violence against women, which makes the link between domestic abuse, rape and 
commercial sexual exploitation, and to continue provision of funding to violence against 
women projects.”527 In December 2007, then-First Minister of Scotland, Alex Salmond 
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(SNP), signed the Statement of Intent put forward by the Women’s Coalition to show the 
Scottish government’s commitment to confronting violence against women in Scotland. In 
a report by End Violence Against Women in 2007, Scotland was found to be the ‘best 
story to be told.’528 This conclusion was drawn because “the Scottish government [was] 
developing a strategic approach to addressing violence against women and had allocated… 
funding for services.”529 
Following the signing of the Statement of Intent in 2007, the Scottish government 
expanded its definition, as proposed by the Women’s Coalition, to include ‘coercion’ into 
its definition on violence against women in 2009. In its published approach on tackling 
violence against women, the Scottish government defined violence against women as 
“actions which harm or cause suffering or indignity to women and children… The different 
forms of violence against women—including emotional, psychological, sexual and 
physical abuse, coercion and constraints—are interlinked.”530 Prior to the Scottish 
government listing coercion in its official definition, it was considered to be a 
characteristic of psychological abuse by the government in 2007. For instance, in a review 
of effective interventions, the government stated: “Psychological abuse may include 
emotional abuse, harassment, humiliation, blaming, controlling or coercion, intimidation, 
threats of violence or abandonment, deprivation of contact, verbal abuse, and/or isolation 
or withdrawal from services or other supportive networks.”531 The definition in England 
and Wales was updated in 2004, but made no mention of coercion. While it did include 
psychological abuse, coercion was not specifically referenced until the government ran a 
consultation in December 2011. Therefore, from 2004-2012, the definition of domestic 
violence in England and Wales included the following: “any incident of threatening 
behaviour, violence or abuse [psychological, physical, sexual, financial, or emotional] 
between adults who are or have been intimate partners or family members, regardless of 
gender or sexuality.”532 The 2013 government update to the definition, initiated by the 
2011 government consultation, will be discussed in more detail, as it is part of the critical 
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path, however it is important to point out that the consideration in Scotland of coercive and 
controlling behaviour is what this thesis identifies as the critical juncture for the inclusion 
of a specific offense of coercive and controlling behaviour in England and Wales, as 
shown in Table 12. 
 
Critical Actions 
Following the critical juncture described above, the House of Commons Home Affairs 
Select Committee released a report in June 2008 on domestic violence, ‘honour’-based 
violence, and forced marriage. In addition, the committee focused on domestic violence 
prevention, emergency interventions, resettlement and post-separation support, 
prosecution, perpetrators, partnerships, funding, and legislation. The committee “set out to 
hear at first hand from agencies and organisations working with victims, and with victims 
and survivors themselves. [They] were especially keen to involve individuals and groups 
who might not normally be reached by select committee enquiries.”533 In order to do this, 
the committee held a seminar and conferences, visited various refuges and organisations, 
heard oral evidence regarding domestic violence, initiated an online consultation for those 
who experienced domestic violence and received written submissions from various 
government bodies and agencies.534 One of the various conclusions and recommendations 
drawn from the committee report the committee recommended a revised definition of 
domestic violence due to the fact that 16-18 year olds were excluded from the government 
definition of domestic violence.535 To this, the committee found that there was “little 
support for under-18s in abusive relationships. The existence of abuse in teenage 
relationships further underlines the urgent need for effective early education on domestic 
violence and relationships. … We recommend that the Government consider amending its 
definition of domestic violence to include under-18s.”536 While coercive control was not 
specifically mentioned in this recommendation, the report aided in widening the discussion 
on how domestic violence was defined during that time in England and Wales and 
presented the opportunity to widely discuss the topic with those who normally would not 
be heard in a parliamentary committee meeting or report, as mentioned above. In addition 
                                                        
533 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, “Sixth Report of Session 2007-08,” 9. 
534 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, “Sixth Report of Session 2007-08,” 9-10. 
535 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, “Sixth Report of Session 2007-08” 137-138. 
536 House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, “Sixth Report of Session 2007-08,” 137-138. 
 133 
to widening the discussion on the definition of domestic violence, it underpins the idea and 
the “urgent need for effective early education on domestic violence and relationships.”537 
Not only has this need been expressed throughout this case study, but this specific 
educational need is vital to the understanding of coercive control among young people but 
also between adults, as specified by Stark and other academics mentioned above. 
Following the Home Affairs Select Committee report, the government ran a consultation in 
2009 to generate a ‘national debate on eliminating violence against women and girls,’ and 
create an ‘integrated strategy to combat violence against women.’538 Following the 
consultation, the government enacted a 2010 strategy to eliminate violence against women 
and girls and in order to do this, worked to introduce their strategic narrative in England 
and Wales in 2011. In addition to the consultation, strategy, and action plan, the 
government created a specific offense of stalking (evaluated in Case 1 of this case study). 
In the Call to End Violence Against Women and Girls strategy, the government described 
controlling behaviour, and used the term to describe perceptions and attitudes within 
teenage relationships and ‘honour’-based violence.539 This association of controlling 
behaviour with teenage relationships is important, because coercive and controlling 
behaviour is initially brought up during the Serious Crime Act deliberations in reference to 
children and their parents, and will be discussed in further detail below.  
The Violence Against Women Action Plan, released in March 2011, worked to provide 
information regarding exactly how the strategy would be carried-out. As stated by the 
government, “[b]oth the strategic narrative and action plan build on extensive consultation 
with the statutory sector, voluntary organisations, women and girls and the wider 
public.”540 Priorities for the action plan included the prevention of violence, the provision 
of services, and protection against violence. It is important to reiterate what the 
government details as prevention, protection, and provision. In 2010/2011, the government 
specified that one of their priorities was to “prevent violence against women and girls from 
happening in the first place by challenging attitudes and behaviours which foster it and 
intervening early where possible to prevent it.”541 In specific regards to societal attitudes 
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towards violence against women and girls, the action plan determined how long-term this 
process would be, but that it was important to attempt this change, and also set a medium-
term goal of increasing the reporting of these incidents and improve confidence among 
victims and those that work within the sector.542  
Protection is described in a similar sense, where one of the guiding principles is to “act 
now to ensure that all members of society are aware of how commonplace violence is, the 
impact it can have on the lives of women and children, and how everyone has a part to play 
in challenging violence.”543 Protection also included early intervention and first responses 
where “[d]elivering an effective criminal justice system: Investigation; prosecution; victim 
support and protection; perpetrator programmes” was important to the success of the action 
plan.544  
Lastly, the provision of services was mentioned as an important priority where levels of 
support needed to be adequate to help victim-survivors and those within the domestic 
violence sector, including frontline services, funding and sustainability and effective 
practice and training.545 Interestingly, given the austerity measures currently taking place 
within England and Wales in 2015/2016, one of the guiding principles was to “send a clear 
signal to local areas that the provision of support to victims of VAWG [violence against 
women and girls] is a national priority by continued central funding to frontline 
services.”546 Notably, at this time, coercive control was not specifically mentioned, 
although it was alluded to through various language that was used in reference to 
controlling behaviour and the provided UN declaration on violence against women 
definition from 1993. The action plan used this definition to underpin the United Kingdom 
understanding of violence against women. The definition agreed upon by the UN, as 
described in Chapter 2, includes “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is 
likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including 
threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in 
public or in private life.”547 The inclusion of ‘coercion’ is an important distinction, as it 
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shows that since at least 1993 the UN viewed coercion as a deprivation of liberty and as 
acts of violence against women and girls, as described above. Furthermore, the exclusion 
of coercive and controlling behaviour up to this point is itself important. It shows that 
while coercion was implicitly considered within the strategy and action plan, it was not 
widely thought to be an obvious form of violence against women that needed addressing, 
at least from the viewpoint of the government. Additionally, because of the Home Affairs 
Committee report, the strategy and action plan, the government held another consultation; 
this time on the government definition of domestic violence. 
According to the December 2011 Home Office Consultation on the cross-government 
definition of domestic violence, the above action plan helped lead the government 
initiative on how domestic violence was defined at this time. Ms. May stated: “Effective 
prevention can only happen when it involves all agencies, working together to common 
goals and a common understanding. That is why we are now consulting on the definition 
of domestic violence that all agencies and all parts of government should use.”548 The 
consultation presented four options for consideration: 1. whether the government definition 
should stay the same, 2. whether the definition should be changed to include coercive 
control, 3. whether the definition should include 16 and 17 year olds, and 4. whether the 
definition should consider all children under the age of 18.549 It was stated that the 
“consultation exercise is essential to enable the government to fully scope and explore the 
potential impacts of a number of options to widen the definition of domestic violence.”550 
Moreover, ministers were concerned that the definition was not being applied rigorously 
enough, and also mentioned the Welsh definition of domestic violence in the consultation, 
stating: “Domestic abuse can go beyond actual physical violence. It can also involve 
emotional abuse, the destruction of a spouse’s or partner’s property, their isolation from 
friends, family or other potential sources of support, threats to others including children, 
control over access to money, personal items, food, transportation and the telephone, and 
stalking.”551 Interestingly, the devolved parliament of Wales was mentioned in regard to 
their own definition, showing that the motivation to hold the consultation was based 
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loosely on another territory’s definition of domestic violence. This was also observed in 
the other cases presented in this case study. 
In regard to including coercive control, it was stated that “[a]round one in four women will 
experience domestic abuse in their lifetime, often accompanied by years of psychological 
abuse.”552 Psychological abuse is intrinsic to understanding coercive control and its effects 
on victim-survivors. Furthermore, “[c]oercive control is not currently reflected in the 
government’s definition of domestic violence.”553 This was one of the first explicit 
instances where coercive and controlling behaviour were mentioned in reference to actual 
government policy.  
Following the government consultation on the definition of domestic violence, Ms. Cooper 
raised the issue of coercive control during a speech on September 19, 2012. She addressed 
the impact of coercive control’s effects on teenagers, showing a similar trend of 
considering coercive and controlling behaviour in the context of young people and their 
relationships. Importantly, she raised the issue of austerity, and its effects on the sector, 
including legal aid, refuges, and support services. For instance, she stated: “the 
Government needs to take action over the scale of cumulative cuts to domestic violence 
services and their own legal changes which are making things worse.”554 Notably, she 
pointed out that the definition is not statutory and essentially “does nothing to reverse this 
Government’s decision to use much narrower criteria and tests for granting legal aid in 
domestic violence cases. Nor does it address the disproportionate cuts of 31 [percent] to 
refuges and services supporting women escaping violence.”555 This message is important 
to the critical path because it begins to show the gap that was present once the government 
updated its definition of domestic violence. For instance, the definition attempted to 
identify domestic violence more broadly and include how domestic violence is 
‘underpinned’ by a pattern of coercive control. But because the definition was not a legal 
one, the gap between theory and law became apparent, in that while coercive control was 
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specifically mentioned as a central aspect of domestic violence, it was not reflected in the 
law as an explicit offense.  
Following the consultation, in addition to the statement by Ms. Cooper, then-Deputy Prime 
Minister Nick Clegg MP (Lib Dem) released a statement that the government would 
expand the definition to include coercive control, stating: “These changes are about 
Government taking a lead to help expose the true face of domestic violence, which is much 
more complex and much more widespread than people often realise.”556 This helps move 
attitudes away from domestic violence being seen as a single act to a pattern, and captures 
the larger picture of domestic violence. While the consultation called for an 
‘overwhelming’ change in regard to the government definition, it was not ‘legally 
binding.’ In regard to this change, the Minister for Crime Prevention, Jeremy Browne (Lib 
Dem), cited the change as a way to “raise the profile of domestic violence as an issue.”557 
This is a vital statement as it shows how domestic violence was a priority policy area for 
the Liberal Democrats, and it demonstrates how this raised profile led to changes in regard 
to coercive control and how it was reflected under the law. Significantly, prior to the 
introduction of the Serious Crime Bill in June 2014, the new government definition of 
domestic violence came into effect in March 2013. Once the new definition came into 
effect, this paved the way for individuals to question the gap that this new definition left 
between the definition and the law surrounding coercive control. Because of this gap, Mr. 
Llwyd introduced Standing Order No. 23 on February 26, 2014 in hopes of creating a legal 
framework in regard to domestic violence. This legal framework was to include coercive 
and controlling behaviour, which at that time was neglected under the law. During this 
parliamentary debate, Mr. Llwyd stated that because of the new cross-government 
definition, “not all those behaviours are criminal offences, meaning that there are gaps in 
the current law that are failing victims of domestic violence. … The principal gap in 
current legislative provisions is that coercive control is not considered an offence in the 
law of England and Wales.”558 Following the introduction of this bill, it “failed to complete 
its passage through Parliament before the end of the session. This means the Bill will make 
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no further progress.”559 While the bill did not make progress, it was an important symbolic 
move in terms addressing the gap that was exposed once the government updated their 
definition of domestic violence. Interestingly, the gap between this bill and the Serious 
Crime Bill was only four months.  
During the second reading in the House of Lords on June 16, 2014, Lord Paddick (Lib 
Dem) raised the issue of coercive control in relation to children and physical child 
neglect.560 He mentioned that many women had been convicted of neglect, not because 
they were perpetrators of neglect, but because they did not prevent the abuse perpetrated 
by their partner who “was exercising coercive control over them as well as abusing the 
child.”561 Regarding this, Lord Paddick questioned why the government was taking the 
initiative to mention coercive control in relation to children, but not in relation to women 
and domestic violence.562 To this, Lord Paddick stated that the government had not yet 
“taken the opportunity in this Bill to address what many women’s groups believe to be a 
legislative gap in domestic violence law to deal with psychological abuse and coercive 
control. Indeed, psychological abuse and coercive control, not individual incidents of 
physical violence, are the essence of domestic violence [sic].”563 The gap mentioned 
demonstrates how the new government definition of domestic violence left a void between 
the legal definition and the law. While coercive control was mentioned as an aspect of 
domestic violence, it was not reflected in the law as a specific offense, similar to stalking 
and harassment legislation in Case 1. 
Baroness Brinton echoed the same sentiments and agreed with Lord Paddick on this issue, 
especially in regard to ‘vulnerable’ young people, children, and women. This vulnerability 
was revealed during the Queen’s Speech debate which defined cruelty as both 
psychological and physical, and the effects of this vulnerability could lead to ‘risky’ or 
‘anti-social behaviour’ in the future.564 This is why coercive control fit within the Serious 
Crime Act in the first place. To this, Lord Taylor (Con) stated: “It is why we are amending 
the 1933 Act [referencing the Children and Young Persons Act 1933] to make it absolutely 
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clear that children subject to cruelty likely to cause psychological suffering or injury are to 
be protected by law.”565 It is because of this that Lord Paddick made his comment 
regarding why they were eager to amend the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 in 
relation to children, but not in regard to women and domestic violence. Supplementary to 
this, Baroness Brinton also mentioned stalking and harassment (evaluated in Case 2) 
stating: “As we did with the stalking legislation, it is very important to look at the 
behaviour of the perpetrator and to make sure that all the victims… are appropriately 
looked after.”566 
While the Serious Crime Bill was being debated in the House of Lords, Mr. Llwyd 
introduced the first EDM on coercive control.567 The motion was sponsored by fellow 
Labour and PC members John McDonnell, Jeremy Corbyn, Jonathan Edwards, Ian Lavery, 
and Kelvin Hopkins and garnered 68 signatures in total.568 The motion read: “That this 
House believes that domestic violence is a serious crime; is concerned at the under-
reporting of domestic abuse by victims and the low numbers of prosecutions; and support 
efforts to criminalise coercive control and violence in a domestic setting.”569 In terms of 
the demographics of the signatories, only one Conservative member signed the EDM. The 
majority of signatories were members of the Labour party and Liberal Democrats, of 
which 15 were women. It is argued here that the increased profile surrounding domestic 
violence up to this point helped initiate the August 20, 2014 consultation on strengthening 
the law on domestic abuse. This increased profile included the new government strategy 
and action plan regarding violence against women and girls, an update to the definition, 
Standing Order No. 23, the second reading of the Serious Crime Bill, and EDM 142. 
Because of this increased profile, the government again conducted a consultation regarding 
domestic violence. Beginning on August 20, 2014, the government stated: “This targeted 
consultation exercise is essential to enable the Government to fully scope and explore the 
potential impacts of strengthening the law on domestic abuse.”570 This consultation follows 
what was identified above as a gap in the law by the Shadow Home Secretary, various 
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women’s organisations, and by sponsors and signatories of the above EDM. In regard to 
coercive control, the “consultation is specifically focused on whether we should create a 
specific offense that captures patterns of coercive and controlling behaviour in intimate 
relationships, in line with the Government’s non-statutory definition of domestic abuse.”571 
Following the consultation, there was an overwhelming majority of responses (85 percent 
of 757 responses) that were in favour of strengthening the law regarding domestic abuse.572 
In addition to this, 70 percent of respondents “felt the current law does not capture the 
Government’s definition of domestic abuse.”573 As a result of the consultation, in addition 
to the ‘raised profile’ of domestic violence as an issue, the government was forced to 
reconsider its stance and legislation regarding domestic violence, especially considering 
that the respondents to the consultation included police forces, academics, professionals, 
charities, service providers, victims, and members of the public.574 The variety of 
respondents shows that it was not only victims or charities that believed the law should be 
updated, rather it was members from a variety of backgrounds that believed it should be 
amended to include coercive and controlling behaviour. 
Following the closing of the consultation on October 15, 2014, the House of Lords held the 
report phase of the Serious Crime Bill. The Lords tabled an amendment regarding 
domestic violence due to the results of the consultation. Lord Wigley (PC) stated: “The 
amendment was tabled partly in anticipation of the fact that Members of the other place are 
likely to table amendments on domestic violence during the Bill’s later stages and it was 
thought that, as a result, this place too should have an opportunity to debate this serious 
offence.”575 Because of the gravity of coercive control, it was argued that adding this 
offence was well within the capacity of the Serious Crime Bill.576 Further to this, Lord 
Wigley demonstrated how the conversation surrounding domestic violence has mostly 
been viewed as a non-partisan issue. 
Baroness Howe (Cross Bencher) avowed her support of the amendments and followed her 
support with testimony and quotes from ‘Laura.’577 While describing the abuse that Laura 
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had suffered for three years from her ex-partner, Baroness Howe stated: “Laura’s case 
highlights why the law must change, to take account of all forms of domestic violence, 
emotional as well as physical… Her case also serves to show why police and prosecutors 
should look at the patterns of behaviour in these crimes.”578 In addition to supporting the 
criminalisation of coercive control, the baroness stated that the “[t]raining of police and 
prosecutors must be improved, to take account of all methods of domestic abuse behaviour 
and to have regard of the impact that this debilitating crime can have on its victims.”579 
The importance of this statement will be discussed below. 
In addition to debating the law surrounding domestic violence, the purpose of the 
amendment, according to Lord Rosser (Lab), was to provide context regarding the 
government consultation which sought to consider whether coercive control should be 
criminalised.580 Further questions asked during the consultation revolved around whether 
there should be a register that would include ‘serial stalkers’ and ‘domestic violence 
perpetrators,’ the establishment of a new civil order surrounding ‘serial stalkers’ and 
‘domestic violence perpetrators,’ the criminalisation of DVPNs and DVPOs breach, and 
should DVPNs and DVPOs cover Europe.581 As stated by Lord Rosser:  
The current law does not capture the Government's non-statutory definition of 
domestic abuse as there is no statutory framework around it. Currently, offenders 
can be prosecuted only for acts of physical violence, when such violence is often 
the culmination of psychological and minor physical abuse which constitutes 
domestic abuse, which is outside the reach of the existing criminal law and does not 
get reported until it has actually escalated into physical violence.582  
Further to his point regarding the amendments and the consultation, was the mention of the 
United States and their introduction of specific domestic violence laws, where there has 
been a 50 percent increase in reported cases and an increase regarding the conviction of 
perpetrators.583 
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Echoing the sentiments of Baroness Howe, Baroness Hamwee stated that in regard to 
domestic violence, more effort, prosecutions, resources, practice and training all needed to 
be prioritised.584 Juxtaposed to Lord Rosser, Baroness Hamwee did not think making 
domestic violence a separate crime was necessary on the government's part.585 She 
presented a different perspective in stating that organisations such as Refuge, believe 
domestic violence could be treated less seriously if domestic violence was made a separate 
offence, citing the phrase ‘It's just a domestic.’586 While she did not support the move to 
make domestic violence a separate criminal offence, she did support “legislation to fill any 
gaps.”587  
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con) referenced the Victims’ Voice Survey stating: “I am very 
glad to be discussing whether domestic abuse, including psychological abuse, coercive 
control and a pattern of abuse should be seen in the eyes of the law as a serious crime.”588 
Baroness Stedman-Scott brought up ‘other countries’ that have ‘successfully’ legislated 
psychological abuse and coercive control.589 This brings up the interesting question of 
whether the United Kingdom government specifically is more willing to legislate if other 
countries are successful with their own legislation. We saw this in previous cases of this 
case study above. Lord Bates (Con) supported the amendment, stating: “We want to see 
more perpetrators brought to justice. We do not want victims to be deterred from reporting 
by a legal framework or a criminal justice system that does not work for them.”590 Lord 
Bates further points out how ‘operational improvements’ can be used to manage both 
stalking and domestic violence perpetrators.591 This references what Baroness Hamwee 
stated above in regard to more and improved resources, effort, practice, and training. 
Following this, the Serious Crime Bill was then put forth to the House of Commons to 
consider. 
On December 18, 2014, Ms. May announced that the Liberal Democrat/Conservative 
coalition government would be introducing a new offence of coercive and controlling 
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behaviour.592 She announced that the offence would carry a maximum penalty of five 
years’ imprisonment and an unlimited fine. As Ms. May demonstrated, the offence must be 
‘clear and proportionate’ and should not interfere with the ‘ordinary power dynamics’ 
within relationships. This offence falls under the ‘protection’ section of the action plan put 
forth by the United Kingdom government, as described above. To reiterate the responses 
published by the government, 85 percent of respondents believed that the current law did 
not provide protection to victims of domestic violence.593  
Once the amendments to the Serious Crime Bill were agreed upon, they were then sent to 
the House of Commons. On January 5, 2015 during the second reading of the bill then-
Home Secretary Theresa May declared: “I confirm that we will table amendments in 
Committee to strengthen the protection afforded to the victims of domestic abuse.”594 
Following his statement, Mr. Llwyd mentioned Lord Wigley and Baroness Howe in the 
House of Lords, his Ten Minute Rule Bill from February 2014, and how the updated 
government definition was not currently a legal one. For example, he stated how “[g]aps in 
the current legislation allow perpetrators of psychological, emotional and financial abuse 
to continue their abuse without facing recourse for their actions.”595 Juxtaposed to 
Baroness Hamwee and her comments during the report stage in the House of Lords about 
domestic violence being taken less seriously if it was a specific offence, Mr. Llwyd stated: 
“At present, in the absence of any laws relating specifically to domestic violence, 
conviction rates in England and Wales are depressingly low, and the crime is still under-
reported. ... In American states where specific domestic violence laws have been adopted, 
conviction rates are impressive.”596 Following this, Fiona Mactaggart (Lab) and Ms. Miller 
both welcomed the amendments and the proposal to criminalise coercive and controlling 
behaviour. Ms. Miller specifically mentioned the campaigning that Women's Aid had been 
conducting in regard to this issue, as well as the campaigning of Ms. May.597 
During the 6th sitting of the House of Commons committee meeting, Mr. Buckland stated: 
“Such abuse is hidden behind the closed doors of far too many families. We must bring 
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domestic abuse out into the open if we are to end it. The first step is to call it what it is: a 
crime of the worst kind.”598 This is important because it names coercive and controlling 
behaviour for what it is: a crime and a form of domestic violence, and also shows how 
domestic violence can evoke a sense of secrecy and something shameful. In regard to a 
question raised about ‘funding barriers’ by Andy McDonald (Lab), Mr. Buckland 
responded by stating that more refuges and rape crisis centres had been opened, as they are 
a “vital resource for many women who have nowhere else to turn.”599 This is an interesting 
statement given the various austerity measures and cuts to this specific sector that have 
been mentioned throughout this chapter. Mr. Buckland made the important distinction 
during the committee meeting of the differences and also similarities between stalking 
behaviour and coercive control, stating that stalking laws do not sufficiently cover the 
behaviour that was identified as coercive and controlling behaviour.600 To this he stated, 
“[w]e must create a new offence that makes it crystal clear that a pattern of coercion is as 
serious within a relationship as it is outside one. In many ways worse, because it plays on 
the trust and affection of the victim. That is why we need a new offence.”601 Because the 
crimes are fundamentally different, as Mr. Buckland pointed out, it was essential that the 
government create this new offence in order to cover behaviour that was not previously 
covered under other legislation, namely, stalking legislation. Following this 
acknowledgement, Mr. Buckland introduced the new clause, intended to close a gap that 
was revealed and exposed due to the update to the government definition of domestic 
abuse in 2013.602 As stated by Mr. Buckland, “[t]he new offence seeks to address repeated 
or continuous behaviour in relationships where incidents viewed in isolation might appear 
unexceptional but have a significant cumulative impact on the victim's everyday life, 
causing them fear, alarm or distress.”603 Importantly, Mr. Buckland reiterated that this 
legislation, or any, was not a replacement for police training or responses to domestic 
violence.604 In order to afford victim-survivors protection and provision, and prevent 
violence in the future, implementation is a vital aspect to this, and especially to the 
government's action plan and strategy to ending violence against women and girls. 
                                                        
598 House of Commons, “Public Bill Committee, 20 January 2015, Session 2014-15,” (2015): col. 171. 
599 House of Commons, “Public Bill Committee, 20 January 2015,” col. 171. 
600 House of Commons, “Public Bill Committee, 20 January 2015,” col. 171-172. 
601 House of Commons, “Public Bill Committee, 20 January 2015,” col. 172. 
602 House of Commons, “Public Bill Committee, 20 January 2015,” col. 172. 
603 House of Commons, “Public Bill Committee, 20 January 2015,” col. 172. 
604 House of Commons, “Public Bill Committee, 20 January 2015,” col. 173. 
 145 
Following the statement by Mr. Buckland, Mr. Llwyd presented the new proposed clauses. 
Clause three offered the offence of coercive control within a domestic violence 
circumstance; clause four placed no statutory time limits on the coercive control offence; 
clause five gave the definition of domestic violence, and clause six put forward training, 
standards, and policies where “every police service in England, Wales, and Northern 
Ireland [develops] and [adopts] written policies and standards for officers’ responses to 
coercive control and domestic violence incidents, within one year of the Act coming into 
force.”605 This is especially important because training has been identified as a major 
impediment to effective implementation of legislation by victim-survivors, those working 
within the sector, and those within the government: “It is absolutely vital that we get the 
training done as soon as possible.”606 Mr. Llwyd again mentioned research in the United 
States, as well as research conducted by Refuge, and testimony and activism by Eve 
Thomas, the catalyst behind Eve's Law.607 
Reiterating support and the importance of criminalising coercive and controlling 
behaviour, Seema Malhotra (Lab) specified how Labour had previously called for coercive 
control to be specifically criminalised, citing evidence of Ms. Cooper’s statement in 
2012.608 In addition to showing her support, Ms. Malhotra said that while Labour 
welcomed the new law, effective usage of the law was important. For example, she stated: 
“We welcome the change to the law, but with the caveat that it must be used properly and 
effectively to tackle domestic abuse and give victims the confidence to come forward 
early.”609 It is easy to observe the trend specifically within this case when it comes to 
police training and implementation of the law. For example, Norman Baker (Lib Dem) 
detailed: “we need a combination of appropriate law and appropriate enforcement. My 
impression was that a large part of the problem was that the police did not have the correct 
mindset to take matters forward and were not looking at this issue with the seriousness that 
                                                        
605 House of Commons, “Public Bill Committee, 20 January 2015,” col. 174-177. 
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Members of Parliament have been looking at it. It is that, more than anything else, that 
needs to change.”610  
While the totality of the conversation and debate regarding coercive and controlling 
behaviour was in the context of domestic violence, the bill rarely makes reference 
specifically to ‘domestic violence’ or ‘domestic abuse.’ As Mr. Buckland makes clear, 
“[t]hat is deliberate. ... Victims would not be assisted by the creation of artificial 
definitions that could be misused. We did not fall into that trap when it came to the law on 
stalking and harassment.”611 Further, does the non-reference to domestic violence 
specifically, keep it a hidden crime? The new offence clearly concerns situations of 
domestic violence and relationships yet it is not named within the actual legislation. While 
it could be argued that this is so that the legislation is not ‘over-prescriptive,’ as Mr. 
Buckland suggests, it could however also be suggested that this could create confusion and 
also a downgrade in regard to the seriousness of the coercive and controlling behaviour.612 
It is because of the non-reference to domestic violence in the legislation that Mr. Buckland 
argues against Mr. Llwyd's causes. He detailed: “We do not want victims to be deterred by 
a legal framework that does not work for them and that captures circumstances that fall 
short of the isolation and control they have experienced. I fear, despite the right hon. 
Gentleman's admirable intentions, that his new clauses could create loopholes and that they 
would fall short of aspirations that he rightly has.”613 The original clauses relating to 
coercive control were added to the bill, with Mr. Llwyd conceding new clauses three to 
six. Following the committee meeting on January 20, 2015, the House of Commons held 
another committee meeting where the amendments in regard to the coercive control 
offence were discussed and agreed upon. As Mr. Llwyd stated: “It is an important Bill in 
many ways and I am delighted that it was the vehicle for my coercive control change to the 
law.”614 It is interesting that Mr. Llwyd is claiming ownership of this legislative success. 
This could either be because of an element of ‘political party grandstanding’ where he is 
claiming a moral ground regarding these clauses on behalf of his party’s success on this 
issue, or his own invocation of the traditional notion of men feeling a responsibility to 
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protect women. Following this, the Serious Crime Bill was then put forth to the House of 
Lords for consideration of the Commons amendments.  
After the seventh sitting of the House of Commons committee meeting on January 22, 
2015, the House of Lords considered any amendments made to the Serious Crime Bill. In 
reference to the coercive control offence, Lord Bates announced that the House of Lords 
had accepted the amendments.615 He stated: “The sad fact is that we are still grappling with 
a reality where many people think a crime has been committed in a relationship only if 
violence is involved.”616 This is an important emphasis because as was already discussed 
above, it depends how ‘violence’ is defined. Research has shown that psychological abuse 
and controlling behaviour can be just as destructive as physical violence, and is often 
accompanied with physical violence. This recognition by the government is an essential 
step to preventing domestic abuse, as well as for protection and provisions, as outlined in 
the action plan described above. Delivering another comparison to stalking and 
harassment, Lord Bates specified: “The new offence makes it clear that abusing someone 
in a relationship is every bit as serious as stalking or harassing a stranger. It applies to 
repeated or continuous behaviour in relationships… [which] has a significant cumulative 
impact on the victim’s everyday life. It causes them to feel fear, alarm or distress.”617 
Following this, Baroness Smith reiterated how passing legislation does not eradicate 
problems.618 This is a significant distinction as legislation is often pointed to as only a 
vehicle for solving these problems, and not completely eliminating them. 
 
The Critical Act  
Following the path through the House of Commons and the House of Lords, the Serious 
Crime Bill was given Royal Assent on March 3, 2015. The signing of this legislation 
marked a key moment for English and Welsh law by passing a new offence of coercive 
and controlling behaviour. Importantly, for the victim-survivors of this violence, the 
legislation helped further the conversation regarding what ‘counts’ as domestic violence 
and the various forms it can take. Prior to this, as stated by the Domestic Violence Law 
Reform Campaign, “The laws used to prosecute domestic violence… do not describe its 
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essence. Patterns and power and control are missed. It misses the fact that domestic 
violence, particularly in intimate relationships, is about fear, coercive control and 
continuing acts. It is primarily a pattern of abuse, not a single incident.”619 This legislation 
attempts to change that feeling and bring about a new, inclusive, and comprehensive law 
surrounding domestic violence.  
Because of the critical act in England and Wales creating a specific offence regarding 
coercive control, as of October 14, 2016, Northern Ireland is considering legislating 
against coercive and controlling behaviour, where there is one report of domestic violence 
in Northern Ireland every 18 minutes.620 Therefore, not only can policy in other territories 
influence law in England and Wales, the same can be said for their influence on other 
territories, in this case Northern Ireland. In terms of the legislation passed in England and 
Wales regarding coercive and controlling behaviour, the new law was only used 62 times 
in the first six months of its implementation, with eight out of 22 forces not using the 
offence once, and only nine out of 22 forces using the offence two or few times.621 
Increased awareness, understanding of the new legislation, and specialist training have 
been identified as vital in order for the offence to have any effect. The low number of 
charges was not due to a low number of incidents. For example, in 2014 Citizens Advice 
spoke with 3,000 victims of psychological abuse and 900 victims of financial abuse, 
showing that these types of abuse are common, but that they are either not reported, 
investigated, or charged by the police.622 In regard to this, Emma Pearmaine, head of 
family services at Simpson Millar law firm, stated: “One of the biggest concerns when it 
comes to coercive control is that victims are not aware that being isolated from friends or 
family, having access to money and bank accounts restricted, or even having personal 
medical conditions revealed, is domestic abuse and, now, a criminal offence.”623 Ms. May 
reiterated these concerns by stating that the offence was not being used ‘systematically.’ 
Further evidence that the new law was not being used consistently, appeared in a report by 
the College of Policing. They identified that police were continuing to overlook various 
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risk factors and were too focused on physical violence. Some police officers continued to 
have ‘negative’ and ‘uninformed’ attitudes where “[a] tendency for the police to focus on 
physical violence and what has occurred at the current incident can result in them missing 
abuse which is characterised not by physical violence and injury but by continuous 
coercion and control in other forms.”624 Because the offence is not being used to its full 
capacity, the College of Policing has set up a pilot scheme for officers in order to aid them 
in recognizing coercive and controlling behaviour.625 
 
Findings: Case 4 
For the fourth case, the Serious Crime Act 2015, the devolved parliament of Scotland was 
found as the critical juncture due to their passage of legislation regarding coercive and 
controlling behaviour. While not directly cited as the sole reason for the update in England 
and Wales, it was mentioned numerous times in Chapter 4, similar to instances in other 
cases. In addition to Scotland being identified as the critical juncture, the United States was 
also mentioned as inspiration and reasoning for the consultation.  
Interestingly, the legislation in England and Wales was first, and repeatedly, considered in 
relation to children. Further, coercive and controlling behaviour was cited as vulnerability 
following abuse or risky and anti-social behaviour, showing why it was important to the 
Serious Crime Act. With regard to the representation process described in Chapter 4, the 
legislation was not wholly conceived of in parliament by MPs. It was instead campaigned 
for, consulted on, and then addressed in parliament.  
Similar to the other three cases in this study, the proposed offence had all-party support 
and there was anticipation in the House of Commons that ‘the other place’ (the House of 
Lords) would table amendments because of the updated government definition and the 
upcoming consultation on whether or not to change the law regarding domestic violence. 
While the new offence had all-party support, it did not have unanimous support. Many 
called for operational improvements or a new offence altogether. This was ultimately 
argued against, because the gap would continue to persist whether operational 
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improvements were made or not. Therefore, it was reasoned that there should be 
improvements but also a new offence. Again, while there was all-party support, there was 
not unanimous support among male and female representatives. For example, those who 
welcomed the provisions were men and women from various parties, whereas those who 
opposed the provisions, or spoke up against them, were mostly men. 
Interestingly, ‘The Archers,’ a BBC radio series that features an abusive relationship, was 
identified as an ‘awakening force’ in bringing more attention and shedding light on 
coercive and controlling behaviour. This begs the question of the extent of the effect of 
popular culture on society’s views on issues such as domestic violence. While it is too 
large a question to fully contemplate in this thesis, it is still worth posing. The storyline of 
‘The Archers’ is the ‘systematic undermining of her [Helen’s] personality,’ also referred to 
as the ‘drip drip effect.’626 Importantly, the story avoids the “standard depiction of abuse as 
daily physical violence.”627 While the story aired, the National Domestic Abuse Helpline 
received a 20 percent increase in calls from February 2015-February 2016.628 
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This chapter will offer the outcomes for this research by considering the following findings 
relating to SRW in England and Wales, but also regarding the substantive representation 
more generally, using inferences from this single case study. To reiterate, this thesis 
attempted to evaluate SRW concerning domestic violence legislation in England and 
Wales, by conducting a detailed case study using the critical path framework. As stated in 
Chapter 1, more women entering politics has led to questions regarding so-called 
‘women’s issues’ and whether women make a difference in reference to these issues. This 
thesis sought to move beyond the question of whether women represent women, and 
instead, focused on the representation process as a whole to find out what SRW in the 
context of England and Wales actually means. This approach sought to widen the scope 
and move beyond seeing women as a homogenous group, with uniform interests and 
unvarying political motivations. Given this, the main aims of this thesis were to: 
implement a formalised critical path framework surrounding SRW, use this framework to 
research the impact of SRW on domestic violence legislation in England and Wales, draw 
conclusions on SRW, and expand future knowledge regarding the political representation 
of women, as well as its effects on violence against women legislation. To achieve these 
aims, this thesis considered the following research question: what does SRW mean in 
England and Wales, regarding domestic violence legislation? 
The four cases assessed within the case study were the Crime and Security Act 2010, the 
Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, and the 
Serious Crime Act 2015. The critical path framework was used to answer the following 
seven questions: 1) When does SRW occur; 2) why is SRW attempted; 3) who acts in 
SRW; 4) how is SRW manifested; 5) where does the substantive representation occur; 6) 
in relation to which women is substantive representation expressed; and 7) what policies 
are passed or debated. By using these questions and developing this critical path 
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framework, I am adding to the conversation around SRW. Further, this critical path 
framework allows the researcher to see how various actors, sites, and actions interact 
during the representation process itself. This framework allows a more standardised way to 
evaluate representation and makes it easier to draw comparisons across case studies, 
periods of time, or pieces of legislation. This not only expands the representation process, 
but provides a more systematic and step-by-step means of interrogating the process.  
This framework, and the study of substantive representation in general, includes acts and 
acting for the represented and views representation as a complex structure, rather than a 
linear course of action. Evaluating substantive representation is important, rather than 
simply measuring descriptive representation, because numbers do not equal an 
understanding of behaviour, and why representatives and legislators may attempt to 
represent one group. For example, the concept of critical actors evaluates who the actors 
are, and it brings opportunities for other actors to enter the conversation, such as men, non-
left, or non-feminist actors who claim to act on behalf of women. Additionally, how do 
these actors claim to act for women? What is the interaction between descriptive 
representatives, acts, and actors? This thesis has endeavoured to answer these questions. It 
has also attempted to address various gaps that exist within the literature including how 
domestic violence specifically is represented, as it is not a specific crime; whether party 
allegiances are important to substantive representation; the evaluation of men, non-left, and 
non-feminist actors and the expansion of how sites of representation are explored. Further, 
because WPAs have moved to diversity agencies in England and Wales, how has this 




These four cases have yielded various findings relating to SRW in England and Wales, as 
presented above. In general, some questions from the critical path framework provide more 
insight than others into the representation process. Overall, this thesis contributes to our 
understanding of democracy and policymaking in various ways. In terms of critical actors, 
the results are mixed. Men and women were both observed as critical actors. As stated 
earlier in this thesis, this observation could be because domestic violence has been 
identified as an issue of importance to all actors previously surveyed therefore, this finding 
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may not seem significant in terms of men and women as actors. What is significant about 
this finding however, is the question of what makes SRW different then from other types 
of representation if actors continue to be mostly men, especially in regards to an issue 
where they are not the individuals primarily affected? This question comes back to the 
concern of whether men can substantively represent women, especially on problems where 
experience matters, such as domestic violence. The large-scale conversation regarding 
SRW will continue to show both men and women as critical actors due to the fact that 
currently account for a significantly less amount of MPs than men. This issue could come 
back to the concept of descriptive representation and how any evaluation of the political 
representation of women will include men as the majority of representatives, both 
descriptively and substantively.  
While the four cases within the case study were regarding the same policy area, there are 
further conclusions that can be drawn about substantive representation in England and 
Wales, as well as the study of substantive representation in general. For example, the 
literature examined in Chapter 1 almost exclusively focuses on the House of Commons or 
elected bodies within legislatures and avoids the House of Lords as a representative body. 
Yet, in these four cases specifically, peers held a representative responsibility although 
they were not elected by their constituents. For example, in three of the four cases, the 
amendments for the policies were introduced in the House of Lords, not the House of 
Commons. The Crime and Security Act 2010 was the only example of the amendments 
being introduced in the House of Commons. This is an important finding as it shows that 
while the Commons is often thought of as the representative body, it does not necessarily 
mean that it is always more representative or the leader with regard to issues of public 
importance.  
As stated in Chapter 2, the concept of political time is often understudied within the body 
of work on SRW. However, the concept of political time became important within the case 
study, as legislation was proposed or added in juxtaposition or sequence to either other 
issues or the dissolving of parliament. The concept of political time functions in 
conjunction with the parties in power at the time of legislation. For example, legislators 
pointed to ‘washing up’ as a motivation for passing legislation, showing how parties wish 
to take a political ‘win’ before the next parliament is elected. This was evidenced most 
prominently in the evaluation of the Crime and Security Act 2010 where parliament was 
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dissolving, with the general election to follow a month after the act received Royal Assent. 
The government was also preparing for their new action plan on combating violence 
against women and girls and unquestionably wanted to pass this legislation before both 
events. However, the party in power did not take the lead in initiating these legislative 
changes in three of the four cases. Therefore, party affiliation does not necessarily indicate 
who will act on this issue. Additionally, personal experiences seemed to play an important 
role in either introducing or supporting this legislation, where MPs were contacted by 
constituents or had personal relationships with victim-survivors of violence. These 
experiences and relationships were often spoken of during parliamentary debates, but also 
within speeches and announcements of support for particular legislation. 
The discrepancy between descriptive and substantive representatives is sometimes rectified 
by the party argument where it is argued that while there are differences based on sex, 
party affiliation can make up for this, for example, Labour party members might be more 
inclined to act on various issues than Conservative party members and therefore, having 
Labour members who are men may be more effective than having Conservative members 
who are women. This was not necessarily true for this case study. In the case of the Crime 
and Security Act 2010, the Labour party was in power and did propose the ‘go’ orders. On 
the other hand, the Conservative party was in power for the remaining three cases and did 
not propose the legislation evaluated. The Liberal Democrat party actually took the lead, 
and a member of the Plaid Cymru party, in three of the four cases. There is a suggested 
degree of consensus on this issue between the various parties, although on occasion there is 
a sense of parties claiming for themselves a moral ground by taking ownership of key 
clauses or amendments, such as in the case of Mr. Llwyd during the evaluation of Case 4. 
Therefore, while violence against women and domestic violence was an issue of 
importance to all actors in a previous study described in Chapter 1, the Liberal Democrat 
and Labour parties took the lead in regard to policy development and proposals. While the 
Conservative party supported the measures in general, they were not behind the push for 
legislative change, regardless of their majority in the legislature.  
By employing the critical path framework and identifying critical junctures in each of the 
four cases, regional and international actors were illuminated as important motivations for 
introducing legislation in England and Wales. England and Wales were not leaders in 
regard to legislation on domestic violence, especially prior to these four pieces of 
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legislation. This was evidenced by the UN, representatives, organisations, and individuals 
who debated each issue. In each of the four cases, legislation was influenced by other 
territories’ action on this issue. In Case 1, the critical juncture was initiated by international 
precedent on the issue. This was evidenced in Case 2, Case 3, and Case 4.  
Similar to how international and regional actors played an important role in the foundation 
of the policymaking process on this issue, public consultations functioned as a significant 
step in all four cases, showing the power of public participation in the policymaking 
process. Importantly, victim-survivors were vital actors in this sense. Notably, they are not 
usually considered as actors within the policymaking process, yet they contributed greatly 
to the development of legislation by testifying, campaigning, or participating in 
government consultations. Another actor that played an important role in the policymaking 
process was the WNC in Case 1. While WPA’s were not observed as having a significant 
impact in the other three cases, the WNC played a noteworthy role in the passing of the 
Crime and Security Act 2010. To reiterate, they conducted a series of focus groups in order 
to inform the cross-government consultation about violence against women and girls. 
Under the ‘protection’ theme, one of the recommendations from the WNC was the 
introduction of ‘go’ orders into legislation. Not only did the WNC inform the 
policymaking process, as evaluated as part of the critical path framework, they were able 
to conduct their focus groups with women of various identities including those who 
identified as: 
Black and minority ethnic (BME) women; Traveller women; older women; girls 
and young women; disabled women; transgender women; lesbians; bisexual 
women; asylum seeking women and refugee women; women trafficked into the 
[United Kingdom]; women offenders including women in prison; women in the sex 
industry and in prostitution; ‘vulnerable’ women (survivors of abuse, homeless 
women, women with mental health and substance misuse problems); women from 
rural areas; women night-shift and retail workers; women survivors of rape and 
sexual violence, and women survivors of female genital mutilation.629 
This is significant as it shows the ability of the WNC to not only influence the process of 
formal policymaking, but also the ability to interview and take in the views of various 
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groups of women that may otherwise be silenced. As stated by the WNC, “[w]e were asked 
by the Home Office to run a series of women-only focus groups across England, in 
recognition of the importance of women’s participation in the development of a strategy to 
end violence against women and girls.”630 As is evidenced throughout this thesis, informal 
networks of women, specifically victim-survivors of domestic violence, are able to express 
their positions either online or in person to their respective MPs, in hopes of affecting 
policy change. 
As stated in Chapter 1 of this thesis, WPA’s have transitioned from women’s policy 
agencies to diversity agencies. There have been few reports published on violence against 
women since the WNC merged with other government agencies to create the Government 
Equalities Office (GEO) and there was no mention of WPA’s or diversity agencies after 
this merger that was observed in the case study. This is an important finding because it 
shows that when present, WPA’s play a vital role in connecting together women’s 
movement voices with government. Before their merger with the GEO, the WNC was “the 
independent advisory body on women’s issues in government. The WNC partnership 
[included] over 500 stakeholders from across the [United Kingdom] women’s sector… 
which in turn represents around [eight] million women.”631 Obviously, if they do not exist, 
WPA’s do not play this independent advisory role. What I did find in the other three cases 
without WPA influence was that organisations filled the gap. Therefore, while WPAs were 
absent, some of the stakeholders from across the women’s sector continued to be 
influential and help inform the policy process and use women’s movement goals to affect 
the formal government process.  
Moving forward, WPAs will not likely be re-established in England and Wales, and 
therefore it is important that the women’s sector and various organisations continue to fill 
this gap. A similarity that all four cases hold is that there was some sort of influence over 
government actors’ representation. In all cases, actors pointed to either the WNC’s work 
(in Case 1), or other organisations that had either drawn awareness to an issue, or worked 
in conjunction with the government to address the policy area of domestic violence. For 
example, in Case 2, PAS and NAPO helped to conduct research on both victim-survivors 
and perpetrators regarding stalking and helped to underpin the government’s decision to 
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move forward on stalking law reform. Similarly, in Case 3, Women’s Aid, the National 
Stalking Helpline, and UK Safer Internet Centre had worked on the issue of revenge 
pornography and had the same impact as seen above. In Case 4, the Women’s Coalition in 
Scotland helped the Scottish government address violence against women, which 
eventually led to the critical juncture observed in England and Wales. Interestingly, 
APPG’s also played an important role in perhaps filling the gap left by the transition of 
WPAs to diversity agencies. Unlike WPAs, APPG’s are informal groups within 
parliament, but they are cross-party groups made up of men and women and help to 
‘contribute to the development of policy.’632 Further, there is a specific group for domestic 
violence, of which Women’s Aid participates. Therefore, in cases where a WPA may not 
exist, or does not operate within a specific policy area, APPG’s may be a helpful tool to 
add to the evaluation of representation. Coalitions and women’s organisations and groups 
cannot be underestimated in their influence prior to and during the policymaking process. 
This contributes to our understanding of democracy by furthering the idea presented in this 
case study that the policymaking process is more complex than MPs simply introducing 
and passing legislation. It encompasses a variety of actions, sites, and actors. 
In Chapter 1 of this thesis, feminist theories on violence against women were presented, 
and later used during the analysis of the case study. Feminist theories on violence against 
women underpinned my understanding of the issue in the English and Welsh context by 
carrying the following assumptions, as described in Chapter 1: gender, patriarchy, and 
power are important features that explain men’s violence against women. Matters of 
difference are important features of feminist theory, where race, class, gender, and 
sexuality are experienced differently by individuals within society. This was kept in the 
forefront of my analysis when MPs were specifically discussing victims of violence, and 
whether they positioned these victims along a spectrum of intersectionality. In Chapter 2 of 
this thesis, it was detailed how feminist research methods would be used throughout this 
case study. I was able to conduct feminist research by rejecting the distinction between the 
public and private spheres and pay attention to unequal power relations, relationships, 
marginalization, and positioning myself within the research. I was able to do this while still 
objectively not focusing solely on feminist goals of certain actors. As stated in Chapter 2, 
some political actors may make claims to act on behalf of women, but those claims may 
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not be feminist. My research focused on SRW, and included men in that analysis, and 
therefore the nucleus of analysis concentrated on gender. 
 
By using these theories and research methods to examine the process as well as the actors, 
I found that while MPs were not always framing the issue of domestic violence in 
explicitly feminist terms, they do use often use language that can be attributed to feminist 
theories and that points to feminism as a normative approach to making this issue ‘matter’ 
to their other colleagues. While Westminster is not a venue where feminist values and 
legislation are often drafted, the invocation of feminist language into the debate is a 
significant finding, as it shows the mainstreaming of some feminist ideas, such as coercive 
and controlling behaviour, that may not have been considered before the women’s 
movement and network feminism. This points to how the significance of feminism is 
related to the significance of representation. Both question the status quo, share common 
experiences, engage in collective action and networks, and politicise issues.  
Lastly, in regard to the culture of violence against women described in earlier chapters of 
this thesis, it seems that this issue specifically intersects with politics and politicians in a 
way that often does not directly intersect with male politicians’ lives. This is evidenced by 
way of the murder of Jo Cox in 2016, and how many women MPs became fearful of being 
attacked within their own constituencies, but also about the fear of violence that 
accompanies all women throughout their whole lives. As stated by Krook:  
The assassination of Jo Cox in June 2016… brought this issue into greater focus—
and highlighted that women, in particular, appear to be targeted more often and 
more viciously than their male colleagues. Although there were calls following Jo 
Cox’s death for violent threats towards female MPs to be taken more seriously, 
incidents of online bullying and offline harassment seem—in contrast—to be 
growing more common. Over the past year, numerous MPs have reported online 
rape and death threats, including Jess Phillips, Yvette Cooper, and Anna Soubry.633 
                                                        





This is also demonstrated through George Osborne’s comments on Ms. May, stating that 
“he would not rest until [she] was ‘chopped up in bags in my freezer’.”634 Ms. Creasy, 
Angela Eagle, Diane Abbott, and Luciana Berger have also encountered this type of 
harassment.635 This sort of rhetoric has pressed the Government to conduct a review into 
abuse and intimidation in elections in the United Kingdom. The Cabinet Office stated: 
“The independent committee will look at the nature of the problem of intimidation. … A 
number of candidates have come forward about abuse they experienced during the 
campaign for the 2017 General Election.”636 While the review will not focus solely on 
women, it will undoubtedly be important in adding to the conversation on sexism and 
politics in the United Kingdom.  
In a recent report by Ofsted on domestic violence in the United Kingdom, they stated that 
the Government had failed to devise a long-term strategy to confront the issue. In order to 
combat the issue, a ‘rethink’ must be formulated that acknowledges “sexism and 
inequality, the ‘root causes’ of domestic abuse, must also be tackled in order to mount an 
effective response to the issue.”637 The report further stated that “[p]ower and control are at 
the heart of domestic abuse. We need to tackle the sexism and inequality that are root 
causes of domestic abuse and ensure that perpetrators are held solely accountable for their 
actions.”638 This shows that representatives continue to pass legislation but the culture 
surrounding violence against women continues to be a problem in England and Wales and 
around the world. Representation in this case study may have been generally effective in 
terms of passing legislation, but the culture of violence against women in the United 
Kingdom must be addressed and must be more effective in practice.  
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At the onset of this research, I started with an interest regarding the political representation 
of women. As I read through the literature regarding the topic, I became interested 
specifically in SRW, and how women as a category are represented vis-à-vis their 
representatives. I wanted to move beyond the simple notion of women representing 
women, and ask questions that would add to the conversation surrounding SRW, as well as 
how violence against women is legislated through this representative process. I established 
that the best way to do this was through a comprehensive case study on England and 
Wales. As I began the case study, I found myself overwhelmed by the various ways that 
substantive representation has been investigated. In order to reconcile this challenge, I 
developed a critical path framework as a way to systematically look at the sequence of how 
things happen within the representation process. Borrowing from the project management 
field, the critical path framework helps to identify the activities within the representation 
process that are critical to its success. This framework specifically identifies ‘gendered 
blind spots’ within the discipline by “expanding the range of comparison, as well as 
moving beyond exclusive attention to female legislative behavior, [and] presents an 
opportunity to explore how gendered identities and interests are articulated and advanced 
in politics.”639 Furthermore, this thesis contributes to knowledge in the disciplinary and 
sub-disciplinary areas of: political representation theory and analysis, violence against 
women, and the expansion of knowledge on the United Kingdom, in terms of moving past 
gender quota studies. 
The critical path shows how the questions within this framework are intrinsically linked. 
The critical path framework also increases the ability to trace a variety of occurrences of 
critical junctures, critical actions, critical actors, and critical acts across time periods, 
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legislatures, or policy areas. This is evidenced by comparing the traditional path tables 
versus the critical path framework tables by showing the critical actions that may otherwise 
be missed if only evaluating the Hansard debates. Importantly, this can be expanded to 
other case studies or countries; it is not specific to England and Wales. It can be applied to 
other countries’ issues or legislatures. For example, when considering one policy issue 
across various time periods, this critical path can become increasingly important because 
of the above stated ability to trace this issue, and also bring together a nuanced evaluation 
of this representation. 
This thesis employed a critical path framework to evaluate SRW, regarding domestic 
violence legislation in England and Wales. The evaluation focused on a case study 
assessing four key pieces of legislation: The Crime and Security Act 2010, the Protection 
of Freedoms Act 2012, the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, and the Criminal Justice 
and Courts Act 2015. Within the critical path framework, I synthesised suggested 
questions from various authors in order to add to the conversation regarding substantive 
representation. These questions were: 1) When does SRW occur; 2) why is SRW 
attempted; 3) who acts in SRW; 4) how is SRW manifested; 5) where does the substantive 
representation occur; 6) in relation to which women is substantive representation 
expressed; and 7) what policies are passed or debated. Importantly, the critical path 
framework, combined with these questions help introduce a way to interrogate any 
legislative topic or policy area. This critical path framework contributes to the 
methodological scholarship of SRW by enhancing our ability to do further research and 
expand the future study of representation. This framework increases the knowledge 
regarding SRW and allows a bigger picture of research to be presented. This is important 
because it allows the political and substantive representation of women to be explored 
from a distinctive angle. The research in general benefits from this expansion by allowing 
future research to use these methods and questions in this way. In regard to England and 
Wales, this thesis moves beyond quota studies that have been conducted and identifies the 
varied development within the process in England and Wales.  
Importantly, this framework does not assume who acts on women’s issues, or where SRW 
may occur. Instead, the questions within the framework acknowledge differences between 
women and include men as potential and actual actors.640 Therefore, the framework and 
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questions address the simple question of whether women represent women and aids in 
determining why, how, where, etc. SRW takes place by examining several actors, sites, 
reasons, etc.; not simply what women do (or do not do). In regard to this, “what is missing 
is the broader theoretical framework that shows how a wide range of representative acts 
are related to each other.”641 This thesis sought to do just that by implementing this critical 
path framework and expanding knowledge on how representative actions are 
interconnected not only for this case study, but also for future case studies. 
Through this critical path framework, important findings emerged from the research into 
the SRW in England and Wales. First, critical actors were identified as both men and 
women, from all parties, but organisations, WPAs and APPG’s, and importantly, victim-
survivors played incredible roles in the passing of the above legislation via campaigning, 
activism, and government consultations. Second, the House of Lords played a significant 
representative role within these four cases, despite the fact that the House of Lords is often 
not regarded as a representative body within the literature. Third, the sites that were 
observed during the critical path framework varied greatly as far as representation taking 
place outside of parliament, and also pointed to international influences in each of the four 
cases. Lastly, political time emerged as important concept as it was pointed to numerous 
times throughout the case study. These findings show that when utilising the critical path 
framework, researchers are able to draw conclusions across various pieces of legislation, as 
in this case, that would possibly be buried in instances where the critical path is not used. 
To conclude, the development of this framework contributes to the research and literature 
surrounding the political representation of women, as well as aiding in the transition from 
traditional questions to more inclusive questions regarding gender and representation. 
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